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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers on the economics of public policy. The first chapter of 
the thesis provides a selective overview of the existing political economy literature. The second 
chapter analyzes the relationship between the political representation afforded to members of 
a disadvantaged population group and public policies. The starting point of the analysis is 
the observation that disadvantaged groups tend also to constitute population minorities. The 
chapter examines the success of an electoral law which enhances the political power of a mi­
nority group by reserving seats for them in legislatures in promoting minority interests. It 
develops a theoretical model of the political process to analyze the policy impact of such a law. 
It also takes advantage of the existence of such a law in India to empirically test this prediction. 
Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis turn to an analysis of the relationship between the control rights 
given to a government and policy outcomes. Chapter 3 examines the relationship between a 
government’s redistributive preference and its ability to provide a public good- information. To 
do so, it develops a model in which a group of heterogenous individuals have to make private 
investment and labour supply decisions while relying on the government for information about 
investment returns. The government consists of an elected citizen who chooses a redistributive 
strategy in addition to providing information. The chapter identifies reasons why redistributive 
motives may limit the possibility of credible information transmission by elected governments 
and lead to under-exploitation of profitable investment opportunities. Chapter 4 of the thesis 
turns to an analysis of some of the economic and political determinants of industrialisation in 
underdeveloped agrarian economies. It develops a simple model of an economy in which indus­
trialisation may be inhibited by an investment co-ordination failure amongst landowners. It 
then examines the possibility of government-led coordination of investment activity. The chap­
ter identifies reasons why the possibility of successful coordination of investment activity on the 
part of elected governments is sensitive both to the economy’s underlying income distribution 
and to the set of policy instruments available to the government.
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C hapter 1
Introduction
In the idealised world of traditional public economics government interventions in public policy 
are prompted only by a desire to implement an optimal welfare outcome. In the real world, 
this clearly doesn’t happen. This is because elected policy-makers don’t make public policy 
decisions only on the basis of some given social welfare function. Instead, a policy-maker 
operates in a complicated market where in choosing a public policy intervention she seeks to 
maximise the welfare of different voter groups, her own party’s interest and her own policy 
preferences. As with any other economic market, the relationship between the potentially 
diverse policy interests of these groups and observed policies depends crucially on the form of 
existing political institutions and the identity of participants in the political process.
However, until recently analyses of the political process were rare in mainstream economics. 
This lacuna was particularly glaring given economists’ preoccupation with questions such as 
the design of policies which increase growth, and the design of policies to alleviate mass poverty 
and improve individual well-being.
This thesis seeks to provide an economic analysis of some elements of the political process, 
with a specific emphasis on development. The key argument put forward is that an under­
standing of the policy formation process is necessary for the design of effective policies. To 
this end, the thesis examines three different types of policy interventions. Whilst the economic 
environments considered differ, the focus throughout is on the relationship that citizen identity 
and political institutions bear to the choice and implications of policy interventions. This focus 
also guides the structure of the introduction.
1.1 The Economics of Public Policy
There exists a long tradition in public economics of considering the appropriate choice of pub­
lic policy intervention as that which maximises some given social welfare function (Atkinson 
and Stiglitz 1980). According to this view, governments are best seen as social planners who 
implement this policy choice.
However, since Arrow’s impossibility theorem, it is well known that it is difficult to reconcile 
this view of the policy formation process with equilibrium outcomes delivered by positive models 
of the political process. Arrow (1963) showed that, in general, it is not possible to write down 
an aggregation rule which is defined for all possible individual preferences, satisfies certain 
basic assumptions on the mapping from individual and social preferences and yields Pareto 
optimal policy choices. In other words it is not possible to write down models of the political 
process which are able to identify feasible policy interventions while respecting all citizens’ 
policy preferences.
This suggests that a more promising avenue of research is to instead write down economic 
models of the political process which relate to observed political institutions. The efficiency 
and equity properties of observed policy choices can then be related to the assumptions on 
the primitives of the model. This is the approach adopted by most recent political economy 
models1, and also in this thesis. In general, the key assumptions made in such political economy 
models are assumptions regarding the preferences of participants in the political process and 
the form that political institutions take.
This section provides a brief and selective overview of recent political economy research. In 
doing so, it seeks to provide the reader an introduction to the economic issues which are then 
taken up by the body of the thesis.
1.1.1 G overn m ent id en tity
In every country the government is responsible for defining and enforcing the basic rules which 
govern the functioning of the economy. However, the processes by which the individuals (policy­
makers) who make up the government are selected, and the policy-making powers that they
:For recent overviews of this literature see Persson and Tabellini 1999, and Besley and Coate 1998b.
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enjoy vary greatly across countries.
Variations in the type of political process is particularly marked for the set of developing 
countries. This has given rise to a literature which has tried to link the presence of democratic 
systems of governance (or dictatorships) to a country’s stage of development. However, at­
tempts to obtain empirical evidence on this relationship have been extremely unsatisfactory- 
in the main because changes in political regime are usually endogenous (for a review of this 
literature, see Przeworski and Limongi 1993). Recognition of this fact has led economists to 
instead focus more attention on the theoretical and empirical relationship between the different 
political institutions that typify a given political regime and observed economic outcomes. This 
thesis (and the rest of the literature review) follows this approach and focus on representative 
democracies.
In representative democracies the norm is that citizens elect politicians who are then re­
sponsible for policy implementation. In so far as citizens care about policy outcomes they 
will condition their vote on the policies associated with alternative candidates. Therefore, in 
analysing the policy formation process a first issue of interest is - what determines the policies 
associated with competing electoral candidates?
An early economic analysis of this issue was provided by Downs2 (1957). Downs analysed 
electoral competition between two candidates in a world in which citizens have one dimen­
sional policy preferences. His key finding was that if candidates only care about winning and 
can commit to policy outcomes prior to election, then in the ensuing political equilibrium 
both candidates will offer the same set of policies. Further, the policy outcome selected will 
be the median voter’s preferred policy.3 A number of authors (e.g. Grandmont 1978) have 
generalised this result to economic environments with multi-dimensional policy-making. With 
multi-dimensional policy-making the counterpart of the median voter’s preferred policy is the 
policy vector which beats all others in pair wise competition (i.e. the policy which constitutes 
the Condorcet winner)4.
2Hotelling (1927) also discussed a similar model.
3This as the median voter’s preferred policy beats all other policies in pairwise competition. Gans and Smart 
(1996) provide a general characterisation of the conditions necessary for this result to hold in a one-dimensional 
environment.
4 Often such a policy vector (i.e. a Condorcet winner) may fail to exist. Such a situation arises whenever 
the losing candidate (party) can always affect the electoral outcome by changing her policy stance on some
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The median voter approach to political economy has won many followers. In particular, 
the simplicity of the result makes it an attractive method of endogenising policy formation in 
different economic environments. However, the main problem with the median voter theorem is 
the lack of empirical support for its predictions. In particular, public finance and electoral data 
from most countries allow a conclusive rejection of the twin predictions of the median voter 
theorem. In reality candidates (parties) do not exhibit policy convergence, and the policies they 
choose tend to differ systematically from the median voter’s preferences (Caillaud and Tirole 
1998).
Instead, a large body of empirical papers testifies to the fact that variables such as candidate 
‘ideology’ are a key determinant of observed policy outcomes (Kalt and Zupan 1985, Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997 and Levitt 1996). In general, these papers proceed by identifying empirical 
measures of ideology, and then regressing a legislator’s voting decisions on her ideology. Even 
after controlling for the median voter’s influence on legislator ideology, they find a strong 
influence of personal ideology on voting decisions. This literature has, however, remained 
basically atheoretical as to where the ideology comes from. For instance, for the US the usual 
ideology measure is the rating of legislators published by some ideological interest group such 
as Americans for Democratic Action. These ratings axe just weighted sums of roll call voting 
decisions.
In trying to understand why the data does not support the median voter theorem, economists 
have paid much attention to two assumptions which underlie Downs’ model of the economic 
process. First, that competing candidates only have electoral preferences and second, that 
candidates are able to fully commit to policies at the election campaign stage.
A number of authors (examples include Wittman 1977 and Roemer 1994) have considered 
models in which politicians have policy preferences, and can commit to policies at the campaign 
stage. However, even if candidates have differing policy preferences the ensuing political equi­
librium may still be characterised by policy convergence. The reason is that as candidates care 
about implemented (rather than announced) policies, their policy choices will continue to reflect 
electoral concerns. This is due to the fact that each candidate experiences a discontinuous rise
dimension of policymaking. Recent game theoretic models of policymaking have made some progress in resolving 
such indeterminacy by considering the set of mixed strategy equilibria (Besley and Coate 1998c). In finite games 
mixed strategy equilibria always exist.
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in her expected utility when she shifts from losing to winning (or equivalently, from tying for 
first position to winning). Therefore, policy convergence can persist even when candidates have 
policy preferences.
A different approach taken up in some recent political economy research (Alesina 1988; 
Besley and Coate 1997) is to also relax the assumption that candidates can fully commit to 
policies at the election stage. This thesis adopts this approach to policy analysis. That is, 
throughout it analyses situations in which candidates cannot credibly commit to policies dif­
ferent from their most preferred ones.
In most countries, citizens elect representatives for relatively long periods of time (the usual 
election cycle in most democracies is 4-5 years). It is, therefore, very unlikely that during elec­
tion campaigns politicians and voters will be able to agree upon a full set of state contingent 
contracts which cover all possible economic situations (for a discussion of the incomplete con­
tracting approach to political constitutions, see Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1997). Contrac­
tual incompleteness at the election stage implies that elected representatives enjoy considerable 
flexibility in making policy. Indirect evidence in support of this view is provided by Levitt 
(1996). Levitt shows that in the US the policy weight legislators attach to voter preferences 
exhibits sharp variation over the electoral cycle.
One reason for why politicians and citizens are, in general, unable to write down a full set 
of state contingent contracts is the lack of institutions capable of enforcing campaign promises. 
In this context it is worth noting that the legal enforcement of campaign promises is non­
existent in most countries. For instance, US courts have tended to disfavour any restrictions on 
campaign speech as potential First Amendment violations (i.e. violating an individual’s right 
to free speech) (Sencer 1991). While repeat elections may go someway towards reducing this 
problem of enforcement, Alesina (1988) showed that candidates’ discount rate must be very low 
if full policy commitment is to be sustained as an equilibrium outcome in a dynamic setting 
(with repeat elections).
Other reasons for the observed lack of a full set of state contingent policy contracts include 
citizens’ inability to foresee contingencies and the expense of full description. An interesting 
alternative explanation which hasn’t yet been explored in the literature is that complete con­
tracting over policies may be incompatible with satisfying a politician’s incentive compatibility
12
constraints. Therefore, incomplete contracting may be ex ante efficient even though ex post it 
often leads to inefficient outcomes.5
In the absence of policy commitment, an elected representative will always have an incentive 
to implement her most preferred policy. If voters are rational then they will take account of this 
incentive in selecting amongst candidates. Hence, in general the only time consistent equilibrium 
is one in which candidates follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect 
this outcome. In such situations policy convergence need not result. Such an approach raises 
the key modelling question of determines candidates’ policy preferences.
In the existing literature one can distinguish two answers to this question. The first is 
to distinguish ex ante between the set of candidates (or parties) and citizens. Preferences 
for politicians and citizens are defined separately (Grossman and Helpman 1996; Dixit and 
Londegran 1995). In these models some reasons why candidate policy preferences differ from 
those of citizens may be that candidates receive pure rents from holding office, and/or that 
they have fixed (ideological) policy preferences regarding some dimensions of policy-making. 
This approach has proved useful in analysing political agency models and multidimensional 
models of policy analysis (postulating fixed policy preferences for candidates helps avoid the 
problem of the possible nonexistence of a policy vector which constitutes a Condorcet winner). 
However, such models provide an unsatisfactory depiction of the functioning of representative 
democracies where candidates are citizens who choose to stand for election.
This observation motivates the second approach - the ‘citizen candidate’ models of policy­
making (Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and Coate 1997). These models assume that 
candidates are drawn from the set of citizens. Hence, ex ante the preference distribution 
amongst candidates and citizens is identical. 6
As this thesis is concerned with policy-making in representative democracies the citizen 
candidate approach to policy-making is used throughout. That is, it is assumed that the set 
of potential candidates and the set of citizens coincide. However, in most countries it is some 
subset of the general citizen population which chooses to stand for election. Therefore, regarding
5 On a related note, Aghion and Bolton (1998) consider how incomplete information about the future may 
affect the optimal choice of voting rules at a constitution design stage. They show why ex ante efficiency 
considerations may lead to constitution designers optimally choosing majority rule (rather than unanimity) as 
the basis for future decisions.
6 A drawback with this approach is that it usually leads to the existence of multiple political equilibria.
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the entry of citizens as candidates the thesis considers two different cases - (i)the case where 
candidate entry is mediated by parties and (ii) the case where all citizens may enter, and face 
a common (small) entry cost.
1.1 .2  C itizen  Id en tity
A necessary condition for a non-trivial model of the policy formation process is heterogeneity in 
citizens policy preferences. One way of introducing such heterogeneity is to abstract from the 
details of the economic environment and simply postulate a spatial characterisation of citizens’ 
preferences. That is, policies are points on a real line and citizens’ differ with respect to their 
ideal policy outcome (see Osborne 1995 for a literature review of spatial models of policy­
making). Whilst a useful way of analysing voting behaviour, this approach is unable to shed 
much light on the economic determinants of policy formation. Further, the lack of economic 
underpinnings for the individual preferences postulated implies that it is difficult to undertake 
any kind of efficiency analysis with such models.
Therefore, recent political economy models have instead focussed on economic environments 
in which citizen heterogeneity derives from differences in their economic characteristics. This 
approach brings the relationship between citizens’ economic identity and policy preferences to 
the centre stage.
Seminal work on analysing this relationship was undertaken by Roberts (1977) (and subse­
quently, by Meltzer and Richards 1981). Roberts demonstrated that the median voter theorem 
can be derived as the equilibrium policy outcome of an economic model in which voters redis­
tributive preferences were monotonically related to their productivity (and thereby, income), 
and policy making occurred on a single dimension (income). While Roberts considered the 
case where citizens directly vote over redistribution the same outcome can be sustained in a 
representative democracy in which politicians can commit to policies before the election.
Besley and Coate (1997) extended this result to a world without policy commitment. They 
showed that if certain conditions on the entry stage equilibrium were fulfilled then the median 
voter’s preferred policy outcome would be chosen in the ensuing equilibrium. However, the me­
chanics by which this policy outcome is implemented differs from Roberts (1977). Specifically, 
as candidates cannot commit to policies the elected policy-maker will always implement her pre­
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ferred policies. Therefore, citizens condition their vote on candidate identity. Hence it is via the 
election of the candidate who shares the median voter’s identity (and thereby her preferences) 
that the median voter’s preferred policies are implemented in the political equilibrium.
Much of the existing political economy research in this area has focussed on analyses of 
income based redistribution programmes. Therefore, both in modelling citizens’ policy pref­
erences and in characterising the political equilibrium these papers have tended to focus on 
the relationship between citizens’ income identities and policy outcomes. Whilst such research 
has yielded important insights on the functioning of the policy formation process it is widely 
acknowledged that such a focus cannot provide a complete explanation of observed policy out­
comes.
For example, an important stylised feature of many democracies has been the growth of 
government expenditure since the second world war (Meltzer and Richard 1981). However, 
empirical analysis shows that the cross-country correlation between increases in the size of the 
government and changes in the income distribution is low (Persson and Tabellini 1999). One 
reason for this low correlation is that the fastest growing transfers in most democratic countries 
axe those which target citizens on the basis of their non-income identities. Examples of such 
transfers include pension schemes and medical schemes.
This suggests that for a full understanding of the policy formation process it is important to 
examine the relationship between both income and non-income aspects of citizen and candidate 
identity, and policy outcomes. The case for such research is particularly strong in situations 
where candidates cannot commit to policies during elections. In the absence of citizens and 
politicians being able to write down a full set of state contingent policy contracts, candidate 
identity can be approximated as a form of policy commitment.7
In so far as candidate identity is determined by citizens’ voting decisions, this argument sug­
gests that observed policy choices should be sensitive to changes in the distribution of population 
measured along both income and non-income dimensions. Evidence in support of the latter the­
sis (i.e. that citizens’ non-income identities wield an important influence on policy-making) is
7 One illustration of this was offered during the 1997 debate in the British parliament over the lowering of age 
of consent for homosexuals. During this period a number of gay activist groups followed an aggressive campaign 
of ‘outing’ gay politicians. The proffered reason was that if a parliamentarian’s public identity was known to be 
gay, then he was unlikely to vote ‘anti-gay’. Clearly, the underlying this campaign was a belief that a candidate’s 
identity is informative of his policy preferences.
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provided by some recent empirical papers. Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly (1997) examine the relationship between ethnic diversity, public good provision and 
economic growth.8 They provide evidence (cross country and for US states respectively) that 
even after controlling for an individual’s income identity the ethnic composition of the popula­
tion exerts a significant influence on policy outcomes. Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that 
this provides one explanation for Africa’s growth tragedy. Microeconomic evidence suggesting 
that ethnic diversity has affected the levels of school funding in rural Kenyan schools is provided 
by Miguel (1999).
However, theoretical and empirical work in this area is still at an early stage. In particular, 
there is a paucity of good political economy models that identify the channels through which 
ethnic diversity influences the provision of public goods.9 For example, it is still not well 
understand whether ethnicity affects policy outcomes by directly influencing voters’ policy 
preferences, by affecting their ability to agree upon the level of provision of a public good 
or by influencing the delivery of public goods to members of different ethnic groups.
Until now, the discussion of policy making has been institution free. However, it is clear 
that the form of political institutions adopted by a country will affect the way in which the 
political process aggregates multiple and often conflicting voter policy interests. This is the 
issue to which this chapter now turns.
1.1 .3  P o litica l In stitu tio n s
The political institutions of a representative democracy consist of the political positions (offices) 
that candidates vie for, the control rights associated with these offices and the procedures by 
which candidates may seek election to these offices. This literature review focuses on the set of 
political institutions which are usually provided for in a country’s constitution. Other political
8 In general, there is no single agreed upon definition of ethnicity in the economics literature. The usual 
presumption is that ethnicity is connected to birth and blood (kinship ties), but not absolutely so. As a result, 
in general the literature varies in defining ethnicity on tribal, racial, linguistic and religous grounds (Horowitz 
1985).
9Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1997) develop a model in which a citizen’s ethnicity describes her public good 
preferences. Ethnic groups differ in their public good preference. They show that with sequential voting over 
amount and kind of public good provision - that is, citizens first vote over amount of redistribution and then 
kind of redistribution, the extent of redistribution and therefore public good provision is negatively related to 
extent of ethnic diversity.
16
institutions which influence the functioning of the political process include political parties and 
organised special interest groups (such as political lobbies).
Much of the early research on the form of political institutions and their influence on policy 
outcomes was undertaken by social choice theorists. This literature mainly focussed on norma­
tive analyses of the functioning of political institutions (see Myerson 1995 for an overview). In 
doing so, it provided important insights as to the relative worth of different political institu­
tions in aggregating votes, and in providing various demographic groups political representa­
tion. However, it failed to shed much light on the relationship between the choice of political 
institutions and observed policy outcomes.
This latter issue has been the focus of some recent political economy research10. This 
subsection reviews this literature. As research by economists on political institutions is in early 
stages the literature review also draws upon the existing political science literature. The review 
proceeds as follows. First the economics of political institutions which govern the selection 
and election of candidates is reviewed. The review then discusses political institutions which 
influence the functioning of legislatures. Finally, it turn to the relationship between the control 
rights given to politicians and observed policy outcomes.
Entry stage
It is possible to identify at least two related sets of electoral laws which influence the selection 
and election of candidates in a representative democracy. The first is the (re)districting rules 
adopted by a country or region. These are the rules that govern the drawing of jurisdiction 
boundaries within a region or country. (Re)districting rules are crucial in mediating the extent 
of constituent diversity both across and within districts. This feature of districting rules has 
both been recognised, and exploited by policy-makers to serve specific purposes. For example, 
in the 1980s districting rules were used in US to create majority-minority districts (on this, 
see Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996). The explicit aim of these rules was to increase 
minority representation in legislatures.
An early literature on distributional politics in economics demonstrated that there axe in­
herent fiscal inefficiencies associated with dividing up an economy into disjoint electoral districts
10Persson and Tabellini (1999) describe this area of research as comparative politics.
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(Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson 1981). The reason for this is that policy benefits are often dis­
trict specific while costs are shared by all districts. Therefore, citizens and politicians are prone 
to over-expenditure on district specific transfers. While these models predict that the extent 
of this fiscal inefficiency is likely to increase as the extent of (preference) heterogeneity across 
districts increases, the existing models of such distributional politics (often termed pork barrel 
politics) tend to take the size and demographic composition of jurisdictions as given. How­
ever, as is clear from the US experience with gerrymandering, electoral laws of (re)districting 
influence both the extent of inter and intra jurisdiction diversity. Therefore, we should expect 
policy outcomes to be sensitive to the districting rules adopted by a country or region.
Empirical work in this area is very limited. Some evidence from US states in support 
of this hypothesis is presented in Crain (1998). Using state legislature data Crain shows that 
changes in the demographic characteristics of jurisdictions due to redistricting have affected the 
provision of public goods across US states. However, this evidence is weakened by the fact the 
analysis fails to take account of the obvious endogeneity of districting rules in the US. It is clear 
from recent political science papers (Gelman and King 1994) that in the US (as in many other 
countries) political parties have tended to view redistricting as a means of increasing partisan 
advantage. Therefore, in order to correctly estimate the impact of changes in districting rules 
on observed policy outcomes we would want to use both data on (re)districting and public 
finance data to simultaneously examine the political motivations for redistricting and its policy 
effects.
The second set of electoral rules which influence candidate election are the laws which 
govern vote aggregation. These rules divide into two groups - those that determine the winning 
candidates identity, and those that determine the number of representatives elected from an 
electoral district.
Most democratic countries have adopted either a plurality (first past the post) rule or a 
proportional representation rule. Under plurality voting each voter can give one vote to only 
one candidate, and the candidate with the most votes wins. In contrast, in most proportional 
representation systems each voter gives one vote for one party with seats allocated to parties 
in proportion to their votes. Variations in this basic rule exist depending on what mapping 
between the vote distribution and the number of seats to be filled is adopted, and how the
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identity of candidates in a party list relates to those chosen to be legislators (Myerson 1995).
Countries also vary in whether the electoral districts in the country are single or multi- 
member districts. Both types of electoral districts tend to be characterised by winner take all 
elections. The difference is that in single member elections the top vote receiver is declared as 
elected, while in multi member districts the top x  vote receivers are (where x  > 1).
There exists some empirical evidence suggesting that the extent of political representation 
afforded to members of different demographic groups is sensitive to a country’s choice of elec­
toral rules. For example, simple cross country correlations show that party list/proportional 
representation system results in higher female parliamentary representation than under plural­
ity rule. Therefore, in 1987 the proportion of female representatives in Scandinavian countries 
such as Sweden, Norway and Finland was over 30 percent, while in the US and UK it was less 
than 7 percent. (Rule and Zimmerman 1992).
The evidence is less clear in the case of single versus multi member districts. In so far 
as multi-member districts tend to be geographically larger minority voting strength is often 
diluted. This would suggest that single member districts should do better in ensuring minority 
representation. However, electoral data shows that more women tend to be nominated and 
elected in district with more representatives per district. This effect is strengthened if multi­
member districting is combined with citizens being able to cast multiple votes (Gerber, Morton 
and Reitz 1998).
Recent policy developments and academic research have underscored the need for further 
research in this area. Unhappy with the current representation afforded to women, a number of 
countries (these include Argentina and France) have passed legislation which seek to increase 
the political representation afforded to women. There is also a recent empirical political econ­
omy research which analyses the relationship between legislator’s identity and policy outcomes 
(chapter 2 of this thesis; Besley and Case 1997). These papers find that legislators’ ethnic 
and/or gender identities has a significant effect on policy outcomes. Such findings suggest 
that it is important to examine whether a country’s choice of election rules influences policy 
outcomes by affecting the elected policy-maker’s identity (for the reasons discussed above).11
11 In this context its worth noting that there exists an empirical literature analysing credit (and other transfer) 
programmes. Papers in this literature find that the gender identity of transfer recipient affects subsequent
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Legislature rules
In a multi-jurisdictional world observed policy outcomes also depend on the rules which 
govern the post election bargaining game amongst elected representatives in the legislature. 
One factor which influences the form of this bargaining game is whether a country has chosen 
to adopt a Parliamentary or a Presidential form of legislature. In a Parliamentary form of 
governance the chief executive is elected by the parliament. In contrast, in a Presidential 
system there is an independently elected chief executive.
Relative to Parliamentary systems of governance, Presidential forms of legislature are asso­
ciated with greater separation of powers between members of the legislature (Persson, Roland 
and Tabellini 1997). In such systems legislative committees wield great policy influence. There­
fore, individual legislators have relatively wide ranging policy influence in legislatures. In sharp 
contrast Parliamentary systems tend to be marked by greater legislative cohesion (Diermier and 
Feddersen 1998). This is as the chief executive needs the support of the majority. Therefore, 
policy-making in these environments tends to be characterised by majority party rule.
Empirical evidence suggests that these features of the legislature influence the form and ex­
tent of policy bargaining in the legislature. Persson and Tabellini (1999) exploit the existence of 
cross country variation in the choice of electoral and legislative rules to examine the relationship 
between a country’s choice of political institutions and public finance outcomes. They find ro­
bust evidence that Presidential systems of governance are associated with a smaller government. 
They attribute it to the greater separation of powers observed in Presidential systems.
Their analysis while informative is a very reduced form estimation of the impact of a political 
institution on policy outcomes and leaves scope for further research. For instance, Chari, 
Jones and Marimon (1997) develop a model to show that Presidential forms of governance 
are associated with split ticket voting, wherein citizens elect fiscally liberal representatives 
and conservative Presidents. It would be interesting to empirically examine whether difference 
in voting patterns across Presidential and Parliamentary systems contribute to the observed 
difference in expenditure patterns.
Policy set
expenditure patterns.
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An elected politician’s ability to influence economic outcomes ultimately derives from the set 
of policy interventions available to her. In general, it is possible to distinguish between two broad 
categories of policy interventions that most governments undertake. First, policy interventions 
which seek to establish and enforce the institutions (and rules) that govern the functioning of 
economic markets. Examples include country-level policy decisions regarding the international 
trade (Bagwell and Staiger 1999), provisions for bankruptcy (White 1998), and policies defining 
property rights (Besley and Burgess 1998). The second set of policy interventions are those 
which directly influence economic activity within a given set of institutions. Clearly, all fiscal 
policy interventions fall in this category.
The use of both kinds of policies has the potential to affect individual well-being and ag­
gregate economic outcomes. By now, there exists a large body of political economy literature 
examining this relationship. On the theoretical front, this literature has contributed to an 
understanding of how the form and influence of policy interventions varies across different eco­
nomic environments. Empirically, the literature has made two main contributions. First, it 
has identified a set of reasons why policy outcomes are endogenous to the functioning of an 
economy. This has led to a general acceptance of the view that empirical analyses of policy 
incidence which simply include observed policy outcomes as left hand side variables will often 
give biased results. Second, it has provided important insights on how information about the 
functioning of political institutions may be used to find appropriate instrumental variables for 
policy outcomes.
However, the avenues of research in this area are far from exhausted. For example, a 
continuing puzzle in political economics remains the large cross section variation in observed 
political institutions combined with low time series variation. While it is clear that the status 
quo political institutions create vested interests we know little about how this affects their 
change over time (for some work on this issue, see Aghion and Bolton 1998).
1.2 Thesis Outline
This chapter has provided an introduction to some of the themes which are taken up by the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. The remainder of this thesis provides an economic analysis
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of three different policy interventions. Whilst the economic environments considered differ, the 
modelling of the political process remains constant. That is, throughout the citizen candidate 
approach to policy-making is adopted. The two key components of this approach are that 
candidates are selected from the set of citizens, and that ex ante policy commitment on the 
part of candidates is not possible.
The thesis contributes to two areas of ongoing research in political economy. The first is 
the relationship between a country’s choice of political institutions and policy outcomes. This 
forms the focus of the research reported in chapter 2. The second is the relationship between the 
set of feasible policies available to a government and observed policy outcomes. Two different 
aspects of this relationship are analysed in chapters 3 and 4.
I conclude this introduction by providing a more detailed summary of these chapters.
Chapter 2 of the thesis examines the policy influence of an electoral law which guarantees 
minorities representation. The starting point of the chapter is the observation that in most 
democracies disadvantaged groups tend also to be politically under-represented. One conse­
quence of this is that the policies implemented by electorally accountable governments often 
fail to reflect minority interests. A policy solution is to enhance the political power of minority 
groups. The chapter analyzes the success of an electoral law, which does this by reserving 
seats for minority groups in legislatures, in promoting minority interests. The chapter develops 
a theoretical model of the political process to analyze the policy impact of such a law. The 
key theoretical assumption, that candidates cannot commit to policies, implies that identity is 
relevant to policy choices. The chapter identifies economic reasons why this may lead parties 
to never field minority candidates. In such cases the model predicts that an electoral law of 
political reservation will influence policies. I then take advantage of the existence of such a law 
in India to test this prediction empirically. The principal finding is that minority representation 
has increased transfers to minorities. More generally, the results indicate that legislator identity 
influences policies, and provide some support for the contention that politicians cannot fully 
commit to policies.
Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis turn to an analysis of the relationship between the control 
rights given to a government and policy outcomes.
One of basic tenets of public economics is that pure public goods should be provided by
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governments. Provision of information of common interest to citizens, such as investment 
relevant information, seem like a clear cut application of this principle. Chapter 3 (which is 
joint research with Tim Besley) studies the possibility of credible information transmission 
by governments. To do so, it develops a model in which a group of heterogenous individuals 
have to make private investment and labour supply decisions while relying on the government 
for information about investment returns. The government consists of an elected citizen who 
chooses a redistributive strategy in addition to providing information. The chapter identifies 
reasons why such multi-tasking on part of the government may lead to inefficient outcomes. In 
particular, the chapter identifies conditions under which a government’s redistributive motives 
may limit its ability to provide information. This, in turn, may lead to over- or under-investment 
in high return activities.
Chapter 4 of the thesis turns to an analysis of the economic and political determinants of 
industrialisation in underdeveloped agrarian economies. It is widely accepted that sustained 
growth in the output of an economy is generally accompanied by marked structural changes in 
the shares of agriculture and industry. Understanding the economic and political determinants 
of such structural transformations lies at the heart of development economics. These issues form 
the subject matter of this chapter. The chapter first provides a set of conditions under which 
industrialisation may be inhibited by an investment coordination failure amongst landowners in 
the agrarian sector. It then provides an analysis of the welfare economics and political economy 
of co ordination. Government led coordination of investment activity is shown to be associated 
with a Pareto superior outcome in equal societies. However, in unequal societies the success of 
coordination programmes depends crucially on the initial conditions in the economy and the 
policy intervention considered.
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C hapter 2
M inority R epresentation and Policy  
Choices: T he Significance o f 
Legislator Identity
2.1 Introduction
Economists have identified important equity and efficiency reasons for targeting resources at 
historically disadvantaged groups. However, as these groups often constitute population minori­
ties, there is no guarantee that electorally accountable governments will enact such transfers. 
A policy solution is to enhance the political power of disadvantaged groups as a vehicle for 
promoting their policy interests. Such considerations have led a number of countries to put in 
place electoral laws that aim to provide minorities political power through increased political 
representation. This chapter takes advantage of an unique experiment of this form in India to 
examine the role of an electoral law that influences legislator identity in promoting minority 
interests.
Whilst a substantial political science literature analyzes the role of political representation 
as a policy response1 , there is very little in the economics literature on this topic. Yet the issues
xThe political science literature distinguishes between descriptive representation which relates to how well 
the electoral system reflects the electorate’s demographic characteristics and substantive representation which 
identifies how well it reflects their policy interests (Pitkin 1967, Guiner 1994). This chapter focuses on the role of
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concerned axe of central importance to economists interested in policy analysis. Recent research 
in political economy has identified significant reasons why political markets may fail to deliver 
desirable policy outcomes— one such reason being the form of political institutions (Besley and 
Coate 1999, and Persson and Tabellini 1998). Such research suggests that an understanding of 
the relationship between a country’s choice of political institutions and observed policy outcomes 
is key to the design of effective public policies.
This is particularly true in the case of developing countries. Post colonialism, a majority 
of these countries adopted new constitutions. Often these constitutions marked a sharp change 
from the traditional forms of governance in these countries (Horowitz 1995). Since then, these 
countries have exhibited sharp variations in both policy choices and subsequent economic per­
formance. A number of authors have attributed this to the varying success of the countries’ 
political institutions in aggregating multiple, and often conflicting policy interests (Easterly 
and Levine 1997). However, no systematic economic analyses of this phenomenon exists.
This chapter undertakes such an analysis in the context of a prominent developing country— 
India, and a specific political institution— electoral laws for political representation. It examines 
how a country’s choice of electoral laws, by affecting the extent of representation afforded to 
minorities, influences policy outcomes.
In general, electoral laws for political representation work either by altering voter composi­
tion (gerrymandering in the US), or by directly affecting legislator identity (political reservation 
in India). This chapter focuses on the latter set of laws. A large political science literature 
documents the fact that most electoral laws for minority representation have been successful in 
increasing minority presence in legislatures (Grofman and Lijphart 1994). However, much less is 
known about the relationship between increased minority representation and policy outcomes. 
Analyzing the policy influence of electoral laws that directly alter legislator identity provides a 
clear examination of this relationship. Further, the existence of such an electoral law in India 
makes it is possible to examine the quantitative importance of this relationship.
One important reason why electoral laws that only influence legislator identity may not 
influence policies is the possibility of ex ante policy commitment by politicians. A number of
electoral laws in influencing policies i.e. in providing substantive representation. Related political science papers 
include Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996) and Gerber, Morton and Reitz (1998).
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political economy papers argue that if politicians can commit to policies during the election 
campaign then electoral incentives will cause candidates to commit to policy vector preferred 
by a majority of voters2 (a classic statement of this proposition is the median voter theorem 3). 
As policy outcomes in these models are fully determined by the electorate’s demographic com­
position these models predict that any electoral law which leaves the demographic composition 
of the electorate unaffected will not alter policy outcomes4.
However, in many situations full policy commitment on the part of politicians is not feasi­
ble. Reasons for this include politicians and voters inability to write down a full set of state 
contingent policy contracts prior to election, and/or the lack of institutions that can enforce 
campaign promises. A number of recent papers show that in such cases policy choices are 
sensitive to legislator policy preferences - on this, see Alesina (1988), Osborne and Slivinski
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). In so far as a legislator’s ethnic identity is informative 
of her policy preferences these models predict that an electoral law which increases minority 
representation in legislatures will affect policy outcomes
This chapter develops a theoretical model of the political process to precisely identify this 
channel of influence. The model assumes that citizens have both an income and an ethnic 
identity. Parties compete in the political process by fielding candidates. The elected legislators 
select the levels of income transfers which may target citizens on the basis of their income and 
(or) ethnic identity. The model is used to identify the relationship between a country’s choice of 
political institutions and the extent of policy representation afforded to a minority.5 The model 
predicts that in situations of minority under-representation the introduction of an electoral law 
of political reservation will alter both legislator identity and policy outcomes. Further, this 
policy influence will mainly take the form of increased targeted transfers.
These theoretical predictions rely heavily on the assumption that politicians cannot commit
2 Formally, the candidates will commit to the the policy vector that beats all others policies in pairwise 
competition, and therefore constitutes a Condorcet winner.
3 The median voter theorem is attributed to Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957). These authors considered 
a single dimensional environment and showed that the median voter’s preferred policy constitutes a Condorcet 
winner. There also exist examples of multidimensional political economy models that assume policy commitment. 
These include most probabilistic voting models e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987); Dixit and Londegran (1995).
4 To be precise, such an electoral law will not affect the existence of the political equilibrium.
5 In particular, we show that the combination of a lack of political instititutions which may ensure policy 
commitment and the existence of plurality rule based majoritarian electoral systems imply that legislator ethnic 
identity affects policy outcomes. This, in turn, may lead to minority under-representation.
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to policies. Therefore, to discriminate between the predictions of competing political economy 
models I devise an empirical test to examine whether legislator identity influences policy out­
comes. The test is based on a state level panel data set for sixteen major Indian states from 
1958-92. India is a relevant and interesting ground for testing the theory as it is amongst the 
most ethnically diverse societies in the world. Of equal, if not more importance, is the fact 
that it is also home to a unique experiment in electoral engineering. The Indian constitution 
provides for political representation of minorities via political reservation. That is, prior to 
every election a certain number of jurisdictions are declared as reserved. Only members of the 
minority group so targeted can stand for election in reserved jurisdictions. The composition of 
the electorate in these jurisdictions is, however, left unaltered (1950 Indian constitution).
The Indian constitution specifies that the extent of reservation in place for a minority should 
reflect it’s population share. Therefore, cross state and time variation in a minority’s population 
share are associated with variations in the extent of political reservation it is afforded. Time 
lags in such population based readjustment implies that it is possible to empirically distinguish 
between the policy influence of demographic and minority representation variables. This forms 
the basis of the empirical identification strategy. Using variation in minority representation in­
duced by population changes to measure changes in legislator identity also allows us to deal with 
endogeneity concerns. Specifically, since the extent of reservation afforded to a minority group 
is independent of the functioning of the political process, the extent of minority representation 
in an Indian state can be considered exogenous to the policy-making process.
The chapter’s principal empirical finding is that improved minority representation has in­
creased the levels of targeted transfers going to minorities. This finding provides substantial 
empirical credence to the idea that political representation is central to the design of policies 
that aim at promoting minority interests. More generally, the results indicate that legislator 
identity influences policies, and provide some support to the contention that politicians cannot 
fully commit to policies.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related 
literature. Section 2.3 develops a theoretical model to analyze the causes of minority under­
representation and the subsequent influence of an electoral law of political reservation on policy 
outcomes. Section 2.4 describes the institutional details of political reservation in India. Section
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2.5 uses a panel data set for 16 Indian states to empirically test the relationship between 
legislator group identity and policy choices. Section 2.6 discusses the results and concludes. All 
proofs are in the appendix.
2.2 R elated Literature
This section discusses some of the existing theoretical and empirical literature which is related 
to the work reported in this chapter.
The theoretical framework developed in this chapter is based on the citizen candidate model 
of political economy (Osborne and Slivinski 1996 and Besley and Coate 1997). The main 
assumptions underlying such a model of the political process are that candidates for elections 
are members of the polity, and that these candidates cannot commit to policies during the 
campaign stage. Together, these assumptions imply that candidate identity influences policy 
outcomes. This chapter extends the ambit of such research by analysing both how a country’s 
choice of political institutions may affect the choice of citizen candidates, and the relative 
importance of income and ethnic based voter coalitions in determining political outcomes. The 
latter issue has also been the focus of some political economy papers which consider multi­
dimensional policy-making -Besley and Coate 1998c; Dixit and Londegran 1995.
This chapter also undertakes an empirical analysis of the main theoretical predictions. The 
empirical analysis examines the role of an electoral law of political reservation in providing 
minorities with policy representation across Indian states. The identification strategy used 
seeks to exploit exogenous variation in an economically relevant variable (legislator identity) 
induced by the functioning of a political institution (the electoral law of political reservation). 
This econometric strategy is similar to that adopted in papers which exploit variation in the 
functioning of political institutions across US states to analyze questions of economic interest6. 
Besley and Case (1995) utilize variation in when gubernatorial term limits bind to identify 
the relative weight voter and state governors’ preferences receive in policy-making, and Levitt
(1997) uses electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of policing on crime.
6 The approach may be contrasted with papers that instead utilize information on variations induced by 
changes in the political institution. For example Husted and Kenny (1997) use information on changes in the 
restrictions on the voting franchise to analyze the relationship between median voter’s identity and the policy 
choices.
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To date, empirical public economics research on the determinants of public policies has 
largely focused on the relationship between the demographic composition of political jurisdic­
tions and the kind of transfers provided by governments. Examples include Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly (1997), Cutler, Elmendorfer and Zeckhauser (1993) and Poterba (1997). This chapter 
extends such research by examining how changes in legislator identity influence the transfers 
chosen in situations where the demographic composition of jurisdictions is unchanged.
This analysis of the relationship between legislator identity and policy choices also relates 
to the large empirical literature that tests for the relevance of the median voter theorem in the 
US. A summary of this literature is provided in Poole and Rosenthal (1997). Most of these 
studies find very weak or no support for the median voter model. Instead papers such as Kalt 
and Zupan (1985) and Levitt (1996) show that legislator’s own policy preferences (or ideology) 
are a primary determinant of roll call voting behavior in US legislatures.7 This chapter’s main 
empirical finding is that a legislator’s ethnic identity exerts a significant influence on policy 
outcomes. This finding supports the chapter’s theoretical prediction that in the absence of 
political institutions which ensure policy commitment observed policy outcomes will vary with 
changes in legislators ethnic (or non income) identity.8
2.3 Theory
This section analyzes the determinants of minority under-representation in a representative 
democracy, and the role of an electoral law of political reservation in affecting such representa­
tion. To do so it develops a model in which candidates cannot commit to policy announcements. 
Hence parties and voters influence policies only by their choice of candidates and legislators 
respectively.
7My analysis can be interpreted as examining the relationship between a legislator’s identity and the ideology 
she espouses. In a similar vein Besley and Case (1997) examine the relationship between increased female 
participation in U.S. state legislatures and state level policy making. They find robust evidence in support of 
the thesis that the gender identity of legislators influences policy outcomes.
8 A similar argument has been put forward in papers which examine the relationship between the gender 
identity of transfer (cash/credit) recipients and economic outcomes (Pitt and Khandker 1998; Duflo 1999). These 
papers find that transfer recipients gender identity has a significant effect on subsequent expenditure patterns.
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2.3 .1  E conom ic E nvironm ent
Consider an economy populated by citizens who differ along two dimensions. First, citizens
differ in the income they earn. A citizen is either rich or poor, with her income identity denoted
as i G I  = {r,p}. For notational simplicity I assume that a citizen’s income identity is perfectly
informative of her total income (y i ). That is, rich citizens earn y T =  r (and symmetrically y p =
p), where yr > yp (i.e. r > p). Second, citizens differ in their social identity. A social norm
assigns every citizen at birth to one of two social groups, which I term castes. Every citizen is
born a high or a low caste, with her caste identity denoted c G C — {h, I}. Membership of a
social group does not have any direct economic significance9.
It follows that there are four citizen types in this economy. The total number of type (i, c)
citizens’ is denoted NiC (with Yl X] -W*c =  N ) ; caste c citizens as Nc and income i citizens as
i £ l  c£C
Ni. Citizens are uniformly distributed across N  identical jurisdictions10. The number of type 
(i,c ) citizens in any single jurisdiction is
A citizen’s identity is informative of her policy preferences11. The available policy instru­
ments axe the (triple) parameters of an income based redistribution scheme. These are (i) an 
anonymous tax rate t G [0,1] and the levels of (ii) a non-targeted transfer T  G 5? and (iii) a tar­
geted transfer 8i G 9ft, which only benefits low caste citizens12. The analysis restricts attention 
to feasible transfers. That is (T76i) G Z, where Z  is the set of transfers which, together with 
the associated tax rate t , satisfies the budget constraint:
t J 2 1 2 y ic = N T + N i S ‘ (2-1)
i e i  cec
9The analysis considers redistribution based on citizen’s income and/or ethnic identity. Hence, the correlation 
between citizens ethnic and income identities affects policy choices (on this, also see Akerlof 1978). More generally, 
the analysis is robust to the introduction of some amount of ex ante correlation between these two identities.
101 discuss the implications of inter-jurisdiction heterogeneity later in the paper.
11A citizen’s caste identity affects her policy preferences because it is the basis for targeted transfers. An 
alternative approach would be to assume that citizen utility is directly enhanced by having a representative who 
shares her identity. Possible microfoundations for this assumption include group altruism, or (and) the observa­
tion that in situations of incomplete policy commitment candidate identity approximates a form of commitment 
(since the probability that someone who shares one’s caste identity will share one’s policy preferences is, in 
general, non zero).
12 Increasing the set of policy instruments so as to allow for symmetric transfers which only target high castes 
leave the qualitative aspects of the analysis unaffected.
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A type (i, c) citizen’s utility given the policy vector (t,T ,6i) is:
Uih = (1 -  t)yih + T, i = r,p  
Uu = (1 - t ) y u + T  + 6i, i = r,p
Therefore, her preferred choice of transfers will maximize her post redistribution income. 
The actual choice of policies axe, however, determined via a political process characterized by 
electoral competition between two parties, labelled rich R  and poor P.
This chapter models parties as institutions that mediate between citizens and candidates 
in the political process. They do so by fielding candidates for election in every jurisdiction13. 
Parties select candidates from the set of citizens. Importantly, candidates cannot commit to 
policies during election campaigns. Therefore, an elected candidate will always implement the 
policies which maximize her utility. A candidate’s policy preferences are determined by her caste 
and income identity. Hence candidate identity will matter in the political process. Specifically, 
a party will anticipate the policies associated with every candidate and select that candidate 
set which maximizes the party’s expected utility.
In most countries major political parties are associated with ideological differences on some, 
but not all, policy issues (Caillaud and Tirole 1998).14 Therefore, I allow for partial party 
ideological differences by postulating fixed income identities for parties.15 That is, party P  
represents the poor and party R  the rich. Since parties affect policy via their selection of 
candidates this translates into an assumption on candidate selection. Specifically, party P  only 
fields poor candidates, and party R  rich.
In contrast, I take party caste preferences (and therefore party candidates caste identity) to 
be flexible. I assume that in choosing its candidates caste identity a party’s primary concern 
is electoral. That is, it seeks to maximize the number of jurisdictions (n) in which it wins16. 
However, if the electoral outcome is invariant to the caste identity of a party’s candidates
13 A number of authors have argued for such a candidate centred view of (party) policy-making. For an overview 
see Aldrich (1995)
14In general, these ideological differences tend to differentiate parties along the left right axis.
15 The assumption of fixed income preferences captures long term party ideological differences. For similar 
analyses, see Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Dixit and Londegran (1995).
16 The analysis is unchanged if parties instead seek to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the 
legislature.
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then it will field high caste candidates. This last assumption captures the often discussed fact 
that minority under-representation on party selection boards leads to an ex ante bias in party 
selection procedures against these groups. Overall, this characterization of party preferences 
implies that a party’s choice variable is the proportion of jurisdictions in which it fields low 
caste citizens. This variable is denoted as 7tk £ II =  {0, ^>...1} where K  G {P, P}.
Finally, I describe the electoral and legislative institutions in this economy. My modelling 
of these institutions derives from the Indian experience. In India elections are characterised 
by single member plurality rule, and the legislature is Parliamentary. A number of recent 
political economy papers document the fact that Parliamentary systems of governance are 
usually associated with majority rule in the legislature and voting along party fines (Diermier 
and Feddersen 1998).17 These two features of a Parliamentary democracy are incorporated in 
the analysis. That is, I assume that legislators vote along party fine, and that the transfers 
preferred by the majority party legislators are selected.
As a party’s legislators share the same income identity, intra-party policy differences only 
arise from differences in legislators’ caste identities. The final assumption regarding the func­
tioning of political institutions concerns intra-party policy-making. The analysis assumes that 
party policies are a convex combination of the preferences of legislators belonging to the two 
caste groups. The weight attached to the preferences of legislators of each caste equal its share 
of the total. 18
The analysis examines how the political equilibrium is affected by the introduction of an 
electoral law of political reservation. The implementation of such a law affects the functioning 
of the political process by restricting parties’ feasible candidate set. Specifically, it forces parties 
to field low castes in (at least) the proportion 7r of jurisdictions that are declared reserved.
17For instance, in India this rule is enforced by party whips on most issues voted on in legislatures. Strict 
penalties exist for those who do not follow the whip.
18In a parliamentary democracy the majority party needs to mantain the support of its legislators. Hence 
this assumption can be justified as a solution to a bargaining game in which all legislators have some bargaining 
power.
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2 .3 .2  P o licy  C hoices
The sequence of events in the economy is as follows— the two parties select the proportion of 
jurisdictions in which to field low caste candidates. Then, citizens in every jurisdiction vote 
over the pair of candidates fielded by the parties. Finally, elected representatives select policies 
in the legislature.
As jurisdictions are identical I restrict attention to the case of identical electoral outcomes 
across jurisdictions. Therefore a party either enjoys (expected) electoral success in all jurisdic­
tions, or in none. One implication of this is that the majority party’s candidate and legislator 
sets coincide. This observation simplifies the analysis. It implies that the final policies associ­
ated with a party are completely characterized by two parameters: its (fixed) income identity 
and the proportion of jurisdictions in which it fields low caste candidates. The pair of transfers 
associated with a party may be denoted as 8K(itkWk ) and T k (ttk', Vk ) where K  € {.R,P}.
In voting citizens seek to maximize their post redistribution incomes19. Majority rule implies 
that citizens will condition their voting strategy on the final policies associated with a party, 
rather than on those associated with any single candidate. A citizen’s optimal strategy is to 
vote sincerely for that party’s candidate whose final policies maximize her payoff.20’21 The 
proof is straightforward. If a voter doesn’t affect the electoral outcome, then sincere voting can 
be maintained as an equilibrium outcome. If she does, then she will wish to vote so as to shift 
the final policy outcome towards her desired policy. In two candidate competition models (with 
weakly dominated voting strategies ruled out) this implies sincere voting.
I assume that indifferent voters abstain. If all citizens abstain, then the probability that 
either party is declared the majority party is a half.
19 A type (r, h) citizen favors no redistribution and a type (p, h) citizen non-targeted redistribution. A type (r, I) 
citizen favors targeted redistribution only if the group of poor low castes is small enough (on this, see proposition 
1). Type (p, I) citizens always favor targeted redistribution.
20Formally, let a type (i,c) citizen’s voting decision be a»c € {P , R } U{0} with a(.) =  ( a i i , t h e  
associated type distribution of voting decisions. Citizens vote strategically (and no citizen uses weakly dominated 
strategies) s.t.
a*c =  a r g m a x p (7 r )  C /£(7rp ) +  (1  -  p (tt) ) U * ( k r )&ic
21 In general sincere voting is not optimal if the elected legislature potentially consists of legislators from 
multiple parties (Austen-Smith 1989). However, with majority rule there exists a one to one mapping between 
the majority party’s identity and policy outcomes such that sincere voting is optimal .
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In this setup, party P ’s optimal choice of the proportion of jurisdictions in which to field 
low caste candidates (77) solves:
7ip =  argmaxn(7r)
7T
if n(0) =  72(77) for all 7r G [0,1] then 7r* =  0
where n is the number of jurisdictions. Party P ’s optimization problem is similarly defined.
I focus on pure strategy equilibria of this entry game. With two-dimensional policy-making
such equilibria may not exist, if the losing party can always affect the electoral outcome by
changing (i.e., no policy vector constitutes a Condorcet winner). However, as the strategy 
space is finite a mixed strategy equilibrium of the entry game will exist22.
A political equilibrium consists of a pair of party entry decisions 7r(= {7rp,7r#}) and a vector 
of voting decisions, such that (7rp, ttr) is an equilibrium of the entry game supported by sincere 
voting by all citizen types. Let the probability that party P  is the majority party be denoted 
as p(7r). Then, the probability that the policy outcome23 is {T p  (7rp ) ; 6P (7Tp)} is p(np, 7r) and 
a type (2, c) citizen’s expected utility is:
uic (tt) =  p (7r) Up (ftp) +  (1 - p  (n))Ug(7rR)
where U £  is her utility conditional on party K  being the majority party.
The analysis examines how the introduction of an electoral law of political reservation affects 
the political equilibrium. Imposition of such a law restricts a party’s feasible set of 7r. Each party 
must (at least) field low caste candidates in the reserved jurisdictions (that is tt*p = argmax^ 
up(n) s.t. 7r > 7r). I define a political equilibrium as non-neutral if the policy outcomes differ 
before and after the introduction of an electoral law of political reservation. If policy outcomes
22The set of possible mixed strategies is the probability distribution over II. Let (t r ^ k  , tt)  be party AT’s 
strategy. An entry game equilibrium is a pair of mixed strategies (<7p,<7p) s.t. each party maximises its expected 
utility, given the other party’s entry choice. A pure strategy political equilibrium exists if for some ( f t p , h r ) ,
< r p ( 7 r p , 7 r )  =  (T r ( tt r , 7r) =  1 .
23For mixed strategy equilibria, the probability that the final policy pair is {T p (7rp),5p (7rp)} is 
53 <7p(7Tp)crp(7r)p(7rp,7r) and that it is { T r ( t t r ) ,  6 r (7Tr ) }  is 53 r {-k r )<t p ( i r)(l — p(7Tp,7r) ). Let the proba-
irgn irgll
bility distribution over policies associated with some (<j p ,<t r )  be 0(crp,crp). Then a type (*, c) citizen’s expected 
utility associated with an entry stage equilibrium (<7p(7r),<Tp(7r)) is U i C( < f > ( < T p ( i r ) , c r R ( T r ) ) ) .
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axe invariant to the introduction of political reservation, then the equilibrium is neutral.
2 .3 .3  A n a ly z in g  M in ority  R ep resen ta tion
The analysis first identifies some reasons for why parties may not field low caste candidates. It, 
then, examines the policy effect of the introduction of an electoral law of political reservation 
in such situations. The analysis assumes that no single citizen type constitutes a population 
majority, but that the poor constitute a population majority (Np > \) .  Throughout, the terms 
‘low caste’ and ‘minority’ are used interchangeably.
P ro p o sitio n  1 (Budget Constraint effect) There exists a critical number of poor low caste 
citizens Npi = , such that all legislators are high caste i f  Npi > Np[. In this case only
non-targeted redistribution occurs.
This proposition states that, if the number of poor low caste citizens is too large, then low 
castes fail to obtain political representation. The reasoning is as follows. The fact that the sum 
total of transfers must satisfy a budget constraint implies that increases in the poor low caste 
population share decreases the maximum feasible per-head level of targeted transfers. Whilst 
this does not affect poor low caste citizens preference for targeted redistribution, it adversely 
influences rich low castes preference for targeted redistribution. If Npi > Npi , then rich low 
castes favor no redistribution to targeted redistribution.
This, in turn, implies that the winning party will only field high castes. To see this con­
sider a political equilibrium in which both parties only field high caste candidates. In this case 
no party is associated with targeted redistribution. However, parties’ fixed income identities 
implies their preferred levels of non targeted redistribution differs. Hence citizens vote along 
income fines, and party P  wins. Now consider the losing party’s (party R) ability to affect this 
equilibrium. As long as Npi > Npi rich citizens, irrespective of their caste, favor zero redistri­
bution. Consequently all potential party R  candidates are associated with no redistribution. 
Hence the losing party - party R  cannot affect the level of redistribution it is associated with, 
and therefore citizens’ optimal voting decisions by it’s choice of ir. The equilibrium in which all 
legislators are poor high caste citizens is stable. As it maximizes party P ’s payoff, it is also the 
unique equilibrium.
The main insight afforded by this proposition is that increases in the group size of (some)
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beneficiaries of targeted transfers which leave them less than a majority can adversely affect 
their policy influence. In this model, this also implies that minorities (poor low castes) will fail 
to obtain political representation.
C orollary  to  P ro p o sitio n  1: The equilibrium is non-neutral. There exists a critical value 
of political reservation n = • I f  ft < n, then political reservation increases targeted
transfers. I f  7r > tt then political reservation alters the winning party’s identity such that a no 
redistribution outcome obtains.
With political reservation parties must (at least) field low caste candidates in reserved 
jurisdictions. This does not affect the policies associated with party R  (since all rich citizens 
favour no redistribution). Party P , however, is now also associated with targeted redistribution. 
The extent of targeted redistribution it chooses is increasing in the proportion of low caste 
candidates it fields (i.e. in tt).
Therefore, rich citizens will continue to vote for party R. Interestingly, poor high caste citi­
zens may switch to voting for party R  if the proportion of jurisdictions reserved (and therefore 
the targeted redistribution associated with party P) is too high. That is, political reservation 
affects the political equilibrium by making citizens’ caste based redistributive preferences rel­
evant to their optimal voting decision.24 This, in turn, may alter both the electoral outcome 
and the policies chosen. If n > n  then the ensuing equilibrium the policies favored by the rich 
.will be .undertaken25 (i.e.. there will be no redistribution)................................................................
If, however, the proportion of jurisdictions reserved remains below tt then citizens’ continue 
to vote along class lines and Party P  wins. The policy outcomes, however, differ in that both 
targeted and non-targeted redistribution is undertaken. In both cases the winning party only 
fields low caste candidates in those jurisdictions which are declared reserved.
I now examine whether minority under-representation may persist even when all low castes 
favor targeted redistribution. Therefore assumption 1 holds for the rest of the analysis. 
A ssum ption  1:
» r  NrhT “ t"  UphPMpl < ----------------r —p
24 There exists some qualitative evidence suggesting that legislation which targets a specific social group is 
often associated with the emergence of a politics of identity (Bardhan 1996).
25It is possible to interpret this as a situation in which policy is captured by the ‘minority elite’.
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P ro p o sitio n  2 (Demographic Effect) All legislators are high caste i f  (i) high caste citizens form  
a population majority and (ii) caste preferences are politically decisive (that is , Nph < Nri). 
In this case only non-targeted redistribution occurs.
If both parties only field high caste candidates, then party P  wins (by the same logic 
as in proposition 1). However, the difference from proposition 1 is that assumption 1 holds. 
Therefore, the losing party (party R) can affect citizens’ voting decisions by appealing to their 
caste based redistributive preferences. However, proposition 2 tells us that if Nph < Nri and 
N h >  \  then party R  cannot so affect the electoral outcome. The reason is that if Nph < Nri 
then citizens’ caste based preferences are politically decisive. That is, it is not possible for party 
R  to choose a portfolio of candidates such that low, but not high, caste citizens vote along 
caste lines. Therefore, in situations where party R  fields a non zero proportion of low caste 
candidates and gains the low caste vote it will lose the rich high caste vote. In the ensuing 
equilibrium all citizen types will vote along caste fines. High caste citizens will vote for party 
P  which is associated with no targeted redistribution. As Nh > 1  party P  will win. Therefore, 
while party R  can affect the basis of citizens’ voting decisions it cannot affect the electoral 
outcome. Here it is the demographic composition of the population combined with the fact 
that citizens caste based preferences are politically decisive which militates against low caste 
political representation.
C orollary  to  P ro p o sitio n  2 The equilibrium is non-neutral. Political reservation increases 
targeted redistribution, but leaves the winning party’s identity unaffected.
The proof shows that with political reservation parties field low caste candidates in the 
reserved jurisdictions. Party P  continues to enjoy electoral success. Party R  cannot influence 
the electoral outcome by further increasing the proportion of low caste candidates it fields. The 
reason is the same as in proposition 2. Namely, that any such increase leads to citizens’ voting 
on the basis of their caste preferences. High caste citizens vote for the party fielding fewer low 
castes - party P. As they form a population majority party P  continues to win. Once again, it 
is the demographic composition of the polity which limits the extent of minority representation. 
The difference, of course, is that with political reservation the final policy vector includes both
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targeted and non-targeted redistribution.26’ 27
A key assumption in this model is that candidates cannot commit to policies. This leads to 
parties conditioning candidate selection on candidate identity. In particular, the analysis shows 
that the winning party selects the candidates who share the policy preferences of a majority 
of voters. In situations in which the majority prefers zero targeted transfers are situations in 
which low castes fail to obtain political representation. The reason is straightforward. Since 
(poor) low castes favor targeted redistribution a party cannot both field low caste citizens and 
be associated with zero targeted redistribution.
The analysis identified two such situations.28 In both cases the demographic composition 
of the political jurisdictions played a crucial role. Situations in which low castes formed a 
population minority and caste based preferences are politically decisive are characterized by 
minority under-representation. Importantly, situations in which the population share of poor 
low caste citizens was relatively large (but less than half) are also characterized by minority 
under-representation. In this case all other citizens (including rich low castes) unite in their 
opposition to targeted transfers.29 The subsequent introduction of an electoral law of political 
reservation by forcing parties to alter their candidate set affects policy outcomes.
I now examine the real world relevance of this thesis. To do so, I exploit the existence of an 
electoral law of political reservation across Indian states. In particular, I use Indian state level 
data on the functioning of political reservation to examine the relationship between the presence 
of minority legislators and state level policy outcomes. Before doing so, I briefly discuss some 
empirically relevant generalisations of the theory.
26If Nh >  \  but Nph >  Nri then in many cases only mixed strategy equilibria exist. Conditional on party P  
fielding high castes party R  can attract a majority of votes by fielding some proportion of low caste candidates. 
This leads to cycles where for each candidate mix a party puts forward there is another candidate set that the 
losing party can use to defeat it.
27This analysis focuses on the relationship between the demographic composition of political jurisdictions and 
the extent of minority under-representation. Another reason why minority under-representation may arise is 
extreme party prejudice. Such a case would arises if a party prefers electoral defeat to winning but having to 
undertake targeted redistribution. Such situations may arise when the main national parties are ethnic parties. In 
these cases political reservation is, again, a powerful tool by which low castes may achieve policy representation.
28In the cases analyzed parties’ equilibrium choice of 7r coincided. This feature of the model can be related to 
papers such as Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londegran (1995). These papers show that if party 
policy potentially differs along a ‘fixed’ and a ‘pliable’ dimension then in equilibrium party policies on the pliable 
dimension will coincide, with party differences on the fixed policy dimension determining the winning candidates 
party identity.
29Papers such as Cutler, Elmendorf and Zeckhauser (1993), Poterba (1997) and Gelbach and Pritchett (1997) 
make the same point
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2.3 .4  G eneralizin g  th e  R esu lts
This subsection discusses the robustness of the model to changes in some of it’s underlying 
assumptions. The focus is on assumptions which are relevant to the subsequent empirical 
analysis.
Choice o f electoral law
The analysis modelled the introduction of political reservation as an exogenous change in the 
existing set of political institutions. In reality, such changes are also determined by the political 
process. This would suggest that the determination and policy consequences of such laws should 
be jointly modelled.
One way would be to consider a two period variant of our model— in period one elections 
are held and the elected legislators choose whether to change the electoral institution; in period 
two elections are held under the new electoral arrangements and the elected legislators select 
the levels of redistribution. Clearly, in stage 1 rational voters will anticipate the choice of 
political institutions associated with a policy-maker and will vote accordingly. In the situations 
identified in this model the electoral law of political reservation would not be implemented. For 
in period one a majority of citizens will vote for high caste legislators, whose policy preferences 
are for no political reservation.30
A second way of modelling the choice of electoral institutions- which fits the Indian reality 
- is to postulate a constitution design stage prior to the game analysed in this section. In 
many countries members of constituent assemblies are nominated not elected. If these include 
a sufficient number of minority members (who would push for the introduction of such a law) 
then an electoral law of political reservation may be implemented. In India the fact that the 
head of the Constitutent assembly was a low caste played a crucial role in the implementation 
of the policy of political reservation.
The empirical analysis deals with the potential endogeneity of the electoral law of political 
reservation by only analysing data for the post Independence period in India. The electoral law 
of political reservation was in existence for the entire period. However, the population basis
30In general, this is a reason often cited for the observed persistence of the status quo political institutions in 
most countries.
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of reservation induced exogenous cross state and time variation in the extent of reservation. 
The empirical analysis exploits this data variation. From the theoretical analysis we know 
that in situations of initial minority under-representation the introduction of a law of political 
reservation will lead to the winning party fielding low caste candidates (only) in the reserved 
jurisdictions. This suggests that subsequent population induced variations in the extent of 
political reservation will be associated with variations in both the number of minority legislators 
and policy outcomes.
M ultiple minority groups
This analysis examines the case of a single minority group— low caste citizens. In most countries 
(India being no exception) multiple minority groups exist. Extending our analysis to cover such 
a case alters the quantitative results as the size and number of feasible voter coalitions changes. 
However, as long as (i) the minority groups are reasonably symmetric and (ii) the groups, 
taken together, do not constitute a population majority the qualitative aspects of the results 
generalize.
Inter jurisdiction heterogeneity
The analysis assumed that the demographic composition of jurisdictions is identical. However, 
in reality jurisdictions within a state differ in their demographic composition. In such a case, as 
long as policy-making occurs at the state level and policy outcomes axe common across juris­
dictions, citizens will continue to condition their vote on a party’s entire vector of candidates. 
However, the identity of the winning candidates (and therefore a party’s candidate set) is po­
tentially affected by inter-jurisdictional heterogeneity. In general, introducing inter-jurisdiction 
heterogeneity in models of policy-making concentrates electoral competition in some ‘swing’ 
jurisdictions (for an example of this, see Persson and Tabellini 1998). That is, parties select 
the set of candidates favored by a majority of citizens in these jurisdictions.
It is clear that Indian states are likely to be characterised by substantial inter-jurisdiction 
heterogeneity. Therefore, for the theoretical analysis to be relevant for a state level analysis of 
policy-making I need two identifying assumptions. First, that the demographic characteristics of 
swing jurisdictions be such that minority under-representation results. The second identifying
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assumption related to the fact that I capture the effect of demographic features on policy 
outcomes via state-level demographic data. For this to be appropriate it must be true that a 
state’s demographic composition is correlated with the demographic composition of the swing 
jurisdictions.
2.3 .5  E m pirical P red iction s
To conclude, I outline the main empirically testable predictions of the theory.
P red ic tio n  1: In situations where low castes constitute a population minority, they will fail to 
obtain political representation if :
(i) (budget constraint effect) Poor low castes population share is large
(ii) (demographic effect) Poor low castes population share is relatively low, but caste preferences 
are politically decisive.
P red ic tio n  2: In situations of minority under-representation both the introduction of and 
variations in the extent of political reservation affect policy outcomes. This policy influence 
takes the form of increased targeted transfers and a reduction in the share of non targeted 
transfers.
C orollary: If, however, the extent of reservation is too high then the electoral outcomes may 
be affected by political reservation. In this case political reservation reduces both targeted and 
non targeted transfers.
Finally, I note that a significant effect of legislator identity on the policies chosen may 
also be taken as evidence for, but not proof of, the lack of policy commitment on the part of 
legislators31.
2.4 The Context: Political Reservation in India
In this section I use a state level panel data set from India to empirically examine the relationship 
between minority representation and policy outcomes. To do so, I exploit the cross state and
31 As with any such empirical test I cannot rule out other competing hypotheses. For in so far as I cannot 
isolate a single policy dimension in my empirical analysis I cannot directly test for the extent to which policy 
commitment is absent.
41
time variation in legislator identity induced by the functioning of the electoral law of political 
reservation across Indian states.
The main principles which guide elections in India were laid down in the Indian constitution 
in 1950. The constitution states that India is a federal democracy in which citizens elect rep­
resentatives in single-member jurisdiction elections. The elections axe winner-take-all elections 
with the top vote receiver being elected. Importantly, the 1950 constitution also provided for 
political reservation. Article 330 and 332 of the constitution state that prior to every state and 
national election a certain number of jurisdictions will be reserved. Only candidates belong­
ing to a specified population group may stand for election in these jurisdictions. The entire 
electorate, however, participates in choosing amongst candidates so qualified.
The constitution provides such political reservation for two population groups: scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes. For expositional ease, these groups are referred to as minority 1 
(scheduled castes) and minority 2 (scheduled tribes). Together, the groups make up roughly 
25 percent of the Indian population, of which minority 1 accounts for roughly two thirds (1991 
census). The existence of the ‘minority 1’ population group relates to the Hindu caste system32 
which assigns every individual at birth to a caste. Every caste occupies a (largely) determinate 
position in a hierarchical scale of ranks. Between two to three thousand castes exist, of which 
779 of the most socially disadvantaged castes are identified33 as members of minority 1. The 
population category ‘minority 2’ covers members of India’s indigenous tribal population. Whilst 
the legal basis for group identification is social and common across states (Table 2.1), members 
of these groups tend also to be economically disadvantaged (Table 2.2). 34
The electoral law of political reservation (as set out in the Indian constitution) states that 
prior to every state level election a certain number of jurisdictions will be reserved (separately) 
for each of the two minorities. Two criteria for the selection of reserved jurisdictions. These 
are (i) the population concentration of the minority group in that jurisdiction and (ii) sufficient
32Hindus make up approximately 85 percent of the Indian population (1991 Census). The genesis of the caste 
system is usually traced to the Aryan invasion of India in 1500 B.C. Caste groupings are endogamous with 
hereditary membership.
33This group was first identified in a Government of India Act of 1935.
34In case of minority 1 the cause is caste based restrictions on their social interaction and employment oppor­
tunities (Akerlof 1976). In contrast, the economic backwardness of minority 2 members is mainly due to their 
ecological and social isolation from the mainstream.
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dispersal of reserved jurisdictions within the state. In case of minority 1 criteria (ii) has been 
the main determinant of reservation. Minority 1 citizens 1 form a population minority in almost 
every state assembly level jurisdiction reserved for them35. In case of minority 2 both criteria 
have been used. Minority 2 citizens constitute a population minority in approximately half of 
the jurisdictions reserved for them.
Regarding the extent of reservation, the Indian constitution states that the proportion of 
jurisdictions reserved for a minority should reflect its population share— as defined in the 
decennial census (Article 322, 1950 Indian constitution). The constitution also provides for 
population based readjustment of the proportion of jurisdictions reserved for a group.
The extent of political reservation for a minority in an Indian state is determined by the 
group’s population share. However, changes in a group’s population share and the extent of 
reservation it is afforded have not been contemporaneous. There are two reasons for this. The 
Indian constitution states that the basis for such readjustments must be the decennial census. 
Adjustment on the basis of anticipated population figures is disallowed. Hence, during a single 
census period the proportion of seats reserved for a group is usually adjusted twice - once on 
the basis of provisional census figures, and once on the basis of final census figures. The second 
reason for time lags in the population based readjustment of the number of seats reserved is 
that such adjustments can only occur at the point of election.
It is widely agreed that the presence of minority legislators in Indian state legislatures is 
mainly due to political reservation (Galanter 1978; Dushkin 1972). Table 2.3 shows that during 
the 1960s and 1970s almost all minority legislators36 were elected from reserved jurisdictions. 
The second part of the table analyses minority representation in the upper houses of state 
legislatures (where no reservation exists). Due to the limited nature of the data I cannot 
conclude what the actual representation of minorities would have been in the absence of polit­
ical reservation. Table 2.3 shows that while minority 2 representation in the upper houses of 
state legislatures remained relatively constant, minority 1 representation increased significantly. 
Therefore, based on this table I would conclude that while it is possible that minorities would
35The minority 1 population share in reserved jurisdictions tends to be at best five to six percentage points 
higher than in unreserved jurisdictions.(Galanter 1984)
36We were unable to get data for the 1980s and 1990s. However, the literature suggests that there have not 
been any dramatic changes in this trend (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998).
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have attained significant political representation even in the absence of political reservation, 
the precise extent of representation would have differed.
There exists very little formal literature which analyses the influence that minority repre­
sentation has had on state level policy-making across Indian states. Qualitative evidence on 
whether minority legislators have altered state level policy-making is mixed. Some authors, 
such as Baxi (1984), argue that increased minority representation has not affected state level 
policy-making in India. Instead, minority legislators’ policy behavior has been largely deter­
mined by their need to appeal both to upper caste constituents in reserved jurisdictions and to 
the primarily upper caste membership of party plenary committees.37 In contrast, authors such 
as Dushkin (1972), Joshi (1982) and Galanter (1984) claim that minority representation has 
influenced policy-making. Their main thesis is that minority legislators have tended to act en 
bloc and concentrate effort on increasing transfers to their own group: more cabinet positions 
for themselves, more scholarships and reservations in higher educational institutions and, above 
all, more government jobs 38.
Both theory and the existing qualitative literature provide important reasons for why in­
creased minority representation in state legislatures may not have influenced state level policy­
making. I, therefore, turn to an econometric analysis to formally assess the success of political 
reservation in influencing state level policy-making in India.
2.5 Testing for the D eterm inants o f Policy Choices
The unit of observation in the econometric analysis is an Indian state. The federal nature of the 
Indian constitution implies that Indian state governments have important independent policy­
making powers. Further, many of the subjects on which states enjoy sole jurisdiction relate to 
minority welfare. This suggests that it is appropriate to use an Indian state level panel data set
3 7 The relative poverty of minority group members has meant that attempts at forming minority political 
parties or interest groups have been largely unsuccessful.
38Dushkin (1972) quotes instances of such activism during the 1967-72 national parliamentary session. The 
main national party Congress was defeated on the amendment/ the opinion of the House (that) safeguards 
provided in the Constitution for the scheduled castes and tribes are not being fully implemented’. The defeat 
was primarily due to bloc voting by minority legislators. She also attributes the liberalisation of job reservation 
policy (July 1968, 1970), increased flexibility in targeted educational subsidies (1969), and a stiffening of the 
untouchability offences act (1970) to their influence.
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to analyze the relationship between minority representation and policy outcomes. Whilst the 
electoral law of political reservation has been in force during the entire data period, the extent 
of political reservation has exhibited cross state and time series variation. The analysis exploits 
this exogenous variation in legislator identity, induced by the functioning of the electoral law, 
to examine the relationship between minority representation and state level policy choices.
To do so, I use a data set which covers 16 major Indian states and spans the years 1957-1992. 
These states account for over 95 percent of the Indian population. The data set contains state 
level data on policy outcomes, the proportion of seats reserved for minority 1 and minority 
2 in state legislatures and other variables characterizing state demographic composition and 
income distribution. Due to data availability reasons the precise time coverage varies across 
regressions.
Table 2.4 describes some salient economic and demographic features of these states. Mi­
nority population shares exhibit considerable inter state variation. Whilst all states have some 
minority 1 population, three states do not have any minority 2 population39. The economic 
characteristics of Indian states— measured by per capita state income, Gini coefficient and 
levels of state expenditure and revenue, also exhibit significant cross state differences.
Table 2.5 provides means and deviations for the variables entering the analysis. I control for 
minority presence in a state’s legislature by including data on the proportion of seats reserved 
for each of the two minorities in the state legislature. As discussed earlier this is a very good 
proxy for total minority presence in the legislature. I use data on minority population shares 
to control for voter identity. Time-lags in the population based readjustment of the extent of 
reservation afforded to a group implies that the correlation between contemporaneous changes 
in the population and reservation series is weak (on this also see the further results section). 
Hence the population and reservation series are not observationally equivalent.
To control for other time varying state specific controls I include public finance data on 
state income per capita and federal grants per capita. These provide a measure of the state 
budget constraint. I also include information on state level income inequality. However, this 
data is only used for robustness checks. This is both due to restricted data availability for
39Three states contain nearly half of the minority 2 population: Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Bihar. In 
contrast Punjab, Haryana, J&K and UP until 1974 have no jurisdictions reserved fo rminority 2.
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these series, and the more general worry that these variables are partially determined by the 
dependent policy variable.
In taking theory to the data, the first question that arises is whether the demographic 
features of Indian states are such that minority under-representation is likely (for the rea­
sons discussed in the theory section). From table 2.4 shows that the first requirement of our 
theory— that, the two minority groups constitute a population minority is satisfied in every 
state. Unfortunately, due to the lack of caste wise income data we cannot further test the 
theoretical predictions regarding the causes of minority under-representation. However, the 
summary statistics in Table 2.2 show that the incidence of poverty is much higher amongst 
minorities (the poverty rates amongst minority 1 and minority 2 groups were one and a half 
times that of the general population in 1987). Also, if we regress state-level income inequality 
measure (Gini) on minority population shares we find that increases in minority l ’s population 
share are associated with greater inequality. The same is true of minority 2, though the effect 
is less significant.40 These results are suggestive of the thesis that, absent political reservation, 
these two minorities would have been politically under-represented for two reasons. First, be­
cause they constitute a population minority. Second, because of the relatively high poverty 
rates in these groups (the budget constraint effect).
The data analysis focusses on analysing the influence of minority representation on an array 
of state level public policy. This provides a direct test of the relationship between legislator 
identity and policy outcomes (after controlling for voter effects).41 The analysis, I distinguishes 
between policies on the basis of who the intended beneficiaries are. Policies that do not use 
group identity to discriminate between recipients are termed general policies. Policies that aim 
to transfer resources only to minority members are termed targeted42. This characterization 
applies both to the public finance and asset redistribution variables considered.
The general public finance variables considered are total state expenditure per capita and the 
share going to education. Roughly 21 percent of an average Indian state’s budgetary expenditure 
is allocated to education. The determinants of these general policies are contrasted with those of
40 The point estimates are 0.42 for minority 1 (with a t-statistic of 5.2) and 0.16 for minority 2 (with a t-statistic 
of 1.76).
41 This can be seen as a weak test of the policy commitment model. If there is full policy commitment then 
policy variation should be related to variation in demographic composition.
42The Indian constitution explicitly provides for ‘group’ identification for purposes of public policy making.
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two targeted policies: the share of state expenditure going to ‘minority 1 welfare ’ and ‘minority 
2 welfare On average, between three to four percent of an average Indian state’s expenditure 
is allocated to these two categories. Due to data non-availability, the public finance regressions 
are for the shorter time period 1974-1992. In case of minority 1 welfare, the available data 
series is for an even shorter period (1980-92).43
Two asset redistribution policies are also examined. The general policy analyzed is a cu­
mulative land reform index44. The targeted policy analyzed is total state level job quotas for 
minority 1 and 2. The variable considered in the analysis is the determinants of total reserved 
jobs (i.e. minority 1 jobs +  minority 2 jobs).45 The Indian constitution provides for job quo­
tas for the two minority groups in government services. The precise extent of job quotas in 
any state government service is under the state government’s jurisdiction 46. The regressions 
that consider asset redistribution policies span the time period 1957-1992. Further details of 
variables that enter the analysis are in the data appendix.
2.5 .1  E m pirical M od el
Empirically, I wish to estimate the impact of variations in the extent of minority representation 
on state level policy outcomes, while controlling for the state’s demographic composition. Such 
an estimation procedure serves two purposes. First, it allows us to examine whether legislator 
identity matters. Second, including additional data on state demographic composition allows 
a (weak) test of the competing models of political economy. Specifically, with full policy com­
mitment (and controlling for the demographic composition) we should not expect variations in 
minority representation to affect policy outcomes. However, with incomplete policy commit­
ment, we expect variations in the extent of political representation to affect policy outcomes. 
In particular, our theory predicts that increased minority representation should be associated 
with increased targeted redistribution. In contrast, non-targeted redistribution should fall.
43 Since, the data period covered by regressions vary, I always check that the results are not sensitive to the 
time-period considered.
44 This variable was constructed by Besley and Burgess. It is a count data series that cumulates the land reform 
acts passed by a state. For details, see Besley and Burgess (1998).
45 The reason for this is that some states have legislated on job quotas for these two groups jointly
46 A number of authors have discussed the high levels of political activism associated with the determination 
of job quotas. See for example, Narayana (1980) as well as various reports of the Commissioner for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
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Therefore, in the reported regressions I include minority population shares in a state (Pjt)  
and the proportion of seats reserved for the minority in the state legislature (Rj t )  as explanatory 
variables. I start by using the Indian state level panel data set to estimate linear equations of 
the form:
Ojt  =  a j  +  Pt  +  7 i  Rjt  +  l 2Pj t  +  73 D jt  +  £j t  (2-2)
where Ojt is some state level public policy outcome in state j  at time t, R j t is a vector whose 
two elements characterize the proportion of seats reserved for the two minority groups. The 
vector Pjt denotes minority state population shares. Djt is an electoral dummy which takes a 
value of one in the election year, and zero otherwise.
The constitutionally specified basis for state level reservation is population. Therefore, this 
estimation strategy is appropriate if changes in a group’s population share are uncorrelated with 
contemporaneous changes in policy outcomes (an issue to which I return later). As changes 
in the extent of reservation can only occur at the point of election, it is important to ensure 
that policy variation attributed to changes in the extent of reservation is not simply proxying 
the electoral cycle. Hence, I include an electoral dummy variable Djt. a j is a state specific 
fixed effect and (3t is a year dummy variable. State fixed effects47 control for time invariant 
differences across states which may influence policies. These include, among others, permanent 
differences in state economic structures. Year effects take account of any impact of time related 
macro shocks to the economy as a whole on policy outcomes. Examples include political shocks 
(e.g. declaration of the nationwide ‘emergency’ in 1977), climatic shocks (e.g. droughts) and 
wars.
The main coefficients of interest are j 1 and 7 2. If 7i is insignificant then variations in 
extent of minority representation have no independent policy effect. The coefficient 72 captures 
the voter group size effects. Theory suggests that this variable’s significance should differ 
across general and targeted policies. In the former case, 7 2 captures minority groups direct 
‘voter influence’. In the latter case, it has an additional indirect effect. As increases in a 
minority’s population share make provision of the same level of per head targeted transfers a
47 The inclusion of state level fixed effects implies that the impact of political reservation and demographic and 
economic variables on policy outcomes is identified from deviations from state means over this period.
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more expensive proposition, this would tend to negatively affect non-minority citizens’ preferred 
levels of targeted transfers.
The rest of this section proceeds as follows. I first report the basic results where policy 
outcomes are conditioned on the proportion of seats reserved for the two minority groups 
and their population shares. I, then, provide a series of robustness checks and extensions. 
These include a discussion of exogeneity and identification concerns, an analysis of the relative 
importance of legislator party and group identity in influencing policy and an examination of 
how regional (North-South) differences influence the relationship that legislator identity bears 
to policy outcomes.
2.5 .2  B a sic  R esu lts
Table 2.6 reports the regression results for the basic specification. Columns (l)-(3) analyze 
general policies, while columns (4)-(6) consider targeted policies. All regressions are estimated 
by OLS, except the land reform index. As land reform data is count data, Poisson regressions 
are reported for this case.
Variations in the proportion of minority legislators (as measured by the proportion of seats 
reserved for them) do not significantly affect total per capita expenditure. However, the share 
of expenditure going to education is negatively influenced by increases in the share of minority 
1 legislators. This is suggestive of the thesis that increased minority representation adversely 
affects non targeted transfers- in this case education. However, variations in the share of 
minority 2 legislators don’t affect general polices. In marked contrast, targeted policies respond 
significantly to changes in the extent of minority representation. Minority 2 legislators have 
a positive and significant effect on both the percentage of total state expenditure going to 
minority 2 welfare (column (5)), and on job quotas. Similarly, job quotas responds positively to 
the extent of political reservation afforded to minority 1. The only targeted policy unaffected 
by political reservation is minority l ’s welfare expenditure.48
The results support the thesis that increased minority representation has affected state 
level policy making in India. Data suggests that such increases in representation have raised
48It is worth noting that the data available for this series is much more restricted. Results reported later in 
the paper also suggest that this insignificance is partly driven by the netting out of opposing party and regional 
effects.
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the levels of targeted transfers. There is no evidence that this has been accompanied by an 
increase in total expenditure. Instead the levels of the non targeted transfer- education were 
reduced by increases in minority 1 representation. An analysis of the point estimates suggests 
that the effect is non-trivial. For instance, a one percentage point increase in the proportion of 
seats reserved for minority 2 raises the minority 2’s welfare expenditure share by 0.9 percentage 
points. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that the implied elasticity is over one.
Turning to the relationship between a minority group’s population share and policy out­
comes, the evidence is mixed. General policies such as education expenditure share and land 
reforms enacted axe positively influenced by minority l ’s population share. A one percentage 
point increase in minority l ’s population share raises education spending by 0.8 percentage 
points. One interpretation is that the demand for education and land reform is high among 
members of this group. This is a reasonable interpretation as both illiteracy and landlessness 
are prevalent amongst members of minority 1. In contrast, minority 2’s population share has 
a significant negative influence on both policies. This finding, while surprising at first, is con­
sistent with the very low levels of political activism amongst minority 2 members (Galanter 
1984).
A similar pattern exists for targeted transfers. In general, increases in minority l ’s popula­
tion share raises job quotas and reduces expenditure on minority 2 welfare spending. Minority 
2’s population share exerts a negative but insignificant influence on policy outcomes.
To address the concern that political reservation variables may simply be proxying for 
omitted time varying state specific variables table 2.7 reports results that include additional 
controls. Two measures of the state budget constraint are included— per capita state income 
and per capita federal grants. Changes in the budget constraint may be expected to influence 
the shares of expenditure going to different categories. I also include an additional control 
for voter preference— the Gini coefficient. These controls are lagged as unobserved shocks to 
such variables may be correlated with contemporaneous shocks to policy outcomes. As data 
availability for some of these series is restricted, the number of observations per regression differ 
from table 2.6.
The difference is that the influence of minority 2 legislators on job quotas is not robust to 
the inclusion of additional variables. Data analysis shows that this is mainly driven by the
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state income variable. Also the negative relationship between minority 1 representation and 
education is much less significant. All other results are robust to this specification. Minority 
legislators continue to positively influence the levels of own group targeted transfers. Per capita 
state income, while positively correlated with total per capita expenditure, has no significant 
effect on the sectoral distribution of general expenditure shares, and a negative effect on targeted 
expenditures.49 The same is true of the state level income inequality variable.
2 .5 .3  Further R esu lts  
Exogeneity and Identification
The Indian constitution states that the proportion of jurisdictions reserved for a minority group 
should reflect its population share. Further, the extent of reservation should be readjusted after 
every decennial census. Time lags in the population based readjustment of reservation implies 
that the population-reservation relationship can be captured by an equation of the form:
R jt  =  j t —n “I- vj t
If changes in group population shares are not correlated with changes in the policy-making 
process then the extent of reservation may be considered exogenous to the policy-making pro­
cess.
Linguistic and cultural differences across Indian states have meant that interstate migration 
rates are very low (they constituted roughly 5% of an average state’s total migration in 1991 -  
see Cashin and Sahay 1995). Net interstate migration rates, on average, account for less than 
1% of the population growth rate. Further, census data suggest that no significant cross group 
migration differences exist, and that the main cause for changes in group population shares is 
differentials in birth and death rates. Therefore, as long as these fertility changes are not driven 
by contemporaneous changes in state level policy variables state level population changes in
49 This finding squares with the conventional wisdom that the growth in public expenditure across Indian states 
is primarily due to increased expenditure on non-developmental items, such as wages and interest payments (Rao 
and Sen 1993). One may also conjecture that these findings are consistent with the thesis that state level policy­
making in India has not had a primarily developmental basis - for in that case we would have expected a state’s 
level of development (as measured by state income or more generally by the gini coefficient) and the sectoral 
distribution of government expenditure to be inversely related.
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India axe relatively exogenous to the policy-making process.
I, now, turn to the issue of identification. My identification strategy is based on the fact that 
while minority population shares vary annually, adjustments in the proportion of seats reserved 
for a group occur with a time lag. This is for two reasons. The proportion of seats reserved for a 
group can only be adjusted at the point of election. Further, the Indian constitution states that 
the basis for such readjustments must be the decennial census. 50,51 Both these facts imply 
low correlation between contemporaneous changes in the population and reservation series (as 
we are running panel regressions the relevant correlations are correlations of deviations from 
the mean for the two series). These correlations are 0.22 and 0.18 for minority 1 and minority 
2 respectively (table 2.8a).
Table 2.8b provides a regression analysis of the same. Columns (1) and (3) examine the 
raw correlation between a minority group’s population share and the proportion of jurisdictions 
reserved for it. The correlation is positive and high, confirming that population shares axe the 
primary basis for reservation. Columns (2) and (4) examine the role of the election dummy and 
time and state effects in mediating this relation. The difference is dramatic. The relationship 
between population and reservation series remains positive and significant, but both the point 
estimate and the t-statistic fall. Whilst this suggests that movements in these two series is not 
identical, multicollinearity remains a potential worry - especially in case of minority 2. There­
fore, I re-ran the reported regressions with either only the population series or the reservation 
series entering the regression52. There were no major swings in parameter values or sign changes 
in coefficient values across regressions.
As a further check, I considered two variants of the basic regression. These regressions used 
alternative measures of voter strength. The first utilized information about the electoral cycle. 
I entered a weighted population share of a group as the population variable, where the weight 
took a value of one in an election year and values less than one in non-election years53. The 
identifying assumption underlying this specification is that as citizens mainly influence policy­
50 Often within a single census (ten year) period the extent of reservation is changed twice. Once on the basis 
of the provisional census figures and once on the basis of final population figures.
51 The constitutional requirements imply that the election commission never uses projected population as the 
basis of reservation.
52 These results are available from the author
53Minority population share were weighted in non election years by a weight x where x =  no Qf years to election •
52
making by voting54. Therefore their influence is strongest in election years. The regression 
results were robust to this specification. The second case used census age distribution data to 
measure voter strength. Specifically, only population shares of citizens over the age of 18 were 
included. Again, the results were robust to this specification.
A final concern is that the true relationship between policy outcomes and population shares 
is non-linear, and that it is this effect which is being picked up by the reservation series. I, 
therefore, ran a number of regressions in which the population variable entered non-linearly. 
The results were not affected.
Party Identity versus Group Identity
The theoretical analysis assumed long term income based ideological differences between 
political parties. The analysis suggested that these differences should be reflected in party 
candidate choice. If this is correct, then changes in both a legislator’s group and party identity 
should be correlated with changes in policy outcomes. The model also predicted that variations 
in the extent of political reservation may affect electoral outcomes. This section examines 
the empirical validity of these theoretical predictions regarding the role of political parties in 
mediating the relationship between legislator identity and policy outcomes.
The empirical analysis restricts attention to two Indian political party groupings - the 
Congress party and a Left party grouping55. The latter includes major national left wing parties 
and Janta parties. In general such a grouping may obscure important inter-party differences. 
However, in this case further subdivision of each party grouping into its constituent parties 
leaves results unaffected.
The empirical analysis is in two parts. Table 2.9 examines the relationship between a party’s 
electoral performance, minority population shares and the extent of political reservation. Party 
ideological differences, if present, should affect the electoral support that parties command from 
different population groups. I find that minority l ’s population share is positively correlated
5 4 There could be the alternative thesis that voters lobby. In that case the identification strategy would be 
invalid. However qualitative evidence suggests that there have been very few successful minority political lobby 
groups.
55The parties contained in the the political groupings are: (i) Congress party (Indian National Congress +  
Indian Congress Socialist +  Indian National Congress Urs +  Indian National Congress Organization) (ii) Non 
Congress Parties: (a) Hard Left parties (Communist Party of India-1- Communist Party of India Marxist) , (b) 
Soft Left parties (Praja Socialist Party +  Socialist Party) and (c)Janta Parties (Janta Party -I- Janta Dal Party 
+ Lok Dal Party)
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with the left party’s share of seats. This is consistent with the idea that the party associated 
with greater redistribution commands support from members of the group with relatively high 
poverty rates. In contrast, minority 2’s population share does not significantly influence either 
parties electoral performance. This is probably due to the group’s relatively small size, and 
their relative isolation from the mainstream.
I also find that the left party’s seat share increases with the extent of political reservation. 
This finding is consistent with either of two hypotheses. First, that parties are also (partially) 
segregated on caste lines with the left party representing low castes. Second, that increases in 
the extent of reservation alters the policy mix associated with either party such that citizens 
switch their votes to the left party.
Table 2.10 report the results of regressions where we estimate the relationship between leg­
islator party and group identity and policy outcomes. These regressions include as explanatory 
variables both the total proportion of seats reserved for a minority and the proportion of re­
served seats won by each of the two party groupings. The latter is defined as the ratio of 
reserved seats won by a party to total seats. The relationship between the total proportion of 
seats reserved for a group and policy outcomes is as in the previous section. In addition, the 
results show that in the case of targetted transfers minority legislators party identity has addi­
tional explanatory power. The presence of left party minority legislators positively increase the 
transfers targeted towards that group. The evidence in case of Congress legislators is similar 
but weaker. The only exception is the impact of minority 2 legislators on job quotas. Further, 
for every targeted policy I am able to reject the hypothesis that legislators’ belonging to the 
same party but different groups exhibit similar policy behavior.
North-South Differences
Our model of legislator behavior assumed that the marginal policy influence of an additional 
minority legislator is constant. This section examines the validity of this assumption.
The first hypothesis examined is whether the level of societal prejudice affects minority 
legislators’ policy influence. If a minority legislator’s absolute policy influence is greater in 
states where minorities face less oppression, then we should expect minority 1 legislators policy 
influence to be higher in South Indian states. The caste structure in Southern states is both 
less hierarchical and less oppressive. In addition, these states have been witness to long-lived
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successful anti-caste movements. The second hypothesis examined is whether minority legisla­
tors policy influence is increasing in their numerical strength. If yes, then minority 2 legislators 
in Northern states should exhibit higher policy activism. The population share of minority 2 is 
below 5% in all Southern states.
To examine these hypotheses I run regressions of the form:
Pjt  — a j  +  fit +  IfisRjt  +  7 iR j t D j t +  l2 Cjt +  l $ D j t  -1- £jt (2.3)
where D'-t is a dummy which takes the value of one for North Indian states. The coefficient 
7 ls is a measure of the impact of political reservation in Southern states while the coefficient 
of RjtD'-t is informative of North South differences (Ho : 7  ^ =  7 ln — j ls =  0).
Table 2.11 presents estimates of equation (2.3). Political reservation continues to have a 
largely insignificant effect on total expenditure, and there is some (weak) evidence that increases 
in share of minority 1 legislators reduce education spending. Turning to targeted outcomes 
there is evidence of regional differences. Minority l ’s welfare expenditure is largely unaffected 
by variations in the extent of political reservation, though there is weak evidence of opposing 
North-South effects. In case of minority 2 welfare expenditure, we find that the positive influence 
of minority 2 legislators is driven by minority 2 legislators in North Indian states. This finding 
supports the thesis that the numerical strength of legislators matters.
In case of job quotas, the evidence on North South differences is mixed. For both groups 
there is evidence of significant North South differentials. Further, the positive relationship 
between the political reservation and job quotas appears to be driven by political activism by 
minority legislators in Northern states.
Overall, the empirical results support two thesis. First, that minority representation affects 
(some) policy outcomes. Second, the extent to which minority representation affects policy 
outcomes depends on factors such as the party identity of legislators, the overall level of societal 
discrimination and the total numerical strength of minorities in the legislature.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter makes two main contributions. First it provides a theoretical framework for 
thinking about the policy influence of electoral laws that increase minority representation. 
Second, it uses an Indian state level panel data set to examine the relationship between minority 
representation in state legislatures and policy outcomes. The empirical results demonstrate that 
increased minority representation in Indian state legislatures have raised the level of transfers 
going to these groups. The findings have significant implications for policies that try  to change 
outcomes by increasing political power of disadvantaged groups.56
The theory developed in this chapter has three key features. First, both a citizen’s income 
and ethnic identities may form the basis for redistribution. Second, electoral candidates cannot 
commit to policy announcements. Third, the political process is characterised by Plurality rule 
in elections and a Parliamentary form of legislature. The analysis identifies reasons for why 
these features of the model imply that a legislator’s identity influences final policy outcomes. 
Further, the analysis identifies circumstances under which this leads to parties not fielding 
minority candidates. In such situations of minority under-representation, introduction of an 
electoral law of political reservation will alter policy outcomes, primarily by increasing the level 
of targeted transfers.
This prediction is in sharp contrast to that afforded by political economy models which 
assume that politicians can commit to policies during elections57. In such models, parties 
directly commit to policies that maximize their expected utility. Party candidates are rendered 
mere vehicles of party policy and candidate identity is irrelevant to the choice of final policies. 
Instead, the winning party58 directly commits to policies favored by a majority of voters59. 
Therefore, the extent of minority ‘policy’ under-representation only depends on the composition 
of the electorate. Whilst the introduction of an electoral law of political reservation may increase 
the number of minority legislators, it will not influence policy outcomes.
To discriminate between the predictions of these two competing models of political economy
56 Clearly, further research is needed to analyze fully the welfare implications of such increased targeted 
transfers.
57 A similar reasoning applies if we instead assume that candidates only care about electoral success.
58This is conditional on there existing a pure strategy political equilibrium.
59That is, the policy that constitutes a (strict) Condorcet winner.In many economic environments, this is the 
median voter’s preferred policy.
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I develop an empirical test using Indian data. My principal empirical finding is that legislator 
identity has influenced policy choices across Indian states. This influence has primarily taken 
the form of increased targeted transfers. These results provide some credence to the idea that 
politicians are unable to commit to policy announcements.60 More generally, the empirical 
analysis stresses the importance of taking political economy models to data. Only in this way 
are we able to discriminate between the predictions of competing models as regards factors such 
as the policy significance of legislator identity, and whether politicians can commit to policy 
announcements.
This chapter’s findings are encouraging to the idea that electoral data is an important 
resource in analyzing the determinants of policies undertaken by governments of developing 
countries. This is significant as, unlike much other data from these countries, electoral data 
is usually easily available and easily verifiable. In addition, electoral data exhibits sufficient 
time series and cross section variation to be of use in analyzing issues of economic interest. 
Political economy concerns strongly constrain which types of policies are implementable in 
developing countries. Therefore, gaining a better understanding of the determinants of the 
policy formation process is critical to the formation of effective policy. This type of analysis, 
which relies on a blend of theory and empirical testing, is well suited to such purpose. Finally, it 
is worth noting that analyses such as this also provide important insights regarding the optimal 
design of political constitutions - an issue of particular significance for those countries or regions 
which are ethnically, culturally or religiously diverse.
60The results echo the findings of papers that test for the median voter theorem in the US (Levitt 1996). These 
papers conclusively reject the median voter theorem for the US and find evidence that senators’ simply vote 
according to their ideology without regard for the interests of the electorate or party ideology. We conjecture 
that this paper sheds some light on senator ideology. Specifically, it appears that one economically relevant 
component of ‘ideology’ is a legislator’s ethnic identity.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7 .1  M ath em atica l A p p en d ix
The proofs use the notation UR  (71k ) to denote a type (z, c) citizen’s utility when party K  fields 
7tk proportion of low caste candidates and is the majority party. The voting decision of a type 
(z, c) citizen is denoted as a.iC E {P, P} U {0}
Proof o f Proposition 1
Let Npi = NrhTJ^ phP. I demonstrate that if Npi > Npi then in the ensuing political equilibrium 
parties choose {7tr =  P } » citizens vote sincerely and party P ’s candidate wins in every
jurisdiction s.t. p(0,0) =  1. The proof proceeds as follows. I first characterize the political 
equilibrium when {7tr = ®}k €{r p } * I then verify that {7\r  =  form a pair of best
responses.
With {7tr =  Py party R is associated with the following policies:
Spt0) =  0; T r  (0) = 0  W R E n  (2.4)
and party P  with
Sf (0)  = 0-,Tp (0) = ^ ^ r~- (2.5)
In voting, citizens anticipate these policies and vote sincerely. A type (z, c) citizen votes for 
the party who’s final policies maximize her utility Uic. In identifying citizens optimal voting 
behavior I can restrict attention to a single jurisdiction. This is because both the demographic 
composition of jurisdictions and the level of transfers provided across jurisdictions are identical. 
Therefore identical electoral outcomes can be sustained in every jurisdiction.
In any single jurisdiction citizens compare policies of the two parties such that the optimal 
(sincere) voting strategies (aic) are:
(i) For type (r, h) citizens URh (0) >  URh (0) as r  > npp^ ----- . Therefore a*h = R
(ii)For type (p, h) citizens: URh (0) <  URh (0)as p < NpP+NrV. Therefore a*h = P
(iii)For type (r,Z) citizens: UR (0) >  URt (0) as r > Npp~^ NrV. Therefore a*t =  R
(iv)For type (p, /) citizens: (0) <  URt (0)as p < Npp~^Nrr m Therefore a*z =  P
These voting strategies are easily understood. With {nk }kg{r ,p } no party undertakes
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targeted redistribution. Hence, citizens vote along income lines. Types (r, h) and (r, V) citizens 
vote for party R  and types (p, h) and (p, I) for party P. Further, as Np > 1  party P's candidate 
wins. By symmetry, party P ’s candidate wins in every jurisdiction. The final policies are given 
by (2.5).
This constitutes an equilibrium if and only if {7tr = 0}k €{r ,p } constitute a pair of best 
responses. Before I prove this, note that rich low caste citizens do not desire targeted redistri­
bution if r >  NpP+^rr By rearranging terms, this condition can be rewritten as Npi > Npi. 
That is, if Npi > Npi then irrespective of the value itrtakes party R  is associated with no 
redistribution (as given in (2.4)). This is as (2.4) is the preferred policy outcome of all rich 
citizens.
This, in turn, implies that conditional on itp = 0 any deviation by party R  to 7r# > 0 will 
leave party i?’s policies unaffected. Hence the voting decisions will remain unaltered such that 
p(0,0) =  p(0,7Tfl) =  1. Consequently u r ( 0,0) =  u r  ^0,7r^ V7 G n \{0}. Therefore party R  
cannot alter its final payoff by its choice of 7 T r  and t t r  =  0 is a best response for party R. 
For party P  it is easily shown that up(ir'p ,Q) < itp(0,0) V7xp  G n \{0}. Clearly, as party P's 
expected utility is maximised with 7Tp =  0, it constitutes a best response ■
Corollary to  Proposition 1
Introduction of an electoral law of political reservation restricts parties feasible set of en­
try choices, such tha t txr € n ’ 1} VK  G {R ,P }. The proof demonstrates that
conditional on Npi < Npi the ensuing political equilibrium is characterized by party entry 
choices {txr =  k }k ^ r ; sincere voting by citizens and p(txp, txr) =  1 if 7r < ^pp+Nrr’ an<^  
p(np,i?r ) =  0 if 7r <  Npp+Nrr • For simplicity, I assume 7r ^  Np^+Nrf The Proof proceeds as in 
proposition 1.
With {7tr = P} then party R's  policies are
T r (tt) =  0; Sr (7t) = 0 (2.6)
while those associated with party P  are
r q , f )  =  ( ! _ , )  +  )  ; s f ( n )  =  5f (2.7)
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The associated voting behaviour in a jurisdiction are:
(i)For type (r, h) citizens: U ^  (?) > Ufh (?) as r > (1 — ?) . Therefore a*h = R.
(ii)For type (p, h ) citizens: U£h (?) > U£h (?) if p > (1 -  ?) NPp+NrV
=>* > ^ l l  (2.8)
Npp +  Nrr
Therefore a*h = R  if (2.8) holds, else aph = P.
(iii) For type (r , I) citizens: Ufi (?) >  U% (?) if r  >  (1 — ?) m This
is true as long as Npi > Npi. Therefore a*t = R.
(iv) For type (p,Z) citizens: C ^ (? ) < U£ (?)as p < (1 -  ?) ^ NpP+N-r j^ +  ^
Therefore a*t = P.
To characterize the electoral outcome I distinguish between two cases, depending on whether
(2.8) holds.
I. If (2.8) holds then types (r, h), (p, h) and (r ,/) citizens vote for party K s candidate. By 
assumption, Npi < i Therefore, party R's candidate wins in every jurisdiction. In this case 
p (? ,?) =  0 and the final policies are given by (2.6).
To prove that his constitutes a political equilibrium, I need to show that {7 t r  =  ^ } k £ { r p }  
constitute a pair of best responses. Note that the existence of an electoral law of political 
reservation implies tha t neither party can deviate to 7r <  ?. It follows from my characterization 
of citizens’ voting strategies that a deviation by party P  to 7/  >  ?  leaves voting decisions 
unaffected. Hence p(7r/,? ) =  p (? ,? ) V?* G n 7\{?} and up (? ,? ) =  itp ^7 /,?^ . Therefore, 
7rp =  ?  constitutes a best response for party P. For party R, as up(?,7r/) < rtp (?,?) V7/  G 
n '\{? } , 7t r  = ?  constitutes a best response.
II. I now consider the case when (2.8) does not hold. In this case, citizens continue to vote 
along income fines: type (r, h) and (r, /) citizens vote for party R  and types (p, h) and (p, I) 
citizens for party P. As Np > \  party P's  candidate s.t. p (? ,? ) =  1. The final policies are 
given by (2.7).
To check that { n x  =  ? } k g { r , p }  constitute a pair of best responses note that with 7rp =  ?  
a deviation by party R  to n > ?  leaves the policies it is associated with and voting decisions 
unaffected. Hence p(7/ , ? )  =  p(? ,? ) V7/  G n ^ j ? } .  Therefore u r  ( ? , ? )  =  u r  ^ , 7^ s.t. 7rp =  ?
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is a best response for party R. For party P, as u p (n \n )  < up(n, n) Vn' G II/\{7r}, np = n 
constitutes a best response ■
Proof o f Proposition 2
The proof demonstrates that if (i) assumption 1 holds, (ii) Nri > Nph and (iii)A^, > ^ then 
{7tr — 0}/C€{fl,P} constitutes an entry game equilibrium. Citizens vote sincerely and in the 
ensuing equilibrium p(0,0) =  1.
I first characterize the political equilibrium with {7t k  =  ®}k<={R,P}  an-d then check that 
{7tk = constitute a pair of best responses. With {7tk = 0}k€{p,p> Party R  and
party P's  pohcies are given by (2.4) and (2.5) respectively. Therefore the voting decisions are 
exactly the same as those identified in the proof of Proposition 1. That is, types (r, h) and (r, I) 
vote for party R  and types (p, h) and (p, I) for party P. As Np > ^ party P's  candidate wins 
in every jurisdiction and final policies are given by (2.5).
I now check that {7tk =  constitute a pair of best responses. Given np = 0 if
party R  deviates to some np > 0 then the pohcies associated with it alter to:
Given assumption 1, the voting decisions induced axe:
(i)For type (r, h) voters U^h (n R) > U^h (0) if (1 -  nR)r > . Therefore a*h = R  if and
only if np < n  where
(2.9)
(ii)For type (p, h) voters U^h {np) < U£h (0) as (1 -  nR)p < Npp+NrT. Therefore a*h = P.
(iii)For type (r,Z) voters {nR) > U% (0) if (l - n R)r-\-nR (^ NpP^ rT^ < NPp+Nrr. Assmnption 
1 implies this holds, such that a*t = R.
(iv) For type (p, I) voters: U$ {nR) > (0) if (1 - n R)p-\-nR ( NpP^ rT') > NPp+NrV. Therefore
a*t = R  if nR > n where:
Ni Nr( r - p )
~ NiSNp-Nf ip  + Nrr) K }
Note that if 7f < n  then $n G II such that (2.9) and (2.10) are simultaneously satisfied.
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Solving (2.9) and (2.10), I find that a necessary and sufficient condition for 7r < 7r is
Nri > Nph (2.11)
Given that (2.11) holds, this implies that p(0,0) =  1 and the final pohcies axe given by (2.5).
To ensure that { i — 0}xG{i?,P} constitutes an equilibrium I need to consider potentially 
three possible deviations by party R, given 7rp =  0.
(i) If party R  deviates to ttr  G ]0,7f[ then citizen voting decisions remain unaffected. There­
fore, p{0 ,7r) =  p(txr , 7r) =  0 such that uR (0,0) =  uR (0, nR).
(ii) If party R  deviates to 7tr  G ]7f,7r[ then citizens’ optimal voting decision are affected. 
Specifically, it follows from citizens’ optimal voting decisions that types (r, h), (p, h) and (p, I) 
will vote for party P. Further, p(0,7r) =  p(7rp,7r) such that uR (0,0) =  uR ( 0 , 7 T r )
(iii) If party R  deviates to 7rR G ]iI? 1] then types (r, I) and (p, I) will vote for party R  
and types (r, h) and (p, h) for party P. As Nh > i  p(0,0) =  p(0,7Tp) =  0 . Therefore 
uR (0,0) =  uR (0,7rp).
Taken together, (i) - (iii) imply that party R  cannot affect the electoral outcome by its 
choice of irR. Hence p(0,0) =  p(0 , 7 T r )  = 0 VnR G n/{0}. Therefore, I can conclude that 
7tr  = 0 constitutes a best response for party R. Further as up(0,0) >  up(7^,0) V w G n\{0} 
7rp =  0 constitutes a best response for party P  ■
Corollary to  Proposition 2
The proof demonstrates that with the law of political reservation in place {7tr- =  7r} k z { r , p }  
constitutes an entry game equilibrium, supported by a vector of sincere voting decisions such 
that p (7 r, 7r) =  1.
W ith {7tk =  n}Ke{R,p}P&rty R  and party P 's  are given by (2.6) and (2.7) respectively. The 
voting decisions are as in the corollary to proposition 1 and p (7 r ,7 r )  =  1.
I demonstrate that { t t k  — n } k £ { r , p }  constitute a pair of best responses. To do so, I 
consider a possible deviation by the losing party R  to ttr  = 7t (g n x\  {7r}) when 7Tp =  7r. In 
this case party R's policies change to: T R = 0 and 6R = tv' (^ NpP^ rT j^ ■ The associated voting 
decisions are:
(i) For type (r, h) citizens: U ^  ^7r^ > Urh (5?)^
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(1  -  7r >  >  (1  -  tt) ( NpP^ ~  ) (2 .1 2 )
Therefore a*h = R  if (2.12) holds.
(ii) For type ( p , h ) citizens: for V > 7r U^h < Uph ( t t )  as (1 — i r ' ) p  < (1 — 7r) ^ NpP^ NrT->j.
Therefore a*h = P
(iii) For type (r,/) citizens: ^7r'j > U% (7r) as (1 - n )r + n  (npp+^tT) > ( l - 7r) ^ NpP^ Nrr>j  +
7r (^ NpP^ ^ rr j^. Therefore a*t = R.
(iv) For type (p, I) citizens: >  U p i  (5?) if
/i , ’, NpP + Nrr ^ ^  n  ~\ { N pp + N rr \  ^ ( N vp + Nrr \( l - 7 T ) p  +  7 ------ ) > ( 1 - t t ) ( - ^ ------ j + 7 r ( - £ - _  j  (2.13)
Therefore o:*z =  i? if (2.13) holds.
However, it is easily shown that if Nri > Nph then any t t '  € n" which satisfies (2.13) violates 
(2.12). Therefore by the same logic as in proposition 2, it follows party R  cannot influence 
its probability of winning by changing t t r  to some t t ' >  7r. Hence p(7f,7r) =  p(tt, n )  =  1 
Vn E . Therefore party Rfs expected utility is invariant to its choice of ttr and 'Kr  =  7r
is a best response. For party P  as up(7r,7r) > u p(tt' ,7r) G np = 7r constitutes a
best response ■
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2 .7 .2  D a ta  A p p en d ix
Relevant Provisions in the Constitution o f India (1950)
Identification of minority 1 and minority 2:
Article 341 and 342 of the Indian constitution define the mechanism for declaring communi­
ties as belonging to minority 1 and minority 2 respectively. The Article(s) state: ‘the President 
after consultation with the Governor of the state by public notifications specifies the castes, 
races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which for the purposes of this 
Constitution shall be deemed to be minority 1 (scheduled castes) or specify the tribes or tribal 
communities or parts of it as minority 2 (scheduled tribes) respectively in that state.’
In keeping with this article a scheduled caste order and a scheduled tribe order was pro­
mulgated by the President in 1950. These were based on the 1931 census criteria and 1950 
tribal identification criteria, respectively (see Table 1). In 1956 this list were revised to remove 
anomalies. The lists remained stable until 1976 when a Parliamentary bill eliminated intra-state 
area restrictions on identification of these groups (our population measure takes account of this 
change). The criteria for identification of these groups has, however, remained unaltered since 
1950.
Com position of State Legislature and provisions for political reservation61
Article 170 of the Constitution states that a uniform ratio of population be maintained in 
the division of a State into territorial assembly constituencies. Section 3 of Article 170 states 
that upon the completion of each census the total number of seats be adjusted.
Article 330 provides for the reservation of seats for minority 1 and minority 2 in the Na­
tional Parliament. Article 332 provides for political reservation for minorities 1 and 2 in State 
Legislative Assemblies.
Section 3 of Article 332 identifies the basis for political reservation. It states tha t,‘the 
number of seats reserved shall bear as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total 
number of seats in the Assembly as the population of minority 1 in the state or the minority
61 The constitutional provision of reserved seats is complemented by statutory provisions to enhance political 
participation by these groups- Smaller election deposits are required from them and they enjoy more permissive 
residence requirements.
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2 in the state, as the case maybe, in respect of which seats are so reserved, bears to the total 
population in the state’.
Adm inistration of Elections and Delim itation of Constituencies
The Indian Constitution provides for the establishment of an Election Commission fully 
independent of the Union and State Governments. The Constitution vests in the Election 
Commission the power of superintendence, direction and control of elections.
After Independence, the Parliament passed a law entrusting the work of delimitation to 
a three member commission called the Delimitation Commission. This commission consists 
of a retired Supreme Court judge, a sitting High Court Judge and the Chief Election Com­
missioner, (for further details, see Galanter 1984). The delimitation commission and election 
commission are together responsible for division of a state into constituencies. The orders of 
the delimitation commission and election commission have the force of law and cannot be called 
into question in any court.
Delimitation Commissions were constituted in 1953 (the same commission continued real­
location of seats in 1956) and after the census in 1961 and 1971. The election commission 
was entrusted with the duty of readjusting the proportion of seats reserved after the 1976 area 
delimitation act.
Finally, we should note that in 1976 the total number of constituencies in the Legislative 
assembly of a state were frozen by a National act of Parliament. Therefore post 1976 there 
has been an increased discrepancy between the proportion of minority 1 and 2 in a state and 
proportion of seats reserved.
D etails o f data-set
The data-set used in this paper has been put together from a number of sources. It builds 
on a Indian state level panel data-set collated by Ozler, Datt and Ravallion (1996) and Tim 
Besley and Robin Burgess (1998). The main variables used from the Ozler, Datt and Ravallion 
(1996) data-set are the price indices and output data. The main variables used from the Besley 
and Burgess data-set are the basic public expenditure and electoral data. To this, I have added 
data on targeted expenditure across Indian states and electoral data pertaining to reserved 
seats.
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The data covers the sixteen main Indian states (see table 4). Until 1965 there were 15 states. 
In 1965 Haryana split from Punjab and is entered as a separate variable thereafter.
Public  finance d a ta : The primary source for the public finance data regarding non targeted 
expenditure is the Reserve Bank of India annual publication Report on Currency and Finance.
The first measure of targeted expenditure ‘m ino rity  1 w elfare’ is the state outlays on the 
‘special component plan’. The Special component plan was begun in 1980. The state outlays 
under the SCP are designed to channelise the flow of outlays and benefits from the general 
sectors in the plans of States for development of minority 1 members.
‘M inority  2 w elfare’ includes expenditure under the state plan on ‘tribal sub plan’. This 
scheme began in 1974. The purported aim is that under these schemes every state department 
must allocate a certain amount of its budgetary resources for minority 2 welfare.
Data on these categories was obtained directly from ministry of welfare documents.
A sset red is trib u tio n  d a ta : The cumulative land reform index was created by Besley and 
Burgess (1998). The variable is a cumulative measure the total number of land reform legisla­
tions passed by a state.62 For further details on construction of this variable, see Besley and 
Burgess 1998.
Articles 16(4), 320(4) and 335 provide for job reservations for mmebers of minority 1 and 
2 in state government services. In a few states both groups share a common reservation. Jobs 
in the state government services axe divided into four classes. The job quota variable measures 
the average reservation for the four classes.63 For consistency we consider the total job quotas 
in a state. The variable has been constructed using information given in the annual reports of 
the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Commissioner.
Inequality  d a ta : The measure of state level inequality used is the Gini coefficient. It is taken 
from the Ozler, Datt and Ravallion (1996) data-set. The measure is based on consumption 
data from the 22 rounds of consumption expenditure survey conducted by the Indian National 
Sample Survey.
P opu la tion  d a ta : Population estimates are derived from the five censuses for 1951, 1961, 
1971, 1981 and 1991. We derive yearly population estimates by assuming that between any two
62These reforms can broadly be divided into tenancy reform, abolition of intermediaries, ceilings on land 
holdings and consolidation of land plots.
63In most cases the job quota is constant across the four classes.
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censuses population grew at a constant (exponential) growth rate, derived from the respective 
population totals. The census provides information on the general, minority 1 and minority 2 
populations separately. In 1976, change in the legal classification of minority 1 and minority 2 
led to an increase in their population. We treat this is the following way- we calculate annual 
population for the period 1961-1976 using the estimates for 1961 and 1971. For 1977-1981 we 
use 1971 census estimates recalculated using new population figures and the 1981 figure. There 
is therefore a break in the population series in 1977.
Political reservation data
Data on the proportion of seats reserved in every state legislature for minority land minority 
2 has been collated from the Election Commission document relating to election in a state. The 
data on the party distribution of these seats also derives from the same source.64
641 am grateful to Dr. Prannoy Roy for providing me with access to constituency level electoral data in 
computerised form.
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TABLE 2.1: LEGAL IDENTIFICATION OF MINORITY GROUPS IN INDIA1
Selection Criteria for minority 1 (1931 Census)
• Can be served by clean Brahmans or not
• Can be served by the barbers, water-carriers, tailors etc. who serve the caste Hindus
• Pollutes a high-caste Hindu by contact or by proximity
• Is one from whose hands a caste Hindu can take water
• Is debarred from using public amenities, such as roads, ferries, wells or schools
• Will be treated as an equal by high caste men of the same educational qualification in
ordinary social intercourse
• Is depressed on account of the occupation followed and whether, but for that, 
occupation would be subject to no social disability
Selection Criteria for minority 2 (1950 Presidential List)
• Tribal origin
• Primitive ways of life and habitation in remote and less accessible areas
• General backwardness in all respects
1 The constitution of India (article 341 and 342) states that the designation of castes and tribes as belonging 
to minority 1 and 2 groups respectively will be undertaken by Presidential orders. The criteria in this table 
have formed the basis for such Presidential orders.
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TABLE 2.2: ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MINORITY GROUPS IN INDIA2
total non minority minority 1 minority 2
population population population population
% population share 100 75.4 16.4 7.9
%  urban population 25.7 29.2 18.7 7.3
literacy rate 52.2 57.8 37.4 29.6
% main work force 32.8 36 42
% workers employed in 
the Primary sector3
67.5 62.1 77.1 90
% population below  
poverty line4
36.9 31.15 53.1 58.4
TABLE 2.3: REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY GROUPS IN UNRESERVED 
SEATS OF INDIAN STATE LEGISLATURES5
Lower house o f state legislatures
year number o f unreserved o f which: minority 1 o f which: minority 2
seats legislators legislators
1967 2723 4 8
1975 2958 4 -
Upper house o f state legislatures
Number o f seats o f which: minority 1 o f which: minority 2
legislators legislators
19646 750 12 7
19747 294 23 3
2 Source: Census o f India 1991
3 This sector primarily includes those employed in the agricultural sector
4 Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy for 1983-84
5 Source: Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Commissioner’s reports- various years
6 This data is for 10 Indian states
7 This data is for 7 Indian states
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TABLE 2.4: MAIN STATE ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
itate minority minority minority minority state minority 1 minority2 education Job Cum total
1 popn. 2 popn. 1 Seats 2 Seats income expenditure expenditure expenditure quota landreforr
(%) (%) (%) (%) (rs. p.c) (% of total) (% of total) (% oftotal) (%) legisln.
\ndhra 14 4 13.6 4.3 1004 3.7 1.33 20.05 18.11 1.52
5radesh (0.96) (1) (0.52) (0.67) (260) (1.39) (0.33) (1.67) (1.56) (0.50)
\ssam 6 13 6.1 16.34 903 1.41 3.89 25.2 17.41 2.00
(0.3) (3) (0.9) (4.93) (196) (0.74) (0.47) (1.99) (1.29) (1.06)
Jihar 14 7 13.9 9.16 633 3.97 8.86 24.74 36.9 4.30
(0.3) (1) (0.91) (0.59) (110) (0.72) (2.99) (2.55) (9.6) (1.92)
Gujarat 7 14 6.9 13.65 1176 1.38 4.29 21.84 17.93 3.05
(0.3) (0.5) (0.35) (0.55) (272) (0.54) (1.87) (2.94) (3.2) (1.26)
daryana 19.17 0 18.7 0 1444 4.24 0 17.7 20.1 0
(0.28) (0) (0.18) (0) (357.4) (1.62) (0) (0.81) (0.89) (0)
ammu 8 0 7.5 0 1021 1.96 0 15.67 4 1.33
'Cashmir (0.5) (0) (0.98) (0) (228) (0.9) (0) (1.51) (4.05) (0.71)
Carnataka 14 2 13.9 0.78 1037 3.87 0.27 20.25 19.75 2.83
(1-2) (1.7) (0.64) (0.19) (216) (1.29) (0.16) (1-33) (3.07) (1.38)
Cerala 9 1 8.76 1.05 864 2.35 0.36 31.2 10 5.44
(0.7) (0.1) (0.43) (0.37) (182) (0.45) (0.19) (3.7) (0.1) (3.37)
dadhya 13 21 13.7 21.06 843 3.48 8.55 19.12 31.09 2.80
’radesh (0.5) (1-4) (0.81) (1.94) (190) (0.60) (4.02) (1.98) (7.23) (0.71)
daharasht 7 7 7.7 6.46 1288 1.35 2.26 19.47 18.10 1.86
a (1.6) (1.6) (2.9) (1.02) (331) (0.38) (0.63) (1-01) (2.9) (0.42)
)rrissa 15 22 15.82 22.68 873 4.76 11.72 20.38 39.8 5.05
(0.5) (0.5) (1.34) (1.31) (186) (2.17) (4.8) (1.09) (1-25) (3.11)
’unjab 28 0 23.1 0 1732 2.85 0 21.96 22.6 0.58
(4) (1.54) (0) (384) (1.16) (0) (2.88) (2.72) (0.50)
tajasthan 16 12 16.17 11.51 785 4.22 3.45 21.59 23.86 0.94
;
1
(0.6) (0.3) (0.42) (0.37) (136) (0.77) (1.41) (1.32) (6.75) (0.23)
(Tamil 18 0.8 17.96 0.9 1015 4.65 0.24 21.41 16.69 4.91
Nadu (0.4) (0.1) (0.03) (0.32) (272) (1.05) (0.07) (1.91) (1.09) (2.54)
Uttar 21 0.7 21.03 0.12 874 4.6 0.03 21.13 32.58 3.75
Pradesh (0.16) (0.9) (0.38) (0.11) (140) (1.01) (0.01) (1.79) (6.67) (1.25)
pest 20 5 19.3 5.8 1173 2.78 1.2 23.45 27.08 6.13
lengal (3.2) (0.13) (0.94) (0.09) (191) (0.48) (0.37) (1.65) (7.59) (5.58)
’OTAL 14.5 7.29 14.01 7.30 1030.52 3.24 2.95 21.33 22.29 2.91
(6.16) (7.49) (5.28) (7.70) (346.12) (1.57) (4.07) (4.56) (10.3) (2.74)
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The data appendix provides further details.
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TABLE 2.5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL VARIABLES
units mean
standard
deviation years
Policy choices
1. state expenditure p.c. rs. per person 197.88 86.2 1974-928
of which:
2. minority 1 welfare share9 % 3.24 1.57 1980-92
3. minority 2 welfare share10 % 2.96 4.08 1974-92
4. education share % 21.59 3.95 1974-92
5. cumulative land reform absolute nos. 2.9 2.74 1957-92
index
6. minority job quota % 22.29 10.62 1957-92
Political reservation11
Seats reserved for 
1. minority 1 in state % 14.01 5.28 1957-92
legislatures 
2. minority 2 in state % 7.30 7.7 1957-92
legislatures
Budget constraint variables
1. state income p .c .12 rs. per person 1030.5 346 1960-92
2. federal grants p.c.13 rs. per person 29.31 35.31 1958-92
Income distribution and demographic variables
1. gini coefficient % 29.7 3.8 1958-92
2. minority 1 population % 14.19 5.62 1957-92
3. minority 2 population. % 7.40 7.49 1957-92
Political variables15
1. seats won by congress party % 49.1 25.1 1957-92
of which
(a) minority 1 seats 7.09 4.53
(b) minority 2 seats 4.1 5.19
2. seats won by left parties % 23.3 22.5 1957-92
of which:
(a) minority 1 seats 2.93 4.16
(b) minority 2 seats .93 2.42
8 missing for J&K for 1992
9 missing for 1984 for all states except andhrapradesh & assam, missing for 1980 and 1981 for J&K
10 for andhra we lack 1986 data, for maharashtra & tamilnadu 1974 data and 1974,1975 & 1986 for UP
11 For J&K the series starts in 1962, and for Punjab and Haryana in 1966
121992 data is missing for Haryana, Punjab and J&K
13 1992 data is missing for J&K
14 we lack 1958 data for Gujarat, 1960 and 1992 data for J&K, 1958 data for maharashtra
15 for haryana the data begins in 1966, for J&K we lack data for 1957-61
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TABLE 2.6: MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND POLICY CHOICES
general policies targeted policies
total state 
expenditure 
p.c. 
(rs./person)
education
spending
(%)
cum. land 
reform 
legislation 
(no.)
minority 1 
welfare 
spending 
(%)
minority 2 
welfare 
spending 
(%)
total job 
quotas
(%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
model OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS OLS
%  seats reserved for 
minority 1
0.588
(0.164)
-0.746
(2.854)
0.057
(1.524)
-0.468
(0.991)
-0.310
(1.116)
0.611
(4.443)
%  seats reserved for 
minority 2
-2.305
(1.168)
0.209
(1.028)
-0.0003
(0.011)
-0.644
(1.318)
0.949
(3.388)
0.376
(2.191)
%  minority 1 
population
-4.305
(1.280)
0.786
(3.352)
0.140
(3.384)
0.076
(0.529)
-0.461
(2.413)
0.683
(4.338)
%  minority 2 
population
5.211
(2.639)
-0.616
(3.185)
-0.106
(2.531)
0.269
(0.759)
-0.460
(1.943)
-0.210
(0.860)
F -test: reservation & 
population variables 
election dummy
cumulative land 
reform (t-4)
F(4,264)=2.21 
(0.06)
2.809
(0.644)
F(4, 264)=7.4 
(0)
0.079
(0.294)
Chi2(4)=17.9
(0.001)
0.006
(0.093)
0.085
(4.124)
F(4,158)=1.6
(0.17)
0.120
(0.464)
F(4,258)=6.3
(0.0001)
-0.346
(1.481)
F(4,490)=13.6
(0)
-0.282
(0.602)
state indicators? yes yes yes yes yes yes
year indicators? yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.98 0.99 (pseudo):0.41 0.93 0.90 0.97
sample size 303 304 501 192 298 553
All OLS regressions are reported with robust standard errors. For OLS regressions t-statistics are 
in parenthesis, and for Poisson regression z-statistic. The data is for sixteen states. For all public 
finance regressions, except minority 1, expenditure regressions we use 1974-1992 data. Lack of 
1992 state income data for Jammu and Kashmir reduces the sample size in the column (1) 
regression. Lack of minority 2 expenditure data for 6 observations (for details, see descriptive 
statistics) reduces sample size in the column (5) regression. The minority 1 expenditure 
regression uses data for 1980-92. 16 observations on minority 1 expenditure are missing (for 
details, see descriptive statistics). The land reform regression uses data from 1961-1992. The job 
quota regression uses data from 1957-1992. In both cases the sample size is reduced by the fact 
that the data on political reservation begins in 1966 for Punjab and Haryana, and in 1962 for 
Jammu and Kashmir.
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TABLE 2.7: MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND POLICY CHOICES: 
___________ CONTROLLING FOR OMITTED VARIABLES___________
general policies
total state education 
expenditure spending 
p.c.
(rs./person) (%)
cum. land 
reform 
legislation 
(no.)
minority 1 
welfare 
spending 
(%)
Targeted policies
minority 2 total job 
welfare quotas 
spending
(%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
model OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS OLS
% seats reserved for -0.587 -0.509 0.041 -0.474 -0.255 0.538
minority 1 in legislature (0.198) (1.858) (0.838) (1.004) (0.916) (1.976)
% seats reserved for -1.169 0.227 -0.028 -0.574 0.946 -0.011
minority 2 in legislature (0.631) (1.059) (0.556) (1.054) (3.374) (0.035)
% minority 1 population -4.898 1.072 0.154 -0.015 -0.407 1.120
(1.784) (4.520) (3.181) (0.108) (2.03) (6.322)
% minority 2 population 2.592 -0.649 -0.109 0.291 -0.445 -0.499
(1.387) (3.303) (2.234) (0.705) (1.814) (1.895)
electoral dummy 2.390 0.173 0.003 0.110 -0.325 -0.333
(0.584) (0.655) (0.045) (0.411) (1.370) (0.802)
state income p.c. (t-4) 0.110 -0.002 -0.0003 0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(4.827) (1.670) (0.602) (0.758) (0.910) (2.781)
federal grants to state 0.471 0.046 0.002 -0.001 0.008 0.026
p.c. (t-4) (1.811) (3.551) (0.780) (0.092) (0.909) (2.039)
gini coefficient (t-4) 0.728 -0.013 0.003 -0.033 -0.02 -0.065
(0.877) (0.243) (0.227) (0.723) (0.408) (0.638)
cumulative land reform 
(t-4)
state indicators? yes yes
0.06
(2.747)
yes yes yes yes
year indicators? yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.99 0.99 (pseudo): 0.40 0.93 0.91 0.98
sample size 303 304 443 192 298 443
All OLS regressions are reported with robust standard errors. For OLS regressions t-statistics are 
in parenthesis, and for Poisson regression z-statistic. The data are for the sixteen major states. For 
the public finance regressions the time period covered is as in table 2.6. For the asset 
redistribution regressions (columns 3 and 6) we have data from 1964-92 for 12 states. For 
Haryana (which was formed from Punjab in 1965) we have data from 1970-92. For Punjab we 
have data from 1969-92. For Jammu and Kashmir we have data from 1968-92 and for Assam we 
have data for 1964,1969 and 1972-92.
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TABLE 2.8a: THE POPULATION AND RESERVATION CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Population group Correlation coefficient
(variables considered: deviations from mean of
the population and reservation series respectively)
minority 1 0.22
minority 2 0.18
TABLE 2.8b: POPULATION AND RESERVATION REGRESSION
% seats reserved for minority 1 % seats reserved for minority 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
model OLS OLS OLS OLS
% minority 1 population 0.965
(190.756)
0.099
(1.431)
1.000
(135.585)
% minority 2 population 0.870
(11.811)
Election dummy 
state effects no
-.008
(0.083)
yes no
-0.032
(0.248)
yes
year effects no yes no yes
R squared 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99
sample size 553 553 553 553
All regressions are reported with robust standard errors. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. The 
regressions uses data from 1957-1992 for the sixteen major states. The sample size is reduced by 
the fact that the data on political reservation begins in 1966 for Punjab and Haryana, and in 1962 
for Jammu and Kashmir.
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TABLE 2.9: POLITICAL RESERVATION AND PARTY PERFORMANCE
model
% seats won by 
congress
% seats won by 
left party grouping
(1) (2)
% seats reserved for -1.139 1.047
minority 1 (1.270) (2.194)
% seats reserved for 0.347 0.599
minority 2 (0.488) (0.892)
% minority 1 population -2.287 2.472
(3.372) (4.198)
% minority 2 population 0.442 -0.886
(0.552) (0.971)
state indicators? yes yes
year indicators? yes yes
R2 0.90 0.79
sample size 553 553
All regressions are reported with robust standard errors. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. The 
regressions uses data from 1957-1992 for the sixteen major states. The sample size is reduced by 
the fact that the data on political reservation begins in 1966 for Punjab and Haryana, and in 1962 
for Jammu and Kashmir.
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TABLE 2.10: PARTY IDENTITY AND CASTE IDENTITY
general policies
total state education 
expenditure spending 
p.c.
rs./person (%)
cum. land 
reform 
legislation 
(no.)
minority 1 
welfare 
spending 
(%)
targeted policies
minority 2 total job quotas 
welfare 
spending
(%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
model OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS OLS
Proportion seats 0.997 -0.735 0.066 -0.871 -0.303 0.401
reserved for minority 1 (0.294) (2.783) (1.580) (1.907) (1.107) (2.806)
Proportion seats -5.089 0.257 -0.004 -0.332 0.866 0.524
reserved for minority 2 (1.816) (1.158) (0.122) (0.593) (2.913) (2.723)
%  seats reserved for minority 1 won 
congress party -1.591
by:
-0.018 -0.005 -0.001 .0003 0.09
(1.643) (0.318) (0.388) (0.003) (0.013) (1.321)
left party grouping -2.865 0.013 -0.001 0.107 -0.048 0.271
(2.403) (0.187) (0.113) (1.778) (1.263) (3.431)
%  seats reserved for minority 2 won by 
congress party 2.638 -0.065 0.008 -0.105 0.218 -0.257
(2.403) (1.045) (0.536) (2.442) (2.355) (2.666)
left party grouping 3.707 -0.066 0.007 -0.050 0.267 -0.213
(3.180) (0.981) (0.427) (0.562) (2.483) (2.091)
% minority 1 population -5.141 0.780 0.143 0.128 -0.508 0.502
(1.519) (3.331) (3.283) (0.910) (2.698) (3.121)
% minority 2 population 5.718 -0.641 -0.108 0.314 -0.390 -0.268
(2.960) (3.259) (2.568) (0.874) (1.692) (1.102)
election dummy 3.231 0.036 0.004 0.080 -0.256 -0.317
(0.747) (0.136) (0.066) (0.322) (1.174) (0.664)
cum. land reform(t-4) 
state indicators? yes yes
0.080
(3.594)
yes yes yes yes
year indicators? yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.98 0.99 (pseudo)0.41 0.94 0.91 0.99
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F-tests for legislators 
elected from minority 1 2.44
TABLE 2.10(continuec 
3.63 2.30
)
3.81 2.31 4.21
seats (p value) (0.089) (0.027) (0.31) (0.024) (0.101) (0.015)
elected from minority 2 4.82 1.03 0.09 0.30 2.29 4.85
seats (p value) (0) (0.358) (0.95) (0.739) (0.103) (0.008)
congress16 legislators 4.80 0.19 0.09 1.52 4.33 5.82
(p value) (0.029) (0.663) (0.76) (0.219) (0.038) (0.016)
left legislators 8.95 0.40 0 1.52 6.71 10.26
(p value) (0.003) (0.527) (.11) (0.219) (0.010) (0.001)
sample size 303 304 501 192 298 553
A ll OLS regressions are reported with robust standard errors. For OLS regressions t-statistics are 
in parenthesis, and for Poisson regression z-statistic. The data is for sixteen states. The years 
covered in each regression and resulting sample size is as in Table 2.6 (see endnote o f table 2.6 
for details).
16 This F-test is a joint test of the equality of the coefficients for any party: (proportion SC 
legislators)=(proportion ST legislators)=(proportion gen. Legislators)
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TABLE 2.11 NORTH-SOUTH D 1FFERENCES
general policies targeted policies
total state 
expenditure 
p.c. 
rs./person
education
spending
(%)
cum. land 
reform 
legislation 
(no.)
minority 1 
welfare 
spending 
(%)
minority 2 
welfare 
spending 
(%)
total job quotas
(%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
model OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS OLS
%  seats reserved for 
minority 1 in south17
-2.416
(0.353)
-1.463
(1.785)
0.039
(0.239)
-2.972
(1.251)
-0.647
(1.017)
-2.892
(3.650)
north south differences 9.718
(1.296)
1.011
(1.215)
0.219
(0.133)
2.606
(1.076)
0.029
(0.043)
3.554
(4.354)
% seats reserved for 
minority 2 in south
15.939
(1.690)
0.284
(0.281)
0.067
(0.363)
3.905
(0.603)
-0.492
(0.707)
-5.306
(6.246)
north south differences -22.448
(2.508)
-0.292
(0.297)
-0.070
(0.395)
-4.698
(0.735)
1.612
(2.169)
5.525
(7.008)
%  minority 1 
population
-5.341
(1.613)
0.761
(3.256)
0.139
(3.356)
0.073
(0.503)
-0.393
(2.139)
0.726
(4.744)
% minority 2 
population
5.594
(2.571)
-0.531
(2.360)
-0.105
(2.263)
0.248
(0.697)
-0.416
(1.486)
0.221
(0.801)
election dummy
cumulative land 
reform (t-4)
2.447
(0.572)
0.086
(0.313)
0.006
(0.095)
0.087
(4.128)
0.093
(0.346)
-0.312
(1.331)
-0.142
(0.311)
state indicators? yes yes yes yes yes yes
year indicators? yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.98 0.99 (pseudo):0.41 0.93 0.91 0.98
sample size 303 304 501 192 298 553
All OLS regressions are reported with robust standard errors. For OLS regressions t-statistics are 
in parenthesis, and for Poisson regression z-statistic. The data is for sixteen states. The years 
covered in each regression and resulting sample size is as in Table 2.6 (see endnote of table 2.6 
for details).
17 The regressions included the variable % seats reserved for minority 1 and the same interacted with a 
North India dummy. The dummy took the value of one for north Indian states and zero for South Indian 
states.
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C hapter 3
R ead M y Lips: The P olitical 
Econom y o f Inform ation  
Transm ission
3.1 Introduction
One of basic tenets of public economics is that pure public goods should be provided by gov­
ernments. Information of common interest to citizens, such as public safety announcements, 
seem like a clear cut application of this principle. In some countries, this aspect of government 
intervention is taken much further. For example, the direction of investment strategies of pri­
vate firms is often associated with the economic success of East Asia. Indeed Japan’s Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry is often held up as a paragon of indicative planning where 
firms were encouraged to invest in leading sectors.2 Unquestioning adherence to the view that 
governments should act as knowledge banks for their citizens does, however, require that they 
face no agency problems in deciding what to reveal. This chapter analyzes how the power to
1T h is  ch a p ter  is jo in t  w ith  T im  B esley .
2MITI has been responsible for Japan’s industrial policy post World War II . Conventional wisdom is that 
industrial policy as determined by MITI played an important role in Japan’s subsequent growth performance 
(See for instance, World Bank (1993)).One of MITI’s primary functions was to provide information to the private 
sector via deliberation councils which had members from the Japanese government and the Private sector. Firms 
could choose to not heed MITI’s advice, the creation of the Mitsubishi Automobile company in 1965 against 
MITI’s advice is a case in point.
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redistribute can interfere with incentives for credible information transmission and can lead to 
political failure in the transmission of information. We consider a model where private sector 
investment decisions could be informed by information available to the government. However, 
citizens must rely on politicians elected to carry out redistributive strategies to make announce­
ments. In some cases identified here, this leads to under-exploitation of profitable investment 
opportunities and Pareto inefficiency.
The analysis is related to the growing literature that incorporates imperfect information into 
political economy models, some of which consider the role of cheap talk. We suppose that the 
policy maker is privately informed. This is a common informational assumption in the extensive 
literature on political agency models — see, for example, Rogoff (1990) who demonstrates how 
costly signalling on the part of governments to affect re-election probabilities can result in 
political business cycles. In contrast, we focus on costless signaling. Stein’s (1989) analysis 
of cheap talk by a central bank is related to this chapter. He suggests that limits on credible 
information transmission explain why organizations like the Federal Reserve may make only 
imprecise policy announcements.
Recent electoral models have focused on situations where some citizens are better informed 
than others prior to an election. This approach includes the recent work by Feddersen and 
Pesendorfer (1996) on how well voting aggregates information. Grossman and Helpman (1999) 
allow for the possibility of imperfectly informed voters being swayed by special interest group 
endorsements which take the form of cheap talk. Banerjee and Somanathan (1997) consider 
the role of cheap talk in a world in which citizens enjoy an informational advantage. However, 
rather than modeling elections, they consider the possibility of direct reports of the state of the 
world to an uninformed policy maker. They demonstrate why only certain kinds of citizens get 
the ear of policy makers and hence are influential in the policy process.
Other papers have focused on how legislative processes may be affected by communication. 
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) and Austen-Smith (1990) focus on how strategic pronouncements 
by committees can influence legislation passed on the floor of a legislature. In similar spirit, 
Matthews (1989) considers how rhetoric (modeled as cheap talk) can affect policy outcome 
in an environment where a president with veto power faces a legislature which is imperfectly 
informed about the president’s type.
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Many of these contributions build on Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) seminal work on strate­
gic information transmission. They showed how diversity in preferences between a sender and 
receiver limits the amount of information that can be credibly conveyed. In comparison, in this 
chapter, the extent of preference diversity is endogenous. The policy maker and hence message 
sender is elected. Our model embeds the cheap talk game in an explicit economic environ­
ment where individuals make private investment and labor supply decisions and governments 
redistribute. This allows for a clear distinction between the issues of how much information is 
revealed in equilibrium and whether investment outcomes axe inefficient in a conventional Pare­
tian sense. We show that (lack of) revelation of information is a distinct issue from whether 
the outcome can be Pareto dominated.
We embed our game of information transmission in a model where citizens are uncertain 
about the value of particular investment strategies and rely on the government to advise them 
on this. After receiving government advice the investment decisions are made. Finally, the 
government can choose to redistribute income across groups. We demonstrate how the pos­
sibility of redistribution is responsible for how credibly governments transmit information — 
a government that cannot redistribute or has no desire to do so faces no credibility problem 
in our model. The choice of the citizen who transmits information and makes redistributive 
decisions is determined in an election. This provides a simple way of making the policy choice 
and information transmission decision endogenous. We use the model to identify when it is 
possible to have a Pareto dominated policy choice selected in political equilibrium.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section lays out the model. 
Section 3.3 considers the complete information case, while section 3.4 extends this to incomplete 
information. Section 3.5 discusses political economy and welfare issues in the model. Section 
3.6 discusses some possible extensions and implications of the results. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The M odel
The economy consists of N  citizens indexed by i 6  {l,..,iV} and lasts one period. There 
axe two productive sectors in the economy, indexed by £ G {A, B}. Citizens either belong to 
sector A or B. The total number of citizens belonging to sector t  is denoted N*. Each citizen
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is endowed with one unit of capital and one unit of labor. We assume that an individual can 
only supply his labor in his own sector3 at a wage rate W£ G {w a,wb} and that wB > u>A- 
On the other hand, capital can be invested indivisibly in either sector, where ki = 1 denotes 
that individual i invests in sector A  and ki = 0 denotes investment in sector B. The return to 
capital in sector t  is denoted where j  denotes the state of the world.
There are four possible states of the world, two of which favor sector A  and two of which 
favor sector B. A base return r is guaranteed in every state. However, an additional incremental 
return may also be available. These increments are denoted {A h , A l } with Ah  > A l  and
tax =  r  +  A h  > rm = r  (3.1)
?A2 =  r +  A l > rB2 =  r 
rB3 =  r + A L > rAz = f  
rB 4 =  r +  A h  > rA4 = r
Hence, in states 1 and 2 sector A  is favored and in states 3 and 4 sector B  is favored. While a 
citizen can invest in either sector, we suppose that it is cheaper to invest in one’s own sector. 
We suppose that this is due to unmodelled monitoring costs denoted by 8. A key assumption 
that we maintain throughout the analysis is
Assum ption 1: A B >  8 >  A l  >  0.
This implies that the returns are sufficient to cover the transaction cost of investing out of 
sector only if the return is A h - Thus it is not enough to know which sector is favored — it is 
necessary to know by how much.
We allow the government to intervene in the economy by redistributing income. We suppose 
that it does so by levying an income tax and redistributing the proceeds back to the citizens in 
lump sum form. The parameters of the tax system are therefore an income tax rate t G [0,1] and 
an income guarantee level T  G 3ft. While this is a simplistic picture of real world redistributive 
strategies, it suffices to make the main points of this chapter. We assume that the tax base does
3 We donot explicitly model the causes of this sectoral labour immobility. Possible causes include non- 
transferable human capital investments on the part of citizens and spatial differences in location of the two 
sectors.
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not allow investors to deduct their cross sectoral investment monitoring costs from their taxable 
income. This seems reasonable given many of these are likely to be non-pecuniary costs.
The preferences of a citizen i located in sector A  in state j  axe
(1 - t) [w aI +  rA jh  +  rBj( 1 -  ki)] -  (f)(1) -  <5(1 -  ki) +  T
where </>(•) is a common disutility of labor function which we suppose to be smooth, increasing 
and convex. For citizen i located in sector B  preferences are
(1 -  t) [wBl +  rAjki +  rBj ( l  -  h)] -  <f>(l) -  6k{ +  T
It is clear that the optimal labor supply in either sector is
I* =  argm ax{(l — t)wel — (f)(1) : I G [0,1]} .
Let v ((1 — t) we) = (1  — t) w tl* — <f>(l*) and define
Vj* (wA, k i,t ,T )  = v ( ( l - t ) w A) +
(1  -  t) [rAjh +  rBj(  1 — fcj)] -  <5(1 -  ki) +  T, and
V f  (wB,k i,t ,T )  = v ( ( l - t ) w B) +
(1 -  t) [rAjh +  rBj(  1 -  fo)] —6ki + T
as the indirect utility function of a representative individual in each sector. Individuals may be 
imperfectly informed about the true state of the world. In this case let qj be the (commonly 
held) probability that the state is j  and let
4
W e (q, ki, we, t,T )  =  qjV f (wt , k{,t, T)
.7=1
denote their ex ante expected utility.
Given a particular state of the world and a particular vector of investment decisions is
83
realized, we can define the vector of ex post feasible tax and transfer policies in state j .  These 
will satisfy the following government budget constraint.
N T  = t [ ( E i l i  fci) rAj + [jV -  k,] rBj+
w aN a I*a (C1 “  wa ) +  wBN Bl*B ((1 - 1) wB)\
Defining k = (k\ , ..., k^), let Zj  (k ) denote the set of (£,T) pairs that satisfy this equation.
3.3 Full Information
We begin by studying equilibrium investment and policy decisions under full information about 
the state. This provides a useful benchmark to compare with the case where investors are ill 
informed about the state of the world. The timing considered in this section is as follows. First, 
nature selects the state which is observable to all. Second, individuals make investment deci­
sions. Finally, government chooses a redistributive policy after which each individual chooses 
his/her labor supply. We are interested in the case where individuals cannot influence gov­
ernment policy through their private sector actions. This is true if the government budget 
constraint is independent of z’s decision. Hence, we consider a large N  where the fractions 
N a /N  (=  7ta) and N B/N  (= (1 — ka)) are fixed, and 'Ka £ [0,1]. We focus on the case where 
everyone within a sector behaves symmetrically. In that case we can think of an investment 
strategy for a representative member of sector t  denoted Kg, with K t = 1 denoting the case 
where members of sector i  invest in sector A  and Kg = 0 denoting the case where sector t  
members invest in sector B. Let K  =  (K a , K b ) represent the aggregate sector investment 
decisions.
To solve the model, we work backwards. Consider the preferences
Gj (7 , K , t ,T ,) =  7 VV4 (wA, K a , t,T )  + ( 1  -  7 ) V f  ( w b , K b , t, T ) .
These represent a weighted sum of the two sector’s utilities. In a political economy model, 
we will argue that we expect either 7  =  1 or 7  =  0  to determine the redistributive decision. 
However, for the moment it is useful to keep 7  as a parameter. As 7  varies, we map the entire
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set of ex post Pareto optimal tax and transfer policies. Define
T) (3.2)
subject to (£, T) G Zj (K)
as the optimal choice of redistributive policy for a particular state, investment profile and social 
preference. Since, in our large economy, K  depends only on the fractions of individuals who 
invest, individuals will treat the redistributive policy as independent of their own investment 
decision.
It is now straightforward to characterize the equilibrium investment decisions for this econ­
omy. Under full information, it is clear that the optimal investment decision of an individual 
in sector i  G {A ,B }  solves
Kh fo'Ti) = ^ “i> { Vi ti ’Ti'>} ■ (3'3)
In this formulation, individuals take the tax policy as given. Note, however, that for high 
enough levels of redistributive taxation, individuals can be prevented from seeking to invest 
anywhere outside their own sector. An equilibrium investment profile solves
Kt j  =  K't] ( t ; j  ( K j )  ,T*3. ( £ , ) )  l  €  { A , B } .
where K j = (K aj (7 ) , K s j  (7 )^• We assume that this exists and is unique.
We can now state our notion of equilibrium. The outcome of the model is a particular tax, 
redistribution and investment profile in each state. Formally, denote this as an investment and 
redistribution sequence (IRS) { tj ,T j,K j} j=1. Then, for a given 7 e  [0,1] a { tj ,T j ,K j} Aj=l can 
be generated as an equilibrium IRS if and only if (i) (t j ,T j ) can be generated from (3.2) given 
K j and (ii) K j can be generated as an equilibrium investment profile.
From assumption 1 it follows that if such an IRS sequence has no redistribution then the 
optimal investment strategies will be
K \  (0,0) =  1 for j  =  1,2,3 and K*AA (0,0) =  0
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(3.4)
K*Bi (0,0) =  1 and K*Bj (0,0) =  0 for j  =  2,3,4.
Without redistribution, it is trivial that these form an equilibrium investment profile. The 
monitoring costs make investment decision conservative — individuals favor their own sector 
unless there is an outstanding opportunity in the other sector.
For this investment profile to be part of an IRS that can be generated as an equilibrium of the 
model, we need to show that this can be generated by actual government and investor behaviour. 
Therefore, we now examine the different IRS’ which can be generated as equilibrium outcomes 
as we vary the preferences of the policy maker (and therefore the extent of redistribution). 
This provides a useful benchmark against which we can compare the results of our subsequent 
analysis.
Recall that citizens in sector B  have higher wages than those in sector A. This means that 
sector A  individuals will, on the whole, desire to redistribute via the income tax. The only 
possible exception is if sufficient inequality is generated by the different investment strategies 
pursued in each sector. Specifically, in state 2 where sector B  individuals do not desire to invest 
in sector A, while sector A  individuals earn an extra return of Al by investing in their own 
sector, this will tend to reduce ex post inequality and may even generate an incentive for sector 
B  individuals to redistribute income. For ease of exposition, we rule this out by assumption. 
Specifically, we assume that 
A ssum ption  2 :
v ( ( 1  — t) w b ) +  ty(t) +  tiTA^L is decreasing in t.
where y(t) = tta^ a a^  ( ( 1  ~  0  wa ) +  (1  — tta ) w b Ib ((•*■ — *) wb ) 1S the total wage income
As Sector B individuals earn a higher wage, then as long as the disutility of labour is 
not too high the first two terms are always decreasing in t. Assumption 2 ensures that any 
redistributive gains accruing to sector B in S2 due to sector A individuals higher investment 
returns does not offset their loss from redistribution as represented by the first two terms. This
will be true provided that the wage difference between the sectors is sufficiently large and/or 
Af, is sufficiently small. For the rest of the analysis we assume that Assumption 2 holds. 
Assumption 2  provides a simple characterization of the equilibrium IRS when 7  =  0.
8 6
Benchmark 1 With 7  =  0, there is a unique IRS { tj , T j, K j }1=1 that can be generated as the 
equilibrium of the model where (i) there is no redistribution in any state and (ii) the investment 
decisions are as given by (3-4)•
With 7  =  0 the equilibrium tax policies are those favored by sector B  investors. It follows 
from assumption 2 that a policy maker who maximizes the payoff of sector B  citizens will 
never choose to redistribute. In this case zero redistributive taxation is delivered as the Pareto 
optimal choice and investment will be as in the full information, no redistribution situation.
We now study the case where 7  =  1, so that the tax policy reflects the preferences of citizens 
in sector A. It is useful to define
* (/*) < sm  v K1 “  +  +  ^
as the tax rate desired by an individual in sector A. Let
T {n) = t(fi) [y(t(fi))+ ij]
be the associated transfer at this tax rate. In the case where fi =  0, we just have the standard 
model where wage inequality drives the desire to redistribute. The parameter fi represents the 
possibility that incentives to redistribute are affected by disparities in income due to asymmetric 
investment strategies across sectors. For example, in state 3 there is an extra redistributive 
incentive because sector B  individuals earn an additional A l  by investing in their own sector, 
compared to the sector A  individuals who invest in their own sector. A very useful assumption 
which we maintained throughout is 
Assum ption 3: (l — 7(0)) A h  >  6.
While it would be straightforward to relax this, its value comes from the benchmark that it 
allows us to establish. The assumption says that, at the level of redistributive taxation at which 
both sectors make the same investment decisions, it is worthwhile to invest in the other sector 
when the return there is A #. This assumption will hold provided that inequality is not too 
great and/or there is a sufficiently steep labor schedule to hold redistributive sentiments by 
sector A  individuals in check. Assumption 3 allows a simple characterization of the equilibrium 
IRS when 7  =  1.
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Benchmark 2 With 7 =  1, there is a unique IRS { tj , T j , K j  }^= 1  that can be generated as the 
equilibrium of the model where
(i) the redistributive strategies are
(t j ,T j) =  (t (0), T  (0)) for j  = 1 ,4,
(t2 ,T2) =  ( t ( - ( l - 7rA) A t ) , T ( - ( l - ^ ) A L))
(*3 , ? 3 ) =  (t ((1 -  t t a )  A i ) ,  T  ((1 -  Wa) A i ) )  , and
(ii) the investment decisions are identical to those found without redistribution.
The first part details the redistribution decisions in each state of the world. This mirrors 
the underlying wage inequality plus any changes in income distribution due to asymmetric 
investment strategies in the two sectors. The second part gives the investment equilibrium. 
The main observation is that this is identical to that under zero redistribution. Assumption 3 
is critical to this finding and allows us to have a simple full information investment benchmark 
against which to contrast incomplete information.
In this model the policymaker’s desire for redistribution is increasing in 7 . Therefore a 
corollary of the two benchmark results is that, under assumptions 2 and 3, every ex post 
Pareto optimal redistribution schedule has the same investment profile. This is true in spite 
of the fact that we have not allowed the policy maker to commit to redistribution in advance. 
Therefore with full information equilibrium redistribution affects labor supply decisions, but not 
investment. The remainder of the chapter examines how these benchmark results are altered 
when investors have incomplete information regarding the state of the world.
3.4 Incom plete Inform ation
We now consider a world in which only the policy maker knows the true state of the world. As 
we argued above, this fits a number of relevant contexts. We assume that the government can 
transmit information costlessly to the citizens, i.e. it is cheap talk. The citizens will listen to 
these messages and update their beliefs taking into account the credibility of the statements 
that they hear.
The timing of the model is now as follows. First, nature determines the state which is
8 8
observed only by the policy maker. The policy maker can then transmit a message to the other 
citizens. On the basis of this, citizens choose simultaneously how to invest. After investment, 
the state of nature is revealed to all citizens. The policymaker then chooses a redistributive 
strategy. Finally, payoffs are realized.
The policy choice will satisfy (3.2). The investment profile depends upon investors’ beliefs 
about which state of the world has obtained. We assume investors in all sectors have identical 
priors and denote these by {pj}*=1- After receiving a message about which state of the world 
has occurred, investors’ posterior probabilities axe {qj}j=i- We focus on symmetric investment 
strategies, where investors take the redistributive policy associated with each state of the world 
as given. Let
K t (g; {«;,?;}■=i)  = ^ g{0,!} ^ V f i w c k i ^ T j )  (3.6)
3= 1
be the optimal investment decision for an investor in sector t. An equilibrium investment profile 
(K a  (7 , q ) , K b  (7 , q)) solves
K t  =  K t  (a , { t ' j  ( k )  ,T ;j ( i f )  } M  I  e { A , B } .
Let
K  (7 , q) =  ( k a  (7 , q) , K b  (7 , q) j^
be the equilibrium investment profile for some beliefs q about the state of the world. Once 
again, we assume that this is unique.
We assume that absent further information (beyond an individual’s priors) about which 
state has occurred, the equilibrium investment profile has each individual investing in their 
own sector. Formally, we make
Assum ption 4: K a  (0,p) = 1 and K b  (0,p) =  0 for all 7  £ [0,1].
This is a joint assumption on the prior beliefs and the tax rates in different states. There is no 
simple way of stating the condition in terms of the primitives.4
4 Essentially, it requires that
|( (1 — h)pi — (1 — <2)P4) AH 
+  ((1 — <2)^2 — (1 — t3,)pz) Az,| <  6,
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Beliefs about which state has occurred can depend upon messages sent by the policy maker 
before investment decisions are taken. A message, denoted m, is restricted to belong to a finite 
set M. containing all possible subsets of the states. These messages require interpretation by 
the investors. Given state j ,  let (f>j(m) be the probability that the government sends message 
m. Therefore, having received message m  the likelihood function is given by 4>j(m), j  = 1 , ...,4. 
Renormalise by defining
/ \
ffj W  =  —
£ < / y M
j
4
These beliefs are admissible if crj(m) =  1 for all messages m  6  M . We suppose that the
j =i
investors update using Bayes rule given the beliefs about the meaning of messages, i.e.
PjVj (” ») 
Y,j=lPj<7j (m )
where q (m,p; a ) denotes the vector of posterior beliefs and let
Gj (7 ,?) =  Gj ( k ^ q ) )  ,3 ^  ( ^ ( 7 , 9 ) ) )  (3.8)
denote the “policy makers” payoff at a particular investment equilibrium. The policy-maker 
optimizes in his choice of messages, given a, that is
m j ( a ) { 5 j  (7 ,g (™ ,p ;o -))}  > (3 -9)
The outcome of the model is a particular tax, redistribution, investment and message profile 
in each state. We call this an investment, redistribution and message sequence (IRMS) and 
denote it by { tj , T j , K j , m j . Then, for a given 7 , an IRMS {t j , T j, K j , mj x can be 
generated as an equilibrium of the model if and only if, there is a set of admissable beliefs a 
such that (i) (tj,T j)  satisfies (3.2) given K j, (ii) K j is an investment equilibrium when q is 
derived from p using Bayes rule, the beliefs a and the messages m, (iii) messages solve (3.9) in 
each state such that mj = m*-(a), and beliefs are such that (f)j{m*-{a)) = 1 .
where the vector of tax rates satisfies (3.2) at the investment equilibrium, for all 7 e [0, 1].
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As is usual in such models, the fact that many different beliefs are possible about the meaning 
of messages implies that the signalling equilibrium will not be unique. There is always a trivial 
equilibrium where no information is transmitted5 and citizens invest entirely on their priors. 
We will focus on cases where beliefs allow us to get as close as possible to a full information 
investment equilibrium.
We now consider the IRMS’s generated by the most informative equilibria under different 
assumptions about the redistributive preferences of the policy maker. We begin with the most 
straightforward case where 7  =  0. In this case, we have:
P ro p o sitio n  1  With 7  =  0 , there exists a set of admissable beliefs a for which an IRMS 
{ tj , T j , K j , m j }1=1  can be generated as an equilibrium of the model with no redistribution, full 
information revelation and investment decisions given by (3.4)
Thus a policy maker without redistributive intentions can credibly reveal the information to 
his citizens. It is easy to see why. A policy maker who cares about sector B  individuals care 
that they invest the right way and has no reason not to reveal the tru th  to sector A  individuals 
when their investment can benefit from it. The policy maker’s incentives do not diverge from 
those of the citizens.
The more interesting case arises where 7  =  1 and the policy maker favors sector A  individu­
als. The following preliminary observation says that full information is not a possibility in this 
instance.
Lem m a 1 : Suppose that 7  =  1 and let (q ,q )  be such that Ksi^-^q) > ATs(l,</), then, for any 
beliefs a,there is no {mj}^=1which satisfies (3.9) such that q{m\,p, a) = q and q (m ^p , cr) = q .
This lemma tells us that there cannot be an equilibrium of the message game that leads 
sector B  individuals to invest in sector A  in state 1 and not in state 2. However, full information 
strategies require sector B  individuals to invest in sector A  in state 1 , but not in state 2. This is 
explained by the policy maker’s desire to redistribute. In state 2, the policy maker who favors 
sector A  always has an incentive to dishonestly announce that state 1 has occurred in order 
to benefit from the increased transfers that he will receive if a sector B  individual invests in
5 If <Tj(m)  =  for all j  and all m  E M, then we have a babbling equilibrium.
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sector A. Thus having a policy maker who favors sector A  cannot result in full information 
being revealed to investors.
To explore this further, we distinguish between two cases, referred to as the over-investment 
and under-investment cases. In the over-investment case, sector B  individuals invest in sector A  
even though they sometimes make a loss by doing so, while in the under-investment case, they 
are conservative and always choose to invest in their own sector. Proposition 2 identifies the 
critical condition that differentiates these two. This condition is a function of investors priors 
regarding the likelihood of states 1 and 2 and the associated investment returns. Specifically, 
for the over investment case we have the following result6
P ro p o sitio n  2  Suppose that ( l —1(0)) [piA# +P2&l \ > (pi JcP2)h, then with 7 = 1  there 
exists a set of admissable beliefs a for which an IRMS  {t j , T j, K j , m j }^_ j can be generated as 
an equilibrium where
(i) redistribution policies are given by:
0tj,T j) =  (t (0),T(0))  fo r j  =  1,2,4 
(ts ,2 s) =  ( t a i - T T ^ A ^ . r a i - ^ A i ) )
(ii) the policy maker announces the true state when the state is 3 or 4, but does not differ­
entiate between states 1 and 2, i.e., m j = j  for j  =  3,4 and m \ =  =  {1 U 2}, and
(Hi) the investment equilibrium has sector A  individuals using their full information invest­
ment strategies and sector B  individuals investing in sector A  in states 1 and 2 and in sector 
B  otherwise.
There are three parts to the Proposition. The first gives the redistributive strategies employed 
by the policy maker. The second gives the equilibrium messages which are the same in either 
state 1 or 2. Thus the true state of the world is not revealed in this case. This is because 
a policy maker who maximizes the payoff of sector A  individuals cannot credibly distinguish 
between states 1 and 2. The argument is exactly that developed to prove Lemma 1. Part (iii) 
of the Proposition gives the investment strategies which lead to over-investment in sector A.
6Propositions 1, 2 and 3 describe weak equilibria in the sense that, in the equilibrium that we describe, in 
some states the policy is indifferent between the posited equilibrium message and some other message.
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We now consider what happens when the tendency is towards to under-investment in sector 
A. Underinvestment arises when investors’ priors about the likelihood of state 1 and 2 and the 
associated investment returns are such that a sector B investor’s expected cost from investing 
in sector A in states 1 and 2 exceed her expected benefits. This outcome is described in
Proposition 3 Suppose that (l — t ( 0)) [piA# +  P2A£,] < (p\ +  P2 )h, then with 7  =  1 there 
exists a set of admissable beliefs a such that an IRMS { t j , T j , K j , mj } can be generated as 
an equilibrium of the model where
(i)redistributive policies are given by
(ti,T i) = ( t ( - ( l  - tta) A / f ) , T ( - ( l  -7Ta ) Ah))
(h ,T 2 ) =  (t (— (1 - t t a )  A l ) , T ( - ( 1  - 7 ta) Al))
(t3 ,T3) =  ( t ( ( l - 7r>1) A L) , T ( ( l - 7rJ4 ) A L))
(t4 , r 4) =  (t (0) ,T  (0)) (3.10)
(ii)the policy maker announces the true state when the state is 3 or 4, but does not differ­
entiate between states 1 and 2, i.e., m j =  j  for j  =  3,4 and m \ = =  {1 U 2}, and
(Hi)an investment equilibrium in which sector A individuals use their full information in­
vestment strategies and sector B  individuals invest in sector B .
Again, there are three parts. The first gives the redistributive strategies. The second the 
equilibrium messages. These are identical to those described in Proposition 4. The third part 
give the investment strategies. The key difference with Proposition 2 is that individuals in 
sector B  now never choose to invest in sector A, even in state 1.
A comparison of Proposition 1 , 2 and 3 shows how a policy maker’s ability to credibly
transmit information is affected by his redistributive preferences. A policy maker with no
desire to redistribute has no credibility problem and generates an IRMS which is the same as
the full information outcome. The desire for redistribution creates a kind of externality since
individuals benefit from others’ decisions to invest directly. If costs of investment are not fully
internalized, then this results in a credibility problem. The Propositions identify a key condition 
determining whether the most informative equilibrium under incomplete information has too
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much or too little investment in sector A  compared to the case of full information. We will see 
below that this has important implications for the welfare analysis.7
3.5 Political Economy and Welfare Analysis
So far, we have taken policy maker preferences as exogenous. We now consider what would 
happen if we allow the identity of the policy maker to be determined in an election. From our 
previous analysis we know that a policymaker’s sectoral identity influences her redistributive 
preferences. This, in turn, affects her ability to provide full information. Endogenising the pol­
icymaker’s identity allows an examination of how citizens optimally trade-off the informational 
and redistributive rents associated with the different candidates in electing the policy-maker. 
It also allows us to identify reasons for why multi-tasking by elected governments may or may 
not lead to a Pareto dominated outcome for the economy.
The political economy model that we use to examine these issues is the citizen candidate 
approach developed in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). This is a 
natural model to consider here where we think of the policy maker as one among the citizens 
located in sector A  or B.
The citizen candidate model has three main stages of political competition. At stage one, 
any citizen can declare him or herself a candidate for office at a small cost c. At stage two, 
voters vote over the declared candidates and at stage three policy is chosen. We suppose that 
the default policy if nobody enters is t = 0, T  = 0 in all states and no messages are sent to the 
citizens. We also assume that voting and entry decisions are strategic. A political equilibrium 
is a set of voting decisions at stage two (where no citizen uses a weakly dominated strategy) 
and a set of entry decisions at stage one which form a Nash equilibrium. For details see Besley 
and Coate (1997).
The last two sections give us a description of what happens in the event that a citizen
7 The equilibria in Propositions 2 and 3 do not permit the policy maker to differentiate between states 1 and 
2 in the messages that they send. Thus, as in Lemma 1, they do not invoke different investment strategies in 
these two states. Hence, from an ex post point of view, the outcome generated in these equilibria will be at least 
as good as any that satisfies Lemma 1. However, from an ex ante view point, it is possible that more informative 
announcements are possible as long as they lead to the same investment strategy ex post. Since our interest 
below is in ex post welfare, we do not pursue this possibility further.
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with a particular type of preference is elected conditional on whether the state of the world is 
observable to the whole polity. A sector A  citizen being elected corresponds to the case where 
7  =  1 and a sector B  sector being elected to the case where 7  =  0. The assumption that there 
axe only two types of citizens permits a fairly routine application of Proposition 2 in Besley 
and Coate (1997). Since (generically) either sector A  or sector B  citizens are in a majority, we 
would expect (for small enough c) a one candidate equilibrium with the candidate representing 
the preference of the majority sector. If a single candidate of the majority type is standing, 
no other citizen of the same type would wish to enter — the policy would be unchanged and 
they would have to pay c. No citizen of the non-majority type would wish to enter as in two 
candidate races where voters do not use weakly dominated voting strategies, the candidate with 
a majority of sincere preferences will win. In what follows, we assume that c is small enough 
so that this constitutes the equilibrium.
In a world of complete information, each citizen will prefer to have their own type in office 
to promote their preferred redistributive policy. The results derived in section 3.3 imply, that 
under assumptions 2 and 3, the investment strategies are invariant to which citizen is in office. 
The only thing decided by political competition is the level of the redistributive taxation. This 
is like the standard Meltzer and Richards (1981) model of redistribution.
Turning to incomplete information, we observed in Section 3.4 that the preference of the 
policy maker affects how much information is revealed and hence equilibrium investment strate­
gies. Our desire to embed the analysis in a model where the policy maker is a citizen generates 
a further complication since he will also be an investor. Moreover, his investment will always 
be an informed one, regardless of whether other citizens are also informed by messages that he 
chooses to send. In a simultaneous move investment game, it would be necessary to separate 
out the policy maker’s informed investment decision from that of his fellow citizens. We do 
not regard the complications involved in specifying the investment equilibrium for this “asym­
metric” case to be worthwhile, in that it does not add anything essential to the analysis of 
the chapter. Hence, we assume that, once elected, a policy maker must place his assets “in 
trust” which are automatically invested in line with other members of his sector and he earns a 
return accordingly. Apart from simplifying the analysis, this parallels the kind of institutional 
arrangement that is commonly observed in representative democracies precisely to limit the
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gains that policy makers can receive by trading on inside information about the future of the 
economy.8 With this assumption, we can use the analysis of the previous section to describe 
what happens when a type A  or B  citizen is elected under incomplete information. Specifically, 
we make the following assumption on the IRMS associated with the political equilibrium. 
A ssum ption  5: If a type B  policy maker is elected then the IRMS described in Proposition 1 
will result. If a type A  policy maker is elected then the IRMS will be as in either in Propositions 
2 or 3.
It is easy to check that each citizen will still prefer to vote a citizen of their own type in this 
case. Hence, once again we expect a one candidate equilibrium where the candidate is from 
the majority sector. If sector B  citizens are a majority, then the outcome is that described in 
Proposition 1 with information fully revealed and no redistribution. If sector A  citizens are in 
the majority, then depending upon whether (l — t (0 )) [piA# +P2&l \ — (pi + P 2 ) is positive 
or negative, either Proposition 2 or 3 will apply.
We know that information is not necessarily revealed in political equilibrium — if a type A  
citizen is elected to choose policy, then we know that information revelation is only partial while 
a type B  citizen would reveal all information. Less clear is whether full information is ex post 
Pareto dominant over the political equilibrium. This will be true if there is a feasible tax change 
such that with the full information investment strategies one of the types of individual can be 
made strictly better off in some state of the world and no worse off in every other. Since, it 
generates full information, it is obvious that the outcome when a sector B  policy maker chooses 
policy cannot be Pareto dominated. Hence, we consider whether the equilibrium with a type 
A  policy maker can be dominated by full information revelation coupled with an appropriate 
variation in tax policy. For the rest of the chapter we assume 
A ssum ption  6 : Sector A individuals constitute a majority in the population.
Our first result in this section relates to the IRMS identified in Proposition 3. Specifically, 
Proposition 4 tells us that a political equilibrium in which this IRMS is generated is Pareto 
inefficient.
8In the U.S. the general rule is that top officials must either divest their holdings, or put them in a blind 
trust. If a top official has not put assets into a blind account, then he or she must definitely be recused from 
handling matters that affect the value of those assets. It is worth noting that many of these restrictions come 
from Executive Orders and ‘ethics codes’ rather than laws.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that ( l  — t ( 0)) [piA// + P2^l ] < (Pi +P2)f> and the political equilib­
rium generates the IRMS described in Proposition 3. Then this outcome can be Pareto domi­
nated by an IR M S  in which there is full information revelation.
Thus the under-investment case results in a Pareto inefficient outcome. Sector B  individuals 
choose to invest in their own sector regardless of the message that they receive and sector 
A  individuals behave as in a complete information world. The only difference in investment 
strategies arises in state 1, where with full information the sector B  individual would wish to 
invest in sector A. This will be the equilibrium investment strategy under full information for 
any Pareto efficient tax on income. Clearly, with full information the sector B  individuals are 
better off in state 1 if we keep the tax rate at t (— (1 — 7Ta) A #). If t (— (1 — 7r^) A #) > 0 
then Sector A  individuals are also better off in state 1 since they get a larger income transfer 
from the government, for a given tax rate. If t  (— (1 — 7Ta) Ah ) = 0 then Sector A individuals 
are indifferent between the two outcomes. Proposition 4 demonstrates a potential inefficiency 
associated with giving an elected policy-maker the right to both provide information and re­
distribute income. As the policy-maker cannot commit to a redistribution schedule prior to 
citizens’ investing she will always have an incentive to misreport in some states of the world. 
In the case identified above this leads to a Pareto dominated outcome.
We now examine the welfare properties of the over-investment case identified in Proposition 
2. Proposition 5 tells us that the outcome cannot be Pareto dominated by a situation in which 
the information about the state of the world is revealed.
P rop osition 5  Suppose that (l — t (0)) [piA# +P 2 A1,] > (pi+P2)^ and that the political 
equilibrium generates the IRMS described in Proposition 2. Then this outcome cannot be Pareto 
dominated by the IR M S  with full information revelation.
In this case, full information leads to sector B  citizens investing less often in sector A. This 
improves sector B  individuals’ welfare. However, holding tax rates constant, this implies a loss 
to sector A  individuals. Moreover, there is no variation in taxes that can undo that welfare 
loss.
Thus, the welfare properties of the political equilibrium associated with the election of a 
sector A  citizen depends critically on whether we are in the under- or over- investment case.
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Loosely speaking, overinvestment is more likely when investors are relatively more optimistic 
about the likelihood of state 1 occurring (piis high) and/or the additional investment return 
from investing in sector A in state 1 is large. The fact that the outcome cannot be Pareto 
dominated in the case of over-investment shows that the absence of full information revelation 
does not necessarily imply inefficiency. Put another way, not revealing information which 
determines investment decisions could form part of an optimal redistributive strategy for the 
government.9
3.6 D iscussion
While we have focused on economy wide redistribution strategies, the point of the paper that 
credibility of information is affected by redistribution possibilities is a general one. One could, 
for example, derive similar results in a case where special interests can make transfers to politi­
cians in exchange for limiting information transmission. The recent crisis over the safety of 
beef in the UK precipitated by a party in government which was traditionally supported by 
farmers could be thought of along these lines. The key ingredient that drives this model is the 
possibility of an agency problem among politicians who no longer equate the social cost and 
benefit of information.
The latter interpretation of our result makes clear that we can also get results similar to 
those developed here from an externality in the production process. Consider a world without 
redistribution where the wage rate in each sector depended upon the amount of investment in 
that sector. Then it would be in the interest of the policy maker, to claim that his/her sector had 
the highest return to capital in order to benefit from wage externality engendered by increased 
investment. This would again reduce the scope for credible information transmission. As in the 
model developed above, rents to earning wage income within a sector are also important. If 
individuals could move to the sector with the highest wage rate, this would not be a problem.
The desire for income redistribution in our model is borne out of an initial wage inequality 
across sectors, where the wage inequality reflects ownership of different levels or types of human
9 The result can be viewed as failure of the conditions for production efficiency to hold in the Diamond-Mirrlees 
(1971) sense. This result requires that the government have a full array of (linear) tax instruments. Here, the 
fact that 6 cannot be taxed is key. If the government were able to adopt a tax system in which 6 were deducted 
from income before tax was levied, there would be no possibility of inefficiency in the policy choice.
98
capital. More generally, we could allow for wealth inequalities across sectors by assuming that 
individuals in different sectors differ in their ownership of capital. Most of the results could 
be extended to cover this case. However, additional complications could arise if investment 
disparities across the sectors made the desire to redistribute in different states of the world 
sensitive to investment decisions. This seems most likely when sector A  individuals are capital 
rich relative to those in sector B  even though the latter enjoy a higher wage rate.
We have cast the problem of this paper as one that arises when the policy maker is elected. 
However, it should be apparent from section three that even with a social planner incomplete 
information is a possibility if the planner’s preferences favor sector A. The main issue is whether 
it is reasonable to think of a truly benevolent planner suffering from credibility problems. 10 In 
the spirit of the literature on time-inconsistent capital taxation, we could interpret our results 
as saying that a planner may face credibility problems in the transmission of information if he 
favors a particular group and has redistributive power. For instance, in this model a planner 
with maximin preferences might yield an IRMS that can be Pareto dominated. However, in 
the final analysis, planners with credibility problems axe probably best thought of as citizens 
who are elected to choose policy, making the political economy interpretation more palatable.
Assumption 3 in the paper guarantees that some transmission of information can be welfare 
improving from an ex ante point of view. If this assumption fails, then it is possible that 
investors in one sector prefer the uninformative “babbling” equilibrium to the more informative 
equilibria. This is because more information leads sector B  citizens to reduce their investment 
in sector A  in certain states of the world. 11 In such cases, ex ante it is possible that full 
information does not dominate the uninformative equilibrium for sector A  individuals. Since 
the political equilibrium can always deliver an uninformative outcome, we would not expect to 
find that political equilibrium is Pareto dominated in such cases.
We have focused here on cheap talk. The existing literature on political agency models 
focuses on costly signalling on part of the policy maker primarily in order to affect re-election 
incentives. Coate and Morris (1995) have shown how this may lead to inefficient outcomes when
10 A fully credible planner could always avoid the inefficiency described in Proposition 6 and could commit to 
a tax rate with full information that made everyone betler off.
11 The failure of assumption 3 is akin to a failure of monotonicity in the sense discussed in Crawford and Sobel 
(1982).
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two sources of uncertainty exist. We might expect costly signalling to re-emerge in situations 
where information transmission is important but governments lack credibility. This may be 
particularly desirable in situations where the cheap talk equilibrium is Pareto dominated. The 
British Prime Minister’s efforts to eat British beef publicly during the recent public safety scare 
illustrates this kind of behavior. However, as is well known from such models, the very factors 
that prevent credible cheap talk may engender distortions in the use of costly signalling. In 
addition, use of these instruments generates a welfare cost that cheap talk may not suffer from.
The model could be thought of as an argument for trying to write constitutions that uncouple 
policymakers’ private interests from the social interest. A policy maker who received a fixed 
wage regardless of the state of the economy and was immune to considerations about the level 
of redistribution would always reveal information faithfully. However, the virtues of such a 
policy could be, in turn, undermined by possible problems of lobbying and promises of future 
favors to politicians.
3.7 Concluding Com m ents
Situations where governments enjoy an informational advantage that is important to private 
decisions are common. Here, we have developed a simple model of why governments might 
not be able to transmit credibly all of the information that they possess. We have highlighted 
how the possibility of redistribution can be key to understanding this, although it is not always 
true that outcomes with limited information are Pareto inefficient. Our analysis can give a 
broad hint of when development strategies based on some kind of indicative planning can 
succeed. Societies where underlying redistributive conflicts are slight seem more likely to be 
successful when they cast governments in this role. This can be squared with the frequently 
made observation that the East Asian economies benefitted from their relatively low levels of 
inequality when embarking on their development strategies.
The analysis suggests possibilities for further research. The possibility that information is 
withheld in equilibrium somewhat undermines the case for governments to monopolize infor­
mation collection. In most democracies, we see this task also being undertaken by the press, by 
independent think-tanks, academics etc. Understanding when private provision of information
1 0 0
may dominate government provision would be an interesting extension. Of course, similar issues 
about credibility arise if the information sources were considered to be partisan. However, this 
kind of approach is well placed to explain circumstances under which private provision of this 
public good would then not be a perfect substitute for government provision and when private 
agencies would arise endogenously.
The analysis also suggests why functions of government might optimally be horizontally 
differentiated, with agencies providing information being separated from those tha t engage in 
redistribution. Of course, functional separation does not guarantee that political influence could 
not be exacted upon those charged with information transmission. Nonetheless, to the extent 
that an ethos of independent impartial transmission of information could be inculcated into 
certain parts of government, the problems described here could be circumvented. The optimal 
assignment of powers to different divisions of governments and the missions that they are given 
merits further consideration.
101
3.8 A ppendix
Proof o f Benchmark 1 Result: With 7  =  0, the policy maker chooses (£j, T f) j=1 to maximize 
(Wb, ATb,£,T). Since Wb > Wa the policy maker chooses =  0 in every state, with 
assumption 2 guaranteeing that this so in state 2. Thus (t j ,T j) = ( t ^  (K ),7 2 j(K ))  = (0 ,0 )  for 
j  =  1,2,3,4. In the investment stage, citizens anticipate no redistribution and given assumption 
1 this implies that investment decisions obey (3.4). ■
Proof o f Benchmark 2 Result: With 7  =  1, the policy maker chooses (tpTj)1j=1 to max­
imize V ^ ( W a ,  K a ,  t ,  T ) .  Since W a  < W b  the policy maker has an ex ante motive to redis­
tribute. In states 1 and 4 the investment returns axe identical across sectors and fi = 0. In 
state 3 investment favors sector B which raises sectoral inequality, with sector A citizens re­
ceiving t  (1 — tv a )  A l of the additional sector B investment returns. In state 2 the investment 
returns favors sector A reducing the incentive to redistribute. Sector A individuals receive 
A l  + 1 (— (1  — 7ta) Al )  of their additional investment return. At the investment stage citizens 
anticipate the redistribution associated with each state. From assumption 3 we know that in 
states 1 and 4, positive redistribution will not prevent citizens from investing in the sector 
with the highest investment return. In states 2 and 3 citizens continue to invest in their own 
sector. Therefore individuals maintain the same investment decisions as with no redistributive 
taxation. ■
Proof o f Proposition 1 : Suppose that the beliefs are :
aj(m j) = 1 f°r mj — j  for j  =  1,.., 4 
aj(m ) = ^  f°r m j  ^ M /  {1 , 2 ,3,4}.
The belief structure is such that any off-the-equilibrium-path messages are intepreted as 
uninformative and are clearly admissible. We now that they support the equilibrium described. 
Assumption 4 says that this will result in individuals investment in their own sectors only. 
The argument in Benchmark result 1 allows us to conclude that, under Assumption 2, the 
optimal redistribution associated with 7  =  0 is (tj,T j) = ( t ^  (K j) ,Tqj (K j =  (0,0) for all 
j  =  1,2,3,4. Hence citizens anticipate no redistribution on or off the equilibrium path. 
Assumption 4 tells us that for any deviation from the messages specified in the statement of the
10 2
Proposition, individuals will invest in their own sectors regardless of the information. Given 
the beliefs about the meaning of messages, it is clear the investors use their full information 
investment strategies on the equilibrium path. Hence, to complete the proof, all we need to 
show is that the policy maker prefers to send the informative message rather than transmitting 
no information. We show this state-by-state. We first show that no off-the-equilibrium path 
message is preferred and then that no deviation to another equilibrium message is optimal for 
the policy-maker in any state. We use the fact that in every state of the world the policy-maker 
sets (t j ,T j) =  (0,0). With 7  =  0, the policy-maker chooses messages to maximise the welfare 
of a representative sector B  individual (V?(w ByK B, t ,T )).
In state 1, the policy-maker will never deviate to off-the-equilibrium path message as Ah  > & 
implies that
v{wB) +  tai -  6 > v(wB) +  rBi (3.11)
where the LHS expression is a Sector B individual’s payoff on the equilibrium path and the 
RHS is the payoff after the posited deviation. In states k (=  2,3 and 4) a Sector B individual’s 
payoff is the same on and off the equilibrium path at
v(wB) +  rBk
Therefore, the policy-maker is indifferent between sending the informative message and an 
uninformative one.
Now consider the policy-maker’s incentives to deviate to other on-the-equilibrium-path mes­
sages. In state 1, deviating to announce state 2 or state 3 or state 4 has occurred results in 
the same investment strategy as announcing an off-the-equilibrium-path message. Thus by the 
inequality in (3.11) this is never a profitable deviation. Now consider the remaining three states. 
In state 2 or state 3 or state 4 announcing that state 1 has occurred strictly lowers the Sector 
B individual’s payoff as < 6 implies that
v(wB) +  ta 2 ~  8 < v(wB) +  rB2
Announcing state 3 or state 4 has occurred in state 2  (or state 2 or 4 in state 3; or state 2 or 3 in
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state 4) leaves the investment strategy unaltered and therefore the Sector B  individual’s payoff. 
It follows that the most informative message sequence which can be sustained in equilibrium is 
m j = j  for j  = ■
P roof o f Lemma 1
W ith incomplete information and 7  =  1, a sector B individual’s optimal investment choice 
solves
Ty}J=1) =
4
fc ^ {o ,i)  'y > Qj (v  — w b ) +  ( 1  — t \ j )  [rAjki  +  T s j ( l  — A:*)] — Ski  +  T \ j )
j = 1
We first show that Kb  (1 , 9 ) > K b  (1, ^ im plies Ka  (15<z) =  1- 
Let 4>f{£) =  Y^j=i €j (v ((! “  *i3) wb) +  Tij +  rBj) and define
4
y B (0  = 4>f (0  +  (1 -  tij) [{rAj -  rBj)k i] -  Ski
j=i
to be a sector B  individual’s expected utihty with probability vector £. Now let (<7, q') be such 
that K b (1 ,q) > K b  (1,</). This requires that
4
^ 2 q j ( l - t i j ) l ( r A j - r B j ) ] - S  > 0  and 
j=i 
4
(1 — tij) [{taj — rBj)\ — S < 0 ,  which implies that:
j - 1
4 4
qj (1  -  tij)  [{rAj ~  rBj)] > S > q'j (1  -  tXj) [(rAj -  rBj)\ .
j = 1 j = 1
A sector A individual’s expected utility can be written as
4
V A = <i)f (£) -  <5 +  ^ 2  qj (1 -  tij) [{r a j ~  rBj)ki] +  Ski 
j = 1
Observe that 1 Qj (1 — ^lj) [(r A? — r Bj)] > ^ implies (1,9) =  1 as claimed.
To complete the proof, we show equilibrium messages such that q (m j,p, a) = q and q (m ^p, cr) =
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q' axe not possible. Consider the policy-maker’s payoff in state 2  when 7  =  l.That is, the policy­
maker maximises a Sector A individual’s payoff such that
G 2 ( 1 , 0  =  « ( ( l - t l 2 ( £ ( l , 0 ) ) « ' A )  +
( l  - t12 ( k  (1 ,0 ) )  \ r A2k A (1,0 +  rB2( l  -  K A (1,0)]
- 6  ( \ - K A ( \ , 0 ) + T n  ( i f  (1 , 0 )
We will show that 6 2  (1, q) >  6 2  (1, q'). There are two cases to consider. First, consider the 
case where K a (  1,90 =  1. Then t i2 ^ ( 1 , 9 )^ = t ( 0) > ( k (1 , 9 ') )  = t ( — (l  - h a ) A l ) .  
Hence,
6 2 ( 1 ,9 )  = v ((1 - t ( 0) ) w A) +  (1 - ^ ( 0 ) ) r ,42
+ t ( 0 )  [k a w a Ia  ( ( !  - * ( 0 ) ) « m )  +  ( 1 - t ta ) w b I*b  ( ( l - t ( 0 ) ) w B )]
<  V ((1 - t  ( -  (1 -  7rA) A l ) )  w a )  +  (1 -  t  ( -  ( 1  -  7m )  A l )) r A2
+ t  ( -  ( 1  -  IT a ) A  l ) [k a w a Ia  ((1  -  HA) A  l )) w a )
+  (1 -  IT a ) w B l*B ( ( 1  - t ( -  (1 -  n A ) A l )) w b )]
<  V ((1 -  t  ( -  (1 -  k a )  a  l ) )  wa)  +  (1 - 1 ( -  (1 -  IT a)  A l ) )  rA2
+ t  ( -  (1 -  7ta) A l )  [k a w a Ia  ( ( l  — * (— (1 — h a ) A l ) )  w a )
+  (1 -  IT a ) w B rB ((1 - 1 ( -  (1 -  7TA ) A l ) )  WB) -  (1 -  TT^ ) A l ]
= 62(1,9')
Thus G2 (1,9) >  G2 (1,9 '). Now consider the case where K a  (1,90 =  0- Then t i 2 ( k  (1,9 )^ =  
t  (0) =  t i 2 (1,9 ')) • Therefore
6 2 ( 1 ,9 )  =  v  ( ( l - t ( 0) ) w A) +  ( l - t ( 0 ) ) r A2
+t  (0 ) [7ta w a I*a  ((1 - 1 (0 )) w A ) +  (1 -  h a) w b Ib  ( ( 1  -  t  (0 )) w B )]
<  V ((1 - t ( 0))uM) + (1 - t ( 0) r B2 - 6
+t (0) [7ta wa Ia ( ( l (0))um) +  ( 1 - 7 ta ) w b I*b ( ( l - £ ( 0 ) ) ^ ) ]
= 62(1,90
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Thus G2 (1><7) >  G2 (I)*/) in this case too.
Now suppose that exist s.t. g(m*,p,cr) =  q and cr) = 4• Then, for all <r,
<S2 ( 1  ,g(m l,p;<7)) > G2(l,q(m*2,p',(r)) { 6 2  (l,g(m ,p;<7))}
— a contradiction. This proves the lemma. ■
P ro o f of P ro p o sitio n  2: We construct beliefs such that the equilibrium is as described. 
Suppose that these are
crj(mj) = 1 when rrij =  j  and j  =  3,4 
<Tj(mj) = \  when 771 j =  { 1  U 2 } and j  =  1 , 2
(Tk{rrij) =  ^ for all A; and for other rrij G At
We now need to show three things: that the posited investment strategies form an investment 
equilibrium, that the redistribution strategies and messages are optimal for a policy maker with 
7  =  1 . 7  =  1 implies that the policy-maker maximises a Sector A  individual’s payoff. Given 
the beliefs, on hearing the message that either state 1 or state 2  has occurred, investors update 
such that
qi(l U 2) =  ———  and <72(1 U 2) =  P2
P 1 + P 2 P1 + P 2
Now consider the decision to invest in sector A  by sector B  individuals. They invest in sector 
A  general if and only if Yl'j-i Qj (1 — fy) i ( r A j  ~ r B j ) \  > When the message is 1U 2 this boils 
down to (l — t (0)) \p iA h  +  p2Al] > (pi +p2)S which is the condition in the Proposition. States 
3 and 4 axe fully revealed in the posited equilibrium bringing forth full information investment 
strategies. Hence, we have shown that the investment strategies with these beliefs are:
K A (I, q (m j, a)) =  1 , for j  =  1,2,3, and K A (1 ,9 (4, cr)) =  0
K b (1, q (rrij, a)) =  1, for j  =  1, 2  and K B (1 , q (rrij, a)) =  0, for j  = 3,4.
Turning now to redistribution, it is easy to check that the redistribution strategies which follow
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(3.5) are
=  ( t( 0 ) , T ( 0 )) for j  =  1 , 2 ,4
(ts.Ts) =  ( ( ( ( l - T r ^ A ^ . T K l - ^ A i ) )
The final step must show that the messages posited are a best response. We need to show that 
no off-the-equilibrium-path message is preferred and that no deviation to another equilibrium 
message is optimal for the policy maker in any state. First recall, that from Assumption 4, any 
deviation to any other message results in an investment strategy where each individual always 
invests in their own sector. Using this, we can show that the policy maker will never prefer to 
deviate to such a message. In states 1 and 2, this follows since
v ( ( l - t ( 0 ) ) t i M )  +  ( l - i f O ) ) ^ *  (3.12)
+ i  (0 ) [tta w a I*a  ((1 -  t  (0 )) w A ) +  (1 -  * a ) ™B 1*b  ( ( !  -  t  (0)) «>b)]
>  V ((1 -  t  ( -  (1 -  tta)  a  j ) )  w A) +  (1 -  t  ( -  (1 -  7ta)  a  j ) )  rAk 
+t  ( -  (1 -  IT a)  A  j )  [tt a w a I*a ((1 -  t  ( -  (1 -  7TA) a  j ) )  WA )
+  (1 -  IT a ) w B l*B ((1 -  t  ( -  (1 -  k a ) A  j ) )  WB ) \
>  V ((1 -  t  ( -  (1 -  7TA ) a j ) )  w A ) +  (1 -  t  ( -  (1 -  7TA ) A  j ) )  r Ak 
+ t  ( -  (1 -  7TA ) A  j )  [tta w A 1*a  ((1 — t (— (1 — tm) a  j ) )  WA )
4- (1 -  7TA) w B l*B ((1 -  t  ( -  (1 -  k a )  a  j ) )  w B ) -  (1 -  n A ) Aj] ,
where the first expression is a Sector A individual’s payoff along the equilibrium path and 
the last is payoff after the posited deviation when the state is either 1 (k = 1 and j  = H) or 
2 (k = 2 and j  — L). In state 3, it is clear that the policy maker is indifferent between this
message and an uninformative one. In state 4, he prefers to announce that state 4 has occurred
as
v  ( ( 1  -  t  (0 )) w A ) +  ( 1  -  t  (0 )) r BA ~  6
+ i ( 0 )  [tta w a I*a  ((1 - t ( 0 ) ) w A ) +  (1 - 7t a ) w b I*b  ( ( l  -  t ( 0 ) ) w B )]
>  v ( ( l - t ( ( l -  7t a) A h ) )  w a ) +  ( 1  -  t  ( ( 1  -  7TA ) A h ))  r A4
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+ t  ((1 -  7m ) a h )  [ k A w a Ia  ((! - t  ((! -  * a )  a h ) )  w a )  
+  (1 -  wa) w b I*b ( ( l — t ((1 — tta) Ah )) w b ) +  Ah ] •
Now consider incentives to deviate to other on-the-equilibrium-path messages. In states 1 and 
2, deviating to announce that state 3 has occurred follows the same logic as a deviation to a 
message interpreted as uninformative as it results in the same investment decisions as in the 
case of uninformed investing. Thus the inequality in (3.12) is relevant. For a deviation to 
announce state 4 in states 1 or 2, it is clear that this is undesirable since redistribution is the 
same and (l — t (0)) vba — 6 > (l —t (0)) taa- Now consider state 3. Deviating to the message 
that state 1 or 2  has occurred is not optimal as
v ( ( 1  -  t (0 )) wA) +  (l -  t (0 )) rA3
+ i (0) [tta wa I*a ((1 -  t (0)) wA) +  (1 -  7ta) wBl*B ((1 - 1 (0)) wB)\
< v ( ( l - t ( ( l -  7TA) A l )) WA) +  (1 - 1 ((1 -  irA) A l )) rA3
+t ( ( 1  -  7ta ) A l ) [nAwAlA ( ( 1  - 1 ( ( 1  -  7rA) A l )) wa)
+  (1 -  7ta ) w B l*B ((1 - 1 ((1 -  7ta ) A l ) )  w b )  +  A L ] -
A deviation to announce state 4 in state 3 is not desirable as (l — t (0)) rB3 ~S  <  ( l — t (0)) rA3
and the level of redistribution falls from t ( ( 1  —7rA) A l ) to t (0). Finally, consider state 4. A
deviation to announcing state 3 yields the same investment profile as the uninformative case 
which we have already shown to be undesirable. Now consider a deviation to announcing 
that state 1 or 2 has occurred. This is not desirable since redistribution is unchanged and 
( l  — t (0)) r*£4 — <5 >  ( l  — t (0)) rAA. ■
P ro o f o f P ro p o sitio n  3: The method of proof is essentially the same as proposition 2. 
The beliefs described in that Proposition can also support the equilibrium in this case. The 
main difference from proposition 2  is that as ( l — t ( 0 )) [piA# -I-^A l] <  (pi +P2) 6 when 
rrij = {1 U 2} and j  =  1,2 sector B investors continue to invest in their own sector. Therefore, 
the equilibrium investment profile now is
K A (l,q(mj,(T)) = l,for j  = 1,2,3 and K A ( l , g (m 4 ,cr)) =  0
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and the corresponding tax profile:
( t i . r O  =  ( t ( - ( l - i r yt) A H) , T ( - ( l - j r i l ) A /r))
(t2 , r 2) =  ( ( ( - ( l - i r ^ A O . T e a - T r ^ A t ) )
(ts.Ts) =  ( t ( ( l - 7 r A) A L) , r ( ( l - 7 r A) A t ))
(t4, r 4) =  (t(O).T(O))
We now show that the posited messages remain an equilibrium in this case by checking that 
the policy-maker does not have an incentive to deviate to off-the-equilibrium-path messages or 
to other equilibrium messages. Since the investment profile in this equilibrium is the same as
in the case where no information is passed except in state 4, the policy maker is indifferent
between this and an uninformative equilibrium in all other states.
In states 1, 2 and 3 the investment strategies and therefore the level of redistribution are 
unaffected by a deviation to an off-the-equilibrium-path (uninformative) message and therefore 
the policy-maker is indifferent between sending the equilibrium messages and any other. In 
state 4, the policy-maker strictly prefers revealing the state as
v ( ( 1  - 1 (0 )) wA) +  (1  -  t (0 )) rB\ -  $
+t (0) [ttawaIa  (C1 “  * (°)) wa ) +  (1 ~  * a ) wBl*B (( l  ~  t (0)) w b )]
> v ( ( 1  -  t ( ( 1  -  7m) A h )) wa) +  (1 -  t ( ( 1  -  irA) A h )) rA4 
+t ( ( 1  -  7TA) A h ) [ k a w a I a  (0- “  * W1 “  * a )  & h ))  w a )
-1- ( 1  -  IT a ) w B l*B ((1 - 1 ((1 -  IT a ) A h ))  w b )  +  A H] .
Now consider the incentives to deviate to other on-the-equihbrium-path messages. In states 
1 and 2 announcing state 3 has occurred leaves investment strategies unaffected. The policy­
maker is therefore indifferent between the messages announcing that the state is either 1 or 2  
and that state 3 has occurred. However, in states 1 and 2 a deviation to announcing state 4 
is strictly undesirable as redistribution is unchanged but ( l — t ( 0 ) ) r ^  — 6 < (l  — t(0 ) )r Ak
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for k = 1,2. In state 3 announcing state 1 and 2 has occurred leaves investment strate­
gies unaffected. The policy-maker is therefore indifferent between the messages (1 U 2) and 
(3). However announcing state 4 is strictly undesirable as redistribution is unchanged but 
(l — t ( 0 ) ) r £ 3  — 6 <  (l — t ( 0 ) ) r v43 . In state 4, a deviation to announcing states 1 and 2 
or state 3 yields the same investment profile as in the uninformative case which we have al­
ready shown is undesirable. ■
P ro o f o f P ro p o sitio n  4: It is easy to prove that full information is dominant state by state. 
In states 2,3 and 4, the redistribution, investment strategies are the same in the full information 
and incomplete information case — they are those given in Proposition 3. Hence, the ex post 
payoffs in both sectors are the same in these states. In state 1, however, sector B  individuals 
will invest at the tax rate t  (— (1 — tv a ) A B) < t (0) by assumption 2. This generates a Pareto 
improvement in that state since this raises mean income. Hence, for a given tax rate, sector 
A  and sector B  individuals gain if t (— (1  — tv a)  A B ) > 0. Otherwise sector B individuals gain 
and sector A individuals are as well off. ■
P ro o f o f P ro p o sitio n  5: To see this, observe that in investment and redistributive strategies 
will be identical under incomplete and full information in states 1,3, and 4. Hence, the only 
possible difference arises in state 2. Under full information, the sector B  individuals will choose 
not to invest in sector A. This makes sector B  individuals better off and . sector A  individuals 
worse off. Hence, to generate a Pareto improvement a variation in the tax rate must be found 
that compensates the sector A  individuals. It is easy to see that this is impossible. Let
H a  (t) = v ( ( 1  -  t) wA) + 1 [tvawa Ia  ((! -  *) WA) +  (1 -  k a ) wBl*B ((1 ~ t) wB) \ .
It is clear that t (0) maximizes H A (t) for t G [0,1]. Hence,
H a  (t (0)) >  H a (t) -  tA L ( 1  -  nA)
for all t G [0,1]. But H A ft (0)) +A ^ is a sector A  individual’s state 2 payoff under incomplete 
information and H A (t) +  A l — tAz, (1 — tv a ) is their state 2 payoff under full information. 
Hence, it is impossible to compensate sector A  individuals for the move to full information ■
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C hapter 4
Technology A doption in A griculture 
and Industrialisation: A nalysing the  
R ole for G overnm ent Intervention
4.1 Introduction
‘Traditional agriculture is niggardly in the meaningful sense that it is an expensive 
source of growth ’ T.W.Schultz (1964)
That processes of development are characterized by increased industrialisation and a de­
crease in agriculture’s share of total output1 is a folk theorem in development economics. Em­
pirical evidence also suggests tha t periods of rapid industrialisation are usually either preceded 
by or accompanied by changes in methods of production in agriculture. Examples include the 
increased mechanisation of agricultural production in England prior to the Industrial Revolution 
(Nurkse 1953), and in Japan at the turn of the century (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1973).
These features of development have influenced the form of many public policy interventions 
in underdeveloped agrarian countries2. In the 1920s the Russian government tried to affect
^ u zn ets (1959) synthesis of the stylised facts of the structural transformation of economies during the process 
of modern economic growth is among the best known expositions of this.
2 This issue formed the basis of the famous Corn law debate between Malthus and Ricardo
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industrialization by deliberately altering the terms of trade between agriculture and industry 
(on this ‘price scissors debate’ see Sah and Stiglitz 1984). Similarly, during the Great Leap 
Forward the Chinese government sought to alter methods of production in agriculture as a way 
of heralding in industrialisation (Lin 1990). Comparable examples exist for other developing 
countries.
Yet the appropriate design of public policies which seek to affect industrialisation by altering 
the methods of agricultural production remains poorly understood. The cost of this lack of 
understanding is possibly high. Over the last four decades low income countries have seen 
the adoption of different kinds of labour augmenting technologies in agriculture. However, in 
marked contrast to industrialised countries these countries have seen only very limited adoption 
of mechanised technologies in agriculture .3 Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide a graphical illustration 
of the same.
Figure 4.1 graphs the capital labour ratio in the agricultural sector for a set of African, 
East Asian and other Asian countries between 1960 and 1990. Figure 4.2 graphs the proportion 
of labour force employed in the agricultural sectors of these countries for the same period. 
The figures show that the East Asian miracle countries experienced a sharp fall in the use 
of labour in agriculture and a rise in the agricultural capital-labour ratio between 1960-1990. 
In contrast, African and other Asian countries did not see large changes in the size of their 
agricultural labour force during this period. Further, while agricultural methods of production 
became more capital intensive in all countries during this period, the extent of capitalisation 
showed significant cross-country variation (figure 4.1). While these countries may have seen 
the adoption of labour augmenting technologies during this period, the graphs suggest that the 
extent of agricultural mechanisation remained limited. Since processes of development have 
usually been accompanied by increased mechanisation of agricultural production it is therefore 
relevant to enquire how public policy may affect citizens’ decision to adopt improved agricultural 
and industrial technologies.
One reason for our limited understanding of such public policies is the lack of an academic 
or policy consensus on the causal links between changes in agricultural methods of production
3 A large empirical literature examines the relative importance of factor accumulation and technological 
progress in explaining the East Asian miracle. Papers such as Chang-Tai Hseih (1998) argue that technological 
progress play a key role in explaining the industrial revolution in East Asia.
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and industrialisation in an economy. Supply side theorists (Lewis 1955, Hirschman 1958) sug­
gest that changes in methods of agricultural production aid industrialisation by transferring 
resources, especially labour to it. Others (Johnston and Mellor 1961, Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1989a) argue that changes in agricultural methods of production promote industriali­
sation by increasing the (agricultural) demand for industrial goods. The two views have very 
different implications for public policy design.
A second reason concerns the implementation of such policies. Processes of industrialisa­
tion are, in general, not distribution neutral. That is, while increased industrialisation of an 
economy improves some citizens’ well-being it renders others worse off. In countries where the 
potential for redistribution is limited this feature of industrialisation may render the possibility 
of policy driven industrialisation unviable. This is particularly likely to be true in representative 
democracies where the policy-maker is electorally accountable.
This chapter provides a formal analysis of these issues. The model used to explore these 
issues is constructed along the following lines. A two sector model of the economy is developed. 
The agricultural sector in the economy produces food, and the manufacturing sector an indus­
trial good. Landowners in the agricultural sector face a choice between traditional agricultural 
methods and investing in a mechanised agricultural technology. The latter uses the industrial 
good as an input. This characterisation of production technologies implies that both supply and 
demand linkages may exist between the two sectors. The analysis identifies conditions under 
which this economy may exhibit multiple investment equilibria. Specifically, for the same set of 
endowments and production technologies the economy may either be characterised by the prac­
tice of traditional agriculture and low levels of industrialisation, or by mechanised agricultural 
production and high industrialisation.
The chapter analyses the possibility of government-led investment coordination in this econ­
omy. The policy-maker’s identity is determined in an election. Two alternative public policy 
interventions are considered. To identify how changes in the income distribution affect the 
possibility of policy led industrialisation the possibility of coordination is considered for both 
an equal and an unequal society. Whilst the social surplus maximising technology is always 
implemented in an equal society, this is not true of unequal societies. For a large set of param­
eter value either the no coordination outcome persists, or mechanised agricultural production
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occurs but workers are rendered worse off.
The explanation for the continued agricultural stagnation and industrial backwardness of 
some low income agrarian economies developed in this chapter is related to ‘big push’ models 
of industrialisation4 (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989b). These models explain how a coor­
dination failure between investors in the industrial sector may limit industrialisation. In these 
models the move to the more industrialised equilibrium is strictly welfare enhancing. There­
fore, a common policy prescription in most ‘big push’ models is that governments should act 
as coordinators of investment activity.
Whilst well-placed to explain instances of successful government led industrialisation pro­
grammes (e.g. the experience of some East Asian countries), these models shed little light on 
the dismal performance of government initiated investment coordination programmes in many 
low income countries (see Bardhan 1984 for a lucid description of India’s failed industrialisation 
program ) . 5 One contribution of this chapter is to identify reasons why policy led investment co­
ordination was successful in some, but not all, developing countries.6 In particular, this chapter 
argues that the distributional consequences of industrialisation may affect both the possibility 
and the welfare implications of policy led industrialisation in an underdeveloped economy.
There exists a literature which examines how political economy concerns may prevent the 
adoption of potentially Pareto superior technologies (Dixit and Londegran 1995; Fernandez 
and Rodrik 1991). However, unlike the research reported in this chapter, this literature has 
tended to focus on economic environments in which unique equilibria exist. This chapter shows 
that the role of public policies in affecting investment is sensitive to the existence of multiple
4 The idea that an economy may be stuck at a low level of industrialisation as a result of policy rather than 
of resource constraints was first discussed by Rosenstein Rodan (1943).
5A cross country comparison often made in this connection is between Korea and Philippines. Benabou 
(1996) details the difference in initial conditions for Korea and PhilippinesDuring the last quarter century, 
Korea’s average growth rate was 6 percent while that for Philippines was 2 percent, .. even though in the early 
1960s the two countries were similar with respect to GDP per capita, population and urbanisation.. Philippines 
was however characterised by a more unequal income distribution. The ratio of the income shares of the top 
twenty percent to the bottom twenty percent was about twice as large in the Philippines....Similar disparities 
characterised land ownership: the Gini coefficient for farmland was 38.7 for Korea and 53.4 for the Philippines 
in 1960 and 1961 respectively.’
6In a series of papers Sah and Stiglitz (1984, 1987) examine the relationship between policy led changes in the 
terms of trade between agriculture and industry and industrialisation. They show that variations in the terms of 
trade can influence the extent of industrialisation. They note that policies that engender industrialisation may 
influence worker income adversely but do not examine how these adverse distributional consequences may affect 
the feasibility of public policies for industrialisation.
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investment equilibria.
The ideas developed in this chapter also relate to papers which analyse the relationship 
between an economy’s income distribution and the possibility of industrialisation (Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1989a; Baland and Ray 1991). These papers examine how changes in a 
country’s income distribution alter the demand for industrial goods and thereby the level of in­
dustrialisation. In contrast, this chapter focuses on how political economy concerns engendered 
by changes in an economy’s income distribution may affect the possibility of industrialisation.
Overall, this chapter makes two contributions to the existing literature. It develops a model 
to explain why processes of development in most countries have been accompanied by structural 
changes in both their agricultural and industrial sectors, and identifies the conditions under 
which such a structural transformation may be inhibited by a coordination failure amongst 
investors in the agricultural sector. The chapter then examines the possibility of policy led 
industrialisation in such a situation, and identifies reasons why the possibility of successful policy 
led industrialisation may depend on the economy’s initial income distribution. By doing so it 
provides one explanation for why both history and expectations have been critical determinants 
of development processes in many countries (Krugman 1991).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 develops a two sector model in 
which landowners face a choice of agricultural technology. The model is used to characterise 
the relationship between landowners’ investment decisions in the agricultural sector and the 
economy’s level of industrialisation. Section 4.3 turns to analysis of the role of the government 
as a coordinator of investment activity. Section 4.4 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
4.2 The M odel
This section develops a simple model of an economy in which demand and supply linkages exist 
between production in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The model is used to analyse 
the relationship between landowners’ choice of agricultural technology and the economy’s level 
of industrialisation. In keeping with some of the recent literature on industrialisation (Krug­
man and Venables 1995, Rodriguez-Clare 1996) high industrialisation is associated with the 
production of increased varieties of the industrial good.
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4 .2 .1  E co n o m ic  E n v iro n m e n t
The economy consists of N  citizens, indexed by j  £ N  = { 1 , N }  and lasts a single period. 
The total stocks of labour and land in the economy are L > 1 units of labour and one unit of 
land. Citizens differ in their endowments of labour and land. Citizen j 's  share of the labour 
and land stocks is denoted as aj and /3j respectively. Citizens’ inelastically supply all their 
labour such that citizen j 's  final income is yj =  ajw L  +  (djK, where ir is the return on land and 
w the wage rate. Citizens’ use their income to buy two kinds of goods- food (denoted as F) 
and manufactures (denoted as M). A citizen’s preferences over these goods take the form uj = 
F uQl~u.
Food production is undertaken by landowners (i.e. citizens with f3j > 0) in the agricultural 
sector. For simplicity, I assume that landowners have identical land endowment, and that there 
is no trade in land. A landowner can produce food by one of two fixed factor production 
technologies- basic or advanced. The technologies are indexed by r  G {b, a} and are given by
Fb =  min (Z,/i)
mm
I denotes the labour requirement and h the land requirement. 7 G [0,1[ and k  € [0,1] are param­
eters which characterise the production function. I assume that M  > k, and that land supply is 
the limiting factor on food production. Hence, irrespective of the agricultural technology used, 
one unit of food is produced in equilibrium .7
Use of the advanced technology is associated with an additional demand for k units of 
manufactures, and a reduced labour demand of 7  <  1 units. Therefore the land rents (7r) 
associated with the two technologies differ. Specifically, 'Kb =  1 — wb and 7ra =  1 — 7 wa — kPg; 
where the price of food is normalised to unity, and P  is the manufactures price.
Manufactures are produced in the industrial sector which is characterized by monopolistic
7The corner solution of zero food production is ruled out by the assumption that u >  0 in agents’ utility 
function. More general specifications of the agricultural production function like CES ensure interior solutions 
for food production and allow factor demands to vary smoothly with prices. However such changes in specification 
do not affect the paper’s main results.
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competition. A continuum of firms indexed by i £ A f = { l,2 ..,n }  produce different varieties of 
manufactures. Specifically, firm i produces quantity X{ of variety i and prices it at pi. These 
varieties are then aggregated into a single manufactures good. Aggregation is via a production 
function which exhibits constant elasticity of substitution in the quantities of each product type 
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, and Ethier 1982). That is,
where n is the set of varieties produced in equilibrium and e is the elasticity of substitution 
across varieties. I assume e > 1 such that product varieties are imperfect substitutes, p = 
measures citizens’ intensity of preference for variety. Whilst the number of varieties produced 
is determined in equilibrium, I assume that a sufficiently large number of industrial varieties 
exist. Hence the elasticity of inverse demand8 faced by a producer can be approximated as 1 — p 
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Costless product differentiation on part of the firms implies that no 
two firms will produce the same variety.
At the firm level, I assume identical production functions for all product varieties9. Firm 
level production is characterised by economies of scale. Production of variety i involves a fixed 
cost of 8 labour units and a constant marginal cost of 0 units of output. Firm i ’s production 
function is
£   ^
Xi =  -h-— for U > 8; 0  otherwise 
0
with firm i ’s associated profits given by PiXi —w((f)Xi+8). Monopolistic competition implies that 
in equilibrium variety i's  price will equate marginal revenue (ppi) and marginal cost. Hence, 
P ii^ r )  =  0«J. For notational simplicity I choose units such that 0 =  Thus variety i's price 
equals the wage rate in the economy, or
Pi = w  (4.1)
Monopolistic competition in the industry implies that in equilibrium p{Xi = w((f)Xi -f 8).
8This property of CES indices is discussed in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
9 The industry wide demand for labour is ld =
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Solving this, we find that the output per firm is constant at
Xi =  1 3 *  (42 )
Firms produce the same quantity of output per variety- x  and price them identically at 
the price p . 10 Therefore, we can simplify the manufactures production function to M  = r i ^ x  
(with P  = n J^p ). It is clear from this expression that for a given n  manufactures production 
exhibits constant returns to scale. However, for a rise in n it displays increasing returns to 
scale.
4 .2 .2  C h o ice  o f  T ech n o lo g y
This section examines the relationship between landowners’ choice of agricultural technology 
and the economy’s level of industrialisation. I first characterize the production and consumption 
decisions associated with the use of either agricultural technology, and then examine landowner’s 
choice of agricultural technology.
I assume full labour mobility across the two sectors. Whilst total labour supply is fixed, 
agricultural labour demand is sensitive to the choice of technology. Hence wage rates vary with 
the choice of agricultural technology. Specifically, equating labour demand and supply gives
xnbpb xriaPa fAWb =  7  r  and wa =   -----  (4.3)L — 1 L — 7
From equation (4.1) we know that pT = wT. Therefore, substituting for pT in equation (4.3) 
allows us to recover the expressions for the number of industrial varieties produced with either 
agricultural technology in use. That is,
nb =  —— -  and na — —— — (4.4)x  x
since 7  < 1 by assumption, it follows that the use of the advanced technology leads to the
production of an increased number of industrial varieties. This discussion is summarized by
10 The symmetric way in which the different industrial varieties enter the formulation of M  and convexity 
(0 <  P <  1) implies that citizens consume the same amount of each variety.
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Proposition 1.
P ro p o sitio n  1: Relative to the basic agricultural technology use of the advanced agricultural 
technology is associated with the production of an increased number o f industrial varieties.
Use of the advanced technology in the agricultural sector frees up an additional (1 — 7 ) 
units of labour. The main issue is whether this increase in industrial labour supply only alters 
factor prices or also increases the level of industrialisation. Proposition 1 tells us that the latter 
occurs. That is, the number of industrial varieties produced in the economy is increasing in 
the industrial labour supply. To understand the reason for this note that industrial varieties 
axe imperfect substitutes (p < 1). This leads to a love for variety on the part of consumers. 
Consequently, returns from the division of labour in the production of industrial varieties exist. 
Hence the extent of industrialisation in the economy is limited, not by the size of total demand, 
but by labour availability.
Increased industrialisation of the economy is also accompanied by the use of a more efficient 
agricultural production process. This is because the use of the advanced agricultural technology 
partially substitutes use of the factor input of labour away from a constant returns to scale sector 
(agriculture) to an increasing returns to scale sector (industry). It is worth noting that this 
prediction of the model finds empirical support. Figure 4.3 plots the change in a country’s
agricultural productivity between 1960 and 1990 against the change in in the capital labour 
ratio in agriculture. For both Asian and African countries agricultural productivity and the 
extent of capitalisation in agriculture are positively correlated.
More generally, proposition 1 provides two empirically testable predictions. First, increased 
mechanisation of agricultural production in a country should be correlated with increased in­
dustrialisation. This phenomenon has been extensively documented for a number of countries 
(Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin 1986)11. Second, this transformation in agricultural methods 
of production should be accompanied by a shift of labour from agriculture to industry. It is 
well known that in most countries periods of agricultural transformation and industrialisation 
were accompanied by large scale labour movement. For instance, in the US agricultural workers
11 For instance, in the US the sharp rise in total factor productivity growth in agriculture between the 1860s 
and World War 1 was accompanied by the increased mechanisation of agricultural production (Oshima 1984; 
Kawagoe, Otsuka and Hayami 1986). Examples of such mechanisation included the widespread replacement of 
horse drawn equipment by equipment powered by internal combustion.
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comprised more than half the labour force in 1870. By the turn of the century their number 
had fallen to less than 40 percent. Finally, the model also predicts that this sectoral shift of 
labour should be driven by changes in agricultural methods in production. However, this last 
prediction is difficult to test since changes in agricultural and industrial production have been 
near simultaneous in most countries.
Whilst proposition 1 identifies the relationship between landowners’ choice of agricultural 
technology and the level of industrialisation in an economy, it is silent regarding the determi­
nants of landowners’ choice of agricultural technology. To examine this I first characterise the 
relationship between the choice of an agricultural technology and factor prices in the economy. 
To focus on the aggregate effects of landowners’ decentralised investment decisions I make a
large economy assumption. That is, I assume that no single landowner’s investment decision
can influence factor prices in the economy.
The final demand for variety x  in the economy is
■ - © '  I
where E T is the total expenditure on manufactures, and potentially consists of consumer
N
and agricultural sector expenditure. Consumer expenditure12 is given by ^  (1 —v)yj. Use of the
j=l
advanced agricultural technology generates an agricultural sector expenditure on manufactures 
of K,Pa units. Therefore, Er may be written as:
Eb =  ( 1 - i / ) ( ( L - %  +  1) (4.6)
Ea = (1 — v)((L — rfwa +  1) +  KvPa
Combining equations (4.5) and (4.6) we get
I -  v
Pb =  and pa = ------------- n z —  (4.7)
VUbX vna{x -  na~e k)
Changes in n affect p via three channels. For a constant ET, imperfect substitutability
12 Given identical homothetic preferences, total consumer demand simply aggregates individual consumer’s 
demand functions.
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between industrial varieties implies that the efficiency of manufactures production is increasing 
in the number of varieties produced13. Therefore P  falls as n  rises. For firm i this fall translates 
into a negative product market effect since the profitability associated with producing variety 
i is reduced. This, in turn, reduces p.
On the other hand, a rise in n potentially creates two kinds of positive pecuniary external­
ities. A lower P  reduces the cost of using the advanced agricultural technology and makes it 
more likely that landowners will adopt the advanced technology. Conditional on landowners 
doing so, the demand for manufactures will increase. This cost (or forward) linkage between 
firms and the agricultural sector enhances firm profits, and consequently raises p. By the same 
logic, an increase in n also raises consumer expenditure on manufactures (demand or (backward) 
linkage) and thereby p.
The higher is n, the smaller is the negative price effect. For large enough n the positive 
externalities associated with the use of the advanced technology can outweigh the negative 
product market effect. This implies that landowners’ choice of agricultural technology is af­
fected by the relative strengths of the negative product market effect and positive pecuniary 
externalities.
Proposition 2: Landowners optimal investment decision varies with the strength of inter­
sector linkages (as defined by k) such that,
1
(i) Landowners invest in the advanced technology if  k < (1 — 7 )n£ -1
1
(ii) Landowners invest in the basic technology i f  k > (1 — 7 )ria- 1
(Hi) Multiple investment equilibria exist such that landowners either invest in the basic or the 
advanced technology if
(1 -  7 )rc<£e_1) > k  > (1 — 7 )n^e-1)
Proposition 2 tells us that for low values of k the advanced agricultural technology minimises 
landowner’s factor costs14. Irrespective of other landowners’ investment decision, a landowner’s 
best response is to invest in the advanced technology. This leads to an unique advanced agri­
13 Given imperfect substitutability between varieties, the lower is n the more intensively consumers substitute 
for missing inputs in their consumption of the manufactures aggregate.
14 The factor prices and labour demand associated with the modern technology are lower than those associated 
with the basic technology and the additional manufacturing aggregate demand of k units is also low.
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cultural technology investment equilibrium. However, as >  0 this is not true for high values 
of k . Specifically, for high enough k  the positive pecuniary externalities are insufficient to com­
pensate for the higher factor prices associated with the use of the advanced technology. In this 
case investing in the basic agricultural technology is a dominant strategy for every landowner.
For intermediate values of k  increasing returns in the manufacturing sector combined with 
the possibility of pecuniary externalities creates the possibility of multiple investment equilibria. 
If landowners invest in the basic technology, then few industrial varieties are produced at a 
relatively high cost. Given the resulting price structure, a landowner’s best response is to 
invest in the basic technology. The result is an investment equilibrium in which all landowners 
invest in the basic technology. If landowners instead invest in the advanced technology more 
industrial varieties are produced. This reduces the cost associated with adoption of the advanced 
technology. In addition, consumer demand for manufactures rises. This makes the combination 
of landowners investing in advanced technology and a higher level of industrialisation a self 
sustaining outcome for the economy.
The economy’s level of industrialisation depends on landowners’ choice of agricultural tech­
nology. In a world with no externalities, we would expect landowners to invest in the most 
efficient technology. However, this Coasian rationale may fail to hold in the presence of pe­
cuniary externalities as the market prices may not signal the true resource cost of alternative 
investment decisions. This, in turn, creates the possibility of multiple investment equilibria. 
Coupled with a coordination failure among landowners, this can lead to landowners’ investing 
in the relatively inefficient agricultural technology.
That an economy may be stuck at low levels of industrialisation due to investors inability 
to coordinate investment has been the subject of recent ‘big push’ models of industrialisation15 
(Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989b). ‘Big push’ models examine the relationship between 
investors decisions in the industrial sector and the economy’s level of industrialisation. This 
chapter extends the ambit of such research by focussing on the relationship between landowners 
choice of agricultural investment and the level of industrialisation in the economy. It identifies
15 A number of different economic environments in which coordination failures among investors may arise have 
been identified in the literature. For instance, an economy in which production is characterised by increasing 
returns to scale may have multiple equilibria if technological externalities (Romer 1990), demand complimenta- 
rities (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989b) or interfirm linkages leading to division of labour (Rodriguez Clare 
1996) exist.
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reasons for why changes in methods of production in agriculture may affect both agricultural 
productivity and industrialisation. This line of research is also related to papers by Matsuyama 
(1992a) and Duranton (1998). These authors examine the role of agricultural productivity in 
economic development, but differ from this chapter in that they consider changes in agricultural 
productivity to be exogenous.
This chapter considers an economy’s level of agricultural productivity as endogenous. I t ’s 
predictions regarding the determinants of agricultural innovation are consistent with existing 
empirical evidence which suggest that the adoption of new agricultural technologies is often 
associated with significant externalities (Besley and Case 1993). Our model predicts that the 
existence of such externalities creates the possibility of an investment coordination failure in 
the agricultural sector. This, in turn, limits processes of economic development for two reasons. 
First, efficient agricultural technologies may not be adopted. Second, the economy’s level of 
industrialisation may be adversely affected.
4.3 Coordination, Welfare and the Political Process
A common policy conclusion in most ‘big push’ models is that the possibility of investment 
coordination failures creates a role for the government as a coordinator of economic activity. 16 
For example Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989b) write, ‘The analysis may have implications 
for the role of government in the development process. First, a program that encourages 
industrialisation in many sectors simultaneously can substantially boost income and welfare 
even when investment in any one sector appears unprofitable. ’17
The example of successful government led coordination usually cited in this literature is
16 An early argument for this was offered by Scitovsky (1954), ‘In the market economy prices are the signalling 
device that informs each person of other people’s economic decision and thus guides production and investment 
decisions. Market prices however reflect the economic situation as it is and not as it will be. For this reason they 
are more useful for coordinating current production decisions .. than .. for coordinating investment decisions 
which have delayed effects .. and should be governed by what the future economic situation is expected to be .. 
hence the belief that there is need either for centralised investment planning or some additional communication 
system to supplement the pricing system as a signalling device.’
17In a similar vein Rodrik (1996 ) writes,‘In such settings, government policy may have a role to play in helping 
speed up the transition to the high income equilibrium. In an influential book Wade (1990) also argued for such 
a ‘governed market’ interpretation of the East Asian miracle. He writes,‘they (the East Asian governments) 
probably helped those conditions (of growth) to be realised and sustained. The way remains open for a reasonable 
person to believe that governing the market is too important to ignore in even a parsimonious explanation of 
East Asian success.’
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the East Asian miracle (Rodrik 1996). A number of East Asian countries saw a sharp increase 
in their growth rates in the 1960s and 1970s (World Bank 1993). During this period the gov­
ernments in many of these countries were actively involved in overseeing the form and level 
of investment undertaken by the private sector. For instance, Japan’s Ministry of Interna­
tional Trade and Industry provided investment relevant information to the private sector via 
deliberation councils. In Korea, a similar job was performed by chabeols (Amsden 1989).
The generalisability of such policies to other countries, however, remains unclear. Theoreti­
cally, it is unclear why investors should find it harder to coordinate investment so as to achieve 
the superior outcome (on this, see Matsuyama 1992b). Or to put it another way, these models 
suggest that countries should randomly switch between the good and bad equilibrium. How­
ever, a large macroeconomics literature testifies to the fact that a country’s initial conditions 
are an important determinant of its subsequent growth performance (Benabou 1996). Further 
there axe numerous examples of countries where government attempts to direct private sector 
investment was an abysmal failure. For instance, while both India and South Korea went in 
for government led investment planning in the late 1950s, only South Korea saw a subsequent 
takeoff in productivity. One reason could be that the resource base of countries where gov­
ernment led investment planning failed was inadequate to support large scale industrialisation. 
However, an alternative explanation is that the form and level of policy intervention adopted 
by some countries was inappropriate.
This section examines the merits of the latter argument. To do so, it focuses on the re­
lationship between an economy’s initial asset distribution, the choice of policy-maker and the 
possibility of policy led coordination of investment. 18 To simplify the analysis I assume that
i i
(i) multiple investment equilibria exist in the economy (i.e. (1  — 7 )na~e) > k, > ( 1  — 7 )n^1-E)) 
and (ii) absent coordination landowners invest in the basic technology.
To examine how a country’s income distribution affects the possibility of government led co­
ordination of investment activity two alternative income distributions (or societies) are considered— 
equal and unequal. 19 In an equal society citizens enjoy identical property rights’ and earn yj =
18 There exists a related literature which analyses the dynamics of industrialisation (Matsuyama 1992b, Gans 
1998 ). These papers also identify reasons for why the initial conditions of an economy may affect the level of 
industrialisation in the economy.
19As I do not consider cases in which the choice of technology alters the income distribution, the existence
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eAf .  In an unequal society citizens either own land or work as wage labourers.20 Within 
each class of citizens, there is complete homogeneity such that a landowner i  (e K — {1 , ..k}) 
owns £ units of land and earns ye = ^ ,  while a worker w (€ W  = {A: +  1, —N})  supphes 
labour units, and earns =  77^ .
The time hne of events considered is as follows. First, citizens elect a coordinator. Post 
elections the coordinator announces the parameters of a policy intervention (to be defined 
below). Then landowners invest in an agricultural technology and finally, payoffs are realised.
The political economy framework considered is the citizen candidate model (see Besley and 
Coate 1997) in which citizens choose whether to stand for election. Two key assumptions un­
derlie this model. First, the coordinator is a citizen elected from the polity. Second, candidates 
cannot commit to the form of the policy intervention prior to the election. Therefore, the 
elected coordinator will in choosing the form and level of policy intervention seek to implement 
the technology which maximises her private return. Anticipating this, citizens will condition 
their vote on the policy interventions associated with each candidate.
The analysis restricts attention to one candidate political equilibria in which a single member 
of the majority group stands for election and wins. Such an equilibrium exists as long as one 
group of citizens constitute a strict population majority and the cost of standing for election is 
not too high (for details, see Besley and Coate 1997). I assume that these conditions are always 
satisfied.
In an equal economy the elected coordinator shares the representative citizen’s identity. The 
lack of policy commitment implies that in selecting the policy intervention the policy-maker 
will seek to implement the agricultural technology r* which solves
r* = argmax —\ -P T~ ^~ v  ^ (4.8)
N v
In a unequal economy the elected coordinator will instead seek to implement the technology
of multiple Nash equilibria remains independent of the precise income distribution considered (Bergstrom and 
Varian 1985).
20That is, in an egalitarian economy aj  — (3j =  V? e  J\f. In a polarised economy for all landowners otj =  0
and Pj =  \ -  For all workers ctj =  -^^and /?• =  0.
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r* which solves:
r* =  argmax (x +  (1 -  X) ( ^ ) )  P ~ ^  (4.9)
where X  = {0,1}, depending on whether the elected coordinator is a landowner or a worker. 
The identity of the elected coordinator will depend on whether workers or landowners constitute 
a strict majority. The analysis considers both cases.
Finally, I define the class of policy interventions for this economy. I consider examples 
of policy interventions which satisfy two properties— (i) they are budget balancing and (ii) 
they are strongly anonymous, in the sense that any citizen’s final payoff only depends on her 
strategy.21 The specific interventions considered are described below.
Before analysing the possibility of policy led coordination of economic activity in this econ­
omy it is useful to characterise the relationship between the multiplicity of equilibria and the 
welfare ranking of these equilibria on the basis of social surplus. In this economic environment 
social surplus (S S ) is defined as the sum of citizens’ indirect utilities, and is given as—
(4.10)
Total social surplus in the economy is increasing in the number of industrial varieties pro­
duced and decreasing in the strength of inter-sector linkages (as captured by k). The former 
effect arises from consumers’ ‘love of variety’, and the latter from the fact that > 0. If inter­
sectoral linkages are very strong then the negative price effect may overwhelm the positive love 
of variety effect such that the advanced technology will fail to maximise social surplus.
L em m a 1 : Use of the advanced agricultural technology maximises social surplus in the multiple 
equilibria regime
In general, the multiplicity of equilibria in the economy is independent of the welfare ranking 
of equilibria. The former is engendered by the possible existence of pecuniary externalities 
combined with increasing returns to scale in manufactures production. The latter depends on 
the relative price and output increases associated with the use of the advanced technology.
1
E l-u
and SSa = 1
v{nac~xx  — k)
V l - i / 1/ l — i/
21 See Piketty (1993) for a discussion of the realism of this assumption.
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Therefore, the advanced technology maximises social surplus only if the efficiency gains from 
reduced labour use outweigh the potential price increases associated with its use. Lemma 1 
tells us that this always holds in our model.
This result suggests that in face of a coordination failure a benevolent social planner with 
access to lump sum tax and transfers should be able to implement the Pareto superior outcome 
for the economy. However, we shall argue below that (i) political economy concerns and (ii) 
reasonable assumptions regarding the set of feasible policy instruments often limit an elected 
policy-maker’s ability to affect such coordination.
The rest of this section proceeds as follows. I first characterise investment coordination in a 
socialised economy. Whilst the actual coordination of economic activity is trivial, the analysis 
helps identify the relationship between an economy’s income distribution and the welfare im­
plications of government led coordination. After this, I consider government led coordination 
in an economy with decentralised investment.
I assume that in the absence of government led coordination landowners invest in the basic 
technology. Therefore, in comparing the welfare implications of government led coordination the 
post coordination investment outcome is always compared to the basic technology equilibrium.
4.3 .1  S oc ia lisa tion  o f  Investm en t
Investment in the economy is socialised if the elected policy-maker directly invests in the agri­
cultural technology. In this case, the sequence of events in the economy is- a single candidate 
from the majority group stands for election and is elected coordinator.22 She then directly 
invests in the agricultural technology.
R em ark: In an equal economy socialisation of investment achieves a Pareto superior outcome.
The elected policy-maker’s payoff is a constant share of the social surplus. She will, therefore, 
invest in the agricultural technology which maximises social surplus. From Lemma 1 we know 
this is the advanced technology. As citizens returns coincide with the coordinator’s this delivers
22This equilibrium can be justified as follows: by assumption the policymaker cannot commit to the choice 
of agricultural technology during the election campaign. Therefore, citizens’ will anticipate candidate’s policy 
preferences and vote for the candidate who shares their preferences. For low entry costs this will lead to an 
equilibrium in which a candidate from the population majority group will stand for election and win. Anticipating 
this outcome no other candidate will stand for election.
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a Pareto improvement for the economy.
P ro p o sitio n  3: In a unequal economy socialisation of investment never yields a Pareto superior 
outcome. Instead either a worker is elected coordinator and the no coordination outcome results, 
or a landowner is elected coordinator, the advanced technology is chosen and workers are worse
off:
Proposition 3 is particularly striking given that the advanced technology maximises social 
surplus in the economy (Lemma 1). Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of the fact that 
the use of the advanced technology reduces the relative price of manufactures. This raises 
landowners profit. However, the price wage equality in the economy23 implies that the choice 
of the advanced technology leaves workers worse off. Therefore, depending on the demographic 
composition of the polity one of two outcomes result. Either a landowner is elected policy­
maker, the advanced technology is chosen and workers are worse off, or a worker is elected and 
the use of the less efficient basic technology persists.
Our finding that industrialisation may leave some group of citizens worse off is in marked 
contrast to most ‘big push’ models. Our results suggest that the reason for this derives from 
the distributional consequences of industrialisation. As the price of manufactures varies across 
technologies, changes in the agricultural technology affect the terms of trade between agriculture 
and industry. This affects the well-being of workers and landowners differentially, such that the 
choice of the advanced technology leaves a subset of citizens worse off.
Since total social surplus is higher under the advanced technology, one may hope to avoid 
the adverse distributional consequences associated with use of the advanced technology by the 
appropriate choice of a redistributive policy. Therefore, I examine the case where the coordina­
tor selects a policy intervention V  which includes the choice of agricultural technology (r), and 
the parameters of an anonymous budget balancing tax and transfer schedule. The parameters 
of the tax and transfer schedule are denoted by (£, T) and satisfy the budget constraint (that is, 
t Vj = N T ). The coordinator’s indirect utility from selecting the policy vector V  =  (r; (t, T)) 
is denoted as uc(r; (t ,T )).
Both in an equal and in an unequal society with a landowner elected coordinator the equi­
23This was derived from a firm’s break even condition, and is given by equation (4.1).
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librium policy outcome is {a;(0 ,0)}. In an equal economy, zero redistribution is optimal as 
citizens enjoy the same income. In a unequal economy, with the advanced technology in use, 
a landowner’s income is higher than a worker’s (i.e. 7ra > wa — for details, see the proof of 
Proposition 3). Therefore, she selects zero redistribution and workers are rendered worse off. 
Hence, the possibility of redistribution fails to lead to a Pareto improvement.
The remaining case to consider is when a worker is elected policy-maker in a unequal 
economy. As 7ra > wa a worker-coordinator24 will choose V  = {a; (1 , 1 )} whenever vc(a; (1 , 1)) > 
vc(b\ (0,0)). This constitutes a Pareto superior outcome only if a landowner’s profits from using 
the basic technology are less than her share of total surplus with the advanced technology in 
use and full redistribution. Proposition 4 provides a sufficient condition for this.
P ro p o sitio n  4: Worker socialisation and redistribution yields a Pareto superior outcome 
i f  the factor returns associated with the no coordination outcome are relatively low. A sufficient 
condition for this is that the ratio of industrial labour supply to total population in the no­
coordination outcome be relatively high such that
~~ff~  >  max( ( ^  “  1 ) ,  ( 1  -  v)}
The condition identified in Proposition 4 ensures (via the labour market clearing conditions) 
that the factor returns associated with the no coordination outcome are dominated by the post 
redistribution return associated with the use of the advanced technology. If this condition is 
violated then worker socialisation may lead to the advanced technology being chosen, but with 
landowners being rendered worse off.
Therefore, even with income redistribution socialisation of investment need not lead to a 
Pareto superior outcome. The demographic composition of the economy and citizens’ relative 
preference for food and manufactures are key determinants of whether socialised investment 
and redistribution brings about industrialisation and improves individual well-being.
24The asumption that advanced technology maximises social surplus implies that vc(a\ (1,1))
129
4 .3 .2  D ecen tra lised  In vestm en t and  C oord in ation
I now analyse government led coordination when investment decisions remain decentralised, i.e. 
are chosen privately by landowners. I continue to assume that absent coordination landowners 
invest in the basic technology. To focus on the aggregate investment effects of government led 
coordination I assume that the total population size is large (N  —*■ oo), and that landowners 
and workers population shares are fixed. This has two implications for the subsequent analysis. 
First, factor prices are invariant to any single investor’s actions. Second, in situations where 
income redistribution occurs via an anonymous tax and transfer scheme changes in a citizen’s 
pre-tax income (holding other citizens income constant) do not affect the income transfer she 
receives.
The generic sequence of events considered is — a policy-maker is elected via the political 
process. She announces the parameters of a public policy intervention V. Landowners observe V  
and then invest in an agricultural technology. Citizens then receive their final payoff. I restrict 
attention to budget balancing policy interventions. In the analysis I distinguish between two 
cases, depending on whether or not the policy-maker can commit to a redistributive schedule 
prior to investment.
This section examines whether the appropriate use of a public policy intervention V  by a 
coordinator may lead to a Pareto superior outcome wherein landowners invest in the advanced 
technology. From Proposition 3 it is clear that some amount of redistribution is necessary if 
investment in the advanced technology is to constitute a Pareto improvement. Given the large 
economy assumption it is sensible to allow for such redistribution via the use of an anonymous 
tax and transfer scheme. Lemma 2 states that the sole use of such a (linear) scheme is insufficient 
to influence landowners’ investment choice.
Lem m a 2: Landowners’ investment choices cannot be affected by the sole use of a budget 
balancing anonymous tax and transfer scheme.
I prove this Lemma by showing that the basic technology equilibrium is not affected by 
the use of a tax and transfer scheme. Use of such a scheme implies that a citizen’s final 
income (denoted as y only depend on her initial income and total income in the economy 
(i.e. y*j = f(y j ,  Y”)). Conditional on other investors choosing the basic technology, an investor’s 
income {yf) is always lowered by a deviation to the advanced technology. This is as the deviation
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leaves factor prices and transfers which only condition on income outcomes unaffected. Hence, 
it cannot constitute a profitable deviation. 25
In general, multiple investment equilibria arise in situations where an individual’s optimal 
strategy depends on everyone else’s strategy (Cooper and John 1988). If a policy intervention 
is to affect coordination it must make investing in the advanced technology a dominant strategy 
for an investor (and therefore, by destroying the interdependence of investor strategies destroy 
the multiplicity of equilibria). Linear income based interventions (of the kind considered in 
Lemma 1) fail to do so.
Therefore I now consider the possibility of investment coordination via the joint use of price 
subsidies and a linear tax and transfer scheme. The restriction that policy interventions should 
not condition on any investor’s identity implies that I focus on a very simple form of price 
subsidy — the case where the coordinator announces a single set of prices for the economy (i.e. 
price subsidies are not conditioned on any single investor’s investment choice).
In an economic environment characterised by multiple equilibria it is unclear whether it is 
appropriate to impose a budget balancing requirement on the policy intervention at every stage 
of the game. Here, I simply assume that a policy intervention is feasible only if it is budget 
balancing in equilibrium. Hence I place no requirements on budget balancing off the equilibrium 
path. This is similar to the restrictions assumed in the Ramsey capital accumulation model.
The set of policy interventions available to the coordinator is denoted as V  =  {p, (t,T)}, 
where p = {pT,PT} is the vector of announced prices and (t,T )  are the parameters of an 
anonymous tax and transfer scheme. From the equilibrium characterisation we know that 
Pa < Pb and pa < Pb (for details, see proof of proposition 3). Therefore the following sequence 
of events constitutes an equilibrium in an equal society.
A citizen j  stands for election and is elected coordinator. She announces the set of policy 
interventions: {p, (t,T )}  = {(pa,Pa) , (0,0)}. At these prices and given zero redistribution a 
landowner’s dominant strategy is to invest in the advanced technology. Therefore, in equilib­
rium all landowners invest in the advanced technology such that the announced prices are the
25 If the economy is so small that an investor’s actions affect her transfer then the same argument holds. In 
this case, the total income and hence transfers are reduced. It is also worth noting that the reasoning for Lemma
2 is similar to the argument provided by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989b) for why profit spillovers are never 
sufficient to engender multiple equilibria.
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market equilibrium prices. Therefore, the announced policy intervention is budget balancing 
and coordination via the use of price subsidies leads to a Pareto superior outcome. As no 
redistribution can be mantained as an optimal strategy for the coordinator, this equilibrium is 
robust to whether the level of redistribution is announced before or after investment.
Now consider a unequal society in which a landowner is elected coordinator. Her optimal 
policy intervention is {(pa,Pa) , (0,0)}. By the same logic as above, faced with this price 
schedule landowners will invest in the advanced technology. However, unlike in an equal society 
such coordination leaves workers worse off. Once again, this equilibrium is robust to whether 
the level of redistribution is announced before or after investment.
The final case is when a worker is elected coordinator in a unequal society. We are interested 
in identifying whether a worker coordinator can choose policies such that a Pareto superior 
equilibrium in which the advanced technology is selected results. In this case it is necessary to 
distinguish between two cases. First, when prior to investment the coordinator cannot commit 
to a redistributive schedule other than her most preferred one. Second, when such policy 
commitment is possible.
It is clear that conditional on investors selecting the advanced technology a worker coor­
dinator favours full redistribution. In the absence of policy commitment this implies that the 
coordinator will choose full redistribution whenever landowners invest in the advanced technol­
ogy. Lemma 3 tells us that this, in turn, renders coordination infeasible.
Lem m a 3: In the absence of policy commitment if prices are subsidised such that investors 
select the advanced technology then the policy maker will select full redistribution. However, the 
policy intervention {p, (t ,T )} =  {(pa,Pa) > (1? 7^ 7)} ex an^e infeasible.
The proof is as follows- the large economy assumption combined with full redistribution 
implies that the policy intervention {(p*, P * ) , (1, ^ ) }  leaves a landowner’s final income inde­
pendent of her actions. Therefore, both investing in the basic or in the advanced technology 
constitute a (weakly) dominant strategy for a landowner. Hence, the existence of multiple 
investment equilibria is robust to the implementation of this policy intervention. Since the 
proposed policy intervention does not satisfy the budget constraint in the basic investment 
equilibria, it is ex ante infeasible.
This Lemma has important implications for the possibility of investment coordination via
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the use of price subsidies. It is often the case that policymaker’s cannot credibly commit to 
the parameters of the redistributive policy prior to investment. Lemma 3 tells us that in such 
situations coordination via the use of price subsidies cum redistribution is infeasible in this case.
The second case to consider is when there exist political institutions capable of enforcing 
full commitment. In this case, prior to investment the coordinator can credibly commit to less 
than full redistribution is feasible. In which case proposition 4 tells us that for some parameter 
values there will exist a t G ]0,1[ such that the combination of price subsidies and income 
redistribution achieves investment coordination and a Pareto superior outcome obtains for the 
economy.Proposition 4 identified a sufficient condition for workers and landowners to be better
off with the advanced technology in use and full redistribution. Since 7ra >  wa it follows that 
landowners are better off with the advanced technology in use and t < 1. Therefore, we only 
need to check whether there exists some t  <  1 for which workers are better off with the advanced 
technology in use. It is clear that there will exist some t = 1 — e (with e sufficiently small) such 
that this holds.
Therefore, if the conditions identified in Proposition 4 hold then the following investment 
sequence constitutes an equilibrium. The worker coordinator announces p = (pa',Pa) and 
t  =  1 — e. Faced with this policy intervention the dominant strategy for a landowner is to invest 
in the advanced technology. In equilibrium the price subsidy scheme is budget balancing, and 
a Pareto superior outcome results for the economy.
Overall, the results in this section provide mixed support for government led coordination 
programmes. It is clear that public policy can be used to achieve coordination of investment 
decisions in the economy. However, the success of any such public policy scheme in realising a 
Pareto superior outcome for the economy depends on a number of factors— the initial conditions 
of the economy (or history), the policymaker’s identity, and on how successful the chosen policy 
intervention is in altering an individual investor’s strategy profile (or expectations).
133
4.4 Discussion
This chapter puts forward an explanation for the lack of industrialisation of some underdevel­
oped agrarian economies— the possibility of a coordination failure amongst investors in the 
agricultural sector. In such situations government led coordination of investment activity leads 
to a Pareto superior outcome in equal societies. However, this is not always true for unequal 
societies.
There are atleast two reasons for this. First, in an unequal society the most efficient agri­
cultural technology may fail to maximise citizens’ returns. Therefore an elected policy-maker 
concerned with maximising her own private returns may not select the socially optimal policy. 
This is true even when we allow for the possibility of redistribution. The second reason relates 
to the interaction between a policymaker’s choice of redistributive policy and the existence of 
multiple equilibria. Multiple investment equilibria arise when an investor’s optimal investment 
choice depends on all other investors investment decision. In the chapter we show that policy 
interventions which leave factor prices unaffected and (or) are associated with transfer based on 
population averages (e.g. linear income based interventions) will, in general, fail to coordinate 
investment. Importantly, if the set of policy instruments inclume income bsed redistribution 
and policy commitment is not possible then these may be the only kind of transfers which axe 
feasible. This, in turn, may render the possibility of government led coordination of economic 
activity infeasible.
This analysis suggests two avenues of future research. First, it would be interesting to take 
some of the predictions of this theory to the data. The main empirical prediction that one 
would wish to test is the potential existence of multiple equilibria in technology adoption in 
agriculture (for an overview of the empirical literature on technology adoption in agriculture see 
Besley and Case 1993). As is well known, the main problem with a direct test of this hypothesis 
is that the counterfactual (i.e. the existence of an alternative equilibrium) is never observed for 
the same economy.
However, it remains possible to undertake indirect tests of this hypothesis. A necessary 
condition for the existence of multiple investment equilibria is that any single landowners’ 
returns from adopting a new agricultural technology should be increasing in the total number 
of users. Therefore, one possibility would be a two stage estimation procedure using farm
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level data on agricultural technology. At the first stage, one could estimate the price of the 
manufactures input as a function of the number of farmers’ using the advanced technology (i.e. 
the technology which uses manufactures more intensively). In the second stage, we can then 
estimate a landowner’s probability of using a technology as a function of the estimated price.
The second avenue for future research suggested by this chapter is a more detailed analy­
sis of policy-making in economic environments characterised by multiple investment equilibria. 
Economists have noted the existence of multiple equilibria in many economic markets (Cooper 
and John 1988). In many of these cases moving the economy out of the ‘low level equilibrium’ 
constitutes a Pareto improvement for all citizens. However, analyses of the relevant policies 
which may be used to ensure such a shift have been limited .26 In addition, the existing liter­
ature analysing government led coordination of investment activity has tended to ignore two 
important constraints on policy implementation. The first is political economy constraints. 
These have been analysed in some detail in this chapter. The second set of constraints which 
arise in the case of price based policy intervention are the appropriate budget balancing con­
ditions which such a policy intervention should satisfy both on and off the equilibrium path. 
This chapter has assumed away this problem but clearly it merits further academic attention.
26Attention has however been restricted to the class of linear redistributive schemes. Clearly, it will be inter­
esting to explore a wider class of policy interventions.
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4.5 Appendix
P roof of Proposition 1
From equation (4.1) pT =  wT. This, together with the wage equation (equation (4.3)) gives
us:
rib = —— ~ and na = —— — (4.11)x  x
As 7  <  1 , the number of industrial varieties produced is strictly higher when landowners use 
the advanced technology. Since food production is unaltered, aggregate production efficiency 
rises ■
P roof o f Proposition 2
Consider an investment equilibrium in which all landowners invest in the basic technology. 
We examine landowner j 's  incentives to instead invest in the advanced technology. She will not 
do SO iff PjTTb > PjTta or
1 — Wb >  1 — 7wb — K-Pb
Substituting for Wb and Pb a necessary condition for an equilibrium in which all landowners 
invest in the basic technology is
k > (1 — 7)725 (e_1) (4.12)
Now consider an investment equilibrium in which all landowners invest in the advanced 
technology. Landowner j  will not deviate to investing in the basic technology iff 0j7ra > (3jTTa 
or
(1 -  7Wa ~  KPa) > (1 -  Wa)
this simplifies to
k < ( 1  -  j ) n a <e-^  (4-13)
Comparing (4.12) and (4.13) a s n a >  rib the economy is characterised by multiple investment
equilibria if
(1 -  7 )71^  < k* < (1 -  7 )71? ^  (4.14)
(sufficiency) From equations (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14) , the sufficient condition for a unique
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equilibrium in which landowners invest in the basic technology is
(£- i )
k  >  ( 1  -  7 ) no
and a sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium in which landowners invest in the ad­
vanced technology is
k  < (1 -  7 )71^  x)
Proof o f Lemma 1
The advanced technology maximises social surplus if Pb > Pa or
k < x(ria~l — nl~x) (4.15)
From (4.14) and (4.15) it follows that the advanced technology maximises social surplus in the 
M.E. regime if
x(na 1 -  n l  1) >  (1  -  7 )n {a x) 
rearranging this expression we get:
> -— -  (4.16)
n e —1 X
note that 4-2 =  (■L ^  = n a — rib- Substituting this for the RHS in (4.16) and solving we
get
1 1
„  E — 1  „  £  — 1TLa ^  T^b
which always holds. Hence the advanced technology maximises social surplus in the ME 
regime ■
Proof o f Proposition 3
We first note that in the M.E. regime pa < pb- The reasoning is straightforward. From
1
Lemma 1 we know that Pa < Pb where PT = tIt~£Pt • Further proposition 1 tells us that 
na > rib. Therefore, Pa < Pb iff Pa < Pb
In this proof we show that the choice of advanced technology by the coordinator can never
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lead to a Pareto superior outcome. The reason is that use of the advanced technology raises 
landowners indirect utility but reduces workers. That is:
LWa p - ( i - v )  <  w. bL- . p - ^ )  and p - ( i - i ' )  >  (4 17\
N - k ^ a N  — k b and k ^ a > k ^ b ^ U)
For notational simplicity, the rest of the proof will drop the wage and land rent share terms 
(i.e. (j^Tfc) and (£)) as they appear on both sides of the two inequalities respectively.
From Lemma 1 we know that Pb > Pa- Therefore, a necesary condition for waPa^l~ ^  < 
w6P “ (1_I/) to hold is that wa < Wb. Importantly, this is also a sufficient condition. To see this 
note that waP a ^~ v  ^ < u ^ P ^ 1-1^
p( l —v) p( 1—v)
E l >  _!>--------^
Pa Pb
Since na > rib and pb > pa this inequality holds. Therefore wa < Wb is a necessary and 
sufficient for waP a ^ ~ ^  < u/&P^1-1^
On the other hand, a sufficient condition for 7TaPa^1 ^  > ^  t P ^ 1-1^  is that 7ra >  'Kb-
Therefore, we have proved our main claim if we can show that (i) wa < u>b and (ii) wa < Wb 
=> 7ra > Kb- This combined with our above argument implies that in ME regime equation (4.17) 
holds.
To see (i) note that wT = pT. As pa < Pb in the multiple equilibrium regime, wa <Wb-
1
(ii) Kb < 7 r a => (7wa +  kPo) < Wb => (7 +  K,ria~£ )wa < Wb- Therefore
wa < Wb and Ka >  'Kb (4-18)
if max Waiiy +  KTla £)wa < Wb- Clearly if ( 7  +  a c £) <  1 , then the sufficient condition for 
(4.18) to hold is that w a <  Wb.
1 1
Note that ( 7  +  Kria~E ) < 1 = > k <( 1  — 7  )na- 1 . But this condition always holds in the
multiple equilibrium regime. Hence, wa < Wb implies that Ka > 'Kb-
Therefore, the choice of the advanced technology reduces worker indirect utility and rasies
landowners indirect utility ■
Proof o f Proposition 4
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Note that 7ra >  wa. Therefore conditional on investing in the advanced technology, a 
worker-coordinator will always undertake full redistribution. This implies that relative to the no 
coordination outcome the policy intervention (a; (1, constitutes a Pareto superior outcome27 
iff
J p L p - V - v ' )  < - i - p - d - 1') (4.19)
N - k  b N v  v '
wbL  p (i_zy) _J_ p (i-i/)
N - k  a N v  b
By assumption, Pb > Pa. Hence a sufficient condition for (4.19) to hold is that 
For the policy intervention (a; (1, j ^ )  to lead to a pareto superior outcome for the economy 
it must also be the case that
Kb p - ( l-u) 1 p _(i-u)
ifc 6 <  N v a
a sufficient condition for which is 7  ^ <  77^ => k <  -Jj.
Combining these two we have a sufficient condition for which simplifies to
1 wbL  (1 -  wb)
—  > m a x {— i — j — } (4-20)
Substituting for wb this condition (4.20) simplifies to
L — 1 rvL — 1 ( 1  — iAL  ._ r >max{_ _ , _ _ }
that is, the ratio of workers in the industrial sector to the total population in the no-coordination 
equilibrium be sufficiently large ■
Proof of Lemma 2
To prove this lemma we show that the existence of the ‘basic technology’ investment equilib­
rium is invariant to the use of a policy interevntion V  £{£,T}. We show this is true even when
total transfers are affected by an investor’s own action. It is easy to check that the argument
goes through even when the latter doesn’t hold.
2 7 where is the transfer accruing to any individual when t =  1, and T  satisfies the budget constraint
N
condition: t ^ V j  =  NT.  
j =l
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Consider the case where a policy intervention {£, T} is introduced. Conditional on all other 
investors choosing the basic technology, we are interested in examining whether it may now 
be profitable for the marginal investor j  to deviate to investing in the advanced technology, 
and a policy intervention. The use of an anonymous tax and transfer scheme implies that
yCj = f ( y j , Y). We now examine how y*j is affected by such a deviation. To do so, note that
W j  _  d f ( )  0 /Q  d Y  
d y j  d y j  “r  d Y  d y j
Budget balancing requires that (i)^jjp =  and >  0. Further the large economy
assumption implies that starting from an investment equilibrium changes in any single investor’s
investment decision cannot affect prices. Hence, >  0
dy^Therefore ^  > 0. That is, a deviation from an investment equilibrium which reduces 
yj will reduce y?. Hence, investor j  will never choose to deviate from the basic technology 
equilibrium ■
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Fig. 4.3 Change in Agricultural Productivity (Production Indices/ Agricultural Land Use) vs Change in Agricultural Capital-Labour Ratio 3
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